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The guiding impulse of this essay is to examine a concept that 
has perplexed philosophers for centuries. That concept is morality. 
Though it is true that philosophy deals with subjects so extremely 
complicated and, at the same time, of such a general nature that it is 
certainly not unusual (and more usually it is the rule) for there to 
be difficulties and discrepancies in any comprehensive position; it 
seems that the problems uncovered in attempting to make sense of 
morality are indicative of something more than this perennial 
difficulty. 
It is primarily in the discrepancy between moral theory and 
moral experience that these problems become most apparent. Moral 
theories do not seem to be able to clearly and satisfactorily account 
for moral experience. Some important element of moral experience is 
invariably slighted. 
It will be the aim of this thesis to show that the failure of 
moral theories is, at least in part, traceable to the peculiarities of 
morality itself. Morality is an ambiguous concept. It contains two 
elements -- order and intution -- which are ambiguous in themselves and 
which also have an ambiguous relationship. The experienced need for 
order, though essentially moral, can become immoral if it is isolated 
from intuition. Likewise, the experience of intuition which takes 
1 
place outside an established order is subject to chaos and solipsism 
and hence to error, misapprehension and self-deceit. In separation 
these two elemen~s tend towards distortion and immorality yet they 
resist combination. Order and intuition are both important in under-
standing mO'rality yet they are, in some s.enses, antithetical. 
Hans Castorp, a character in Thomas Mann's novel~ The Magic 
Mountain, might be seen to refer to the two moral elements of order 
and intuition when he claims: "There are two paths to life: one is 
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the regular o~e, direct, honest. The oth~r is bad, it leads through 
death-- that is the 'spirituel' ~-my." 1 The two moral elements of 
intuition and order can be understood as implying two different moral 
sensibilities and two different approaches to morality. In one approach, 
the sensibility of order dominates the sensibility of intuition. In 
the other approach, the opposite is true. However, both of these 
approaches contain something of the other. In fact, both of these 
approaches are attracted to one another. And both of them contain 
vices and virtues peculiar to themselves. 
An understanding of these two paths will be helpful in explaining 
several troubling things about morality. It will help explain the 
frustration of trying to be clear about moral experience without being 
false to it. It will help explain why many theories of morality are 
unsatisfactory. It will help explain the duality and ambivalence of 
moral experience. This thesis will be an exploration into morality by 
way of these two paths. 
The path which signifies the way of the moral sensibility most 
attuned to order will be explored by reference to the works of four 
men: Immanuel Kant's Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's The Social Contract, G. E. Moore's Principia 
Ethica, andEdward Westermarck's Ethical Relativity. These will be 
used to represent a.spectrum of views from the strict absolutism of 
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Kant to the- social relativism of Westermarck. They will be found to 
emphasize either rigid universal or rigid social rules, both of which 
point towards a general imposition of moral rule~ regardless of par-
ticular individuals and situations. In stressing traits of universality, 
majority opinion, or custom (as they variously do) moral theories tend 
to reject the immediate insights and intuitions of theindividual in 
preference to order. 
· In this context "order" is meant to indicate a regularity of 
life which results from adherence to a clearly defined directive or 
set of directives used in decision making. Thus, it is possible to 
distinguish a similar moral sensibility in seemingly disparate views. 
It is their common attempt to actually enumerate or otherwise explicitly 
state rules which will unambiguously guide moral behavior which is the 
hallmark of the orderly sensibility. What is sought, at all costs, are 
definitive boundaries between what is moral and what immoral. The 
burden of morality is placed on "rules" and not on individual moral 
decisions. Rules define a stark contrast of black and white. Such a 
view makes for an assurance not possible for those who recognize the 
presence of grey. In striving for clarity, however, the moral sensi-
bility dominated by a love of order shows itself to be insensitive to 
the subtleties of moral choices. While striving for unambiguity, it is 
not itself unambiguously good. 
On the other hand, the concept of "intuition" will be used to 
indicate moral regions which are not marked by the stark contrasts 
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implied by "order." As opposed to the technical meaning of intuition 
found in Descartes and others "moral" intuition is not the region of 
11 clear and distinct ideas. 11 Within the context of this thesis 
11 intution11 will be used in a manner more closely related to the homely 
phrase 11woman's intuition" than to what Descartes had in mind. The 
primary reason for distinguishing 11moral11 intuition from other uses of 
the term "intuition'' is that moral intuition is not marked by indubi-
tability. It is, rather, the sensibiliity of order which insists on 
indubitablity. The moral sensibility guided by intuition is less able 
and less willing to make hard and fast distinctions. 
Any liberties herein taken with the term "intuition" are meant to 
reflect the special requirements of morality. 11Moral intuition" cannot 
be understood without accounting for an emotional element as well as an 
epistemological one. Moral intuition is not merely a "knowing11 or a 
11 seeing" it is an emotional response which is a "knowing." Moral 
intuition is not only a question of intellect, but a question of 
emotion as well.· It is an understanding confirmed by the heart rather 
than a knowledge which is the result of calculation and rational 
demonstration. Such understanding need not be irrational, but rational-
ity is not its primary attribute. 
· Because it represents an emotional attachment, moral intuition 
cannot always be restrained by the rational and the calculative. It is 
chiefly supported by an act of will. Unlike a rational demonstration 
which can be accomplished once and for all; or a law which can be in-
voked again and again, a moral intuition must be continually reasserted 
and re-experienced in order to maintain its hold on a man's conscience. 
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It is due to this blending of feeling, knowing and willing that 
the intuitive sensibility cannot acknowledge moral claims on the basis 
of rigid universal or social rules. Morality is not the result of 
adherence to an abstract code, but an attachment to goodness confirmed 
by the emotions. Because it cannot guide itself by codes and inviolable 
rules, . this sensibility must feel its way along the path of morality 
in the dark -- and it is a rare man who can walk in the dark without 
stumbling. The sensibility of intuition is acknowledged to be dangerous. 
The path which signifies the way of the moral sensibility most 
attuned to intuition will be explored chiefly with the help of Thomas 
Mann's novel, The MagiF Mountain. Reference will also be made to the 
works ofHermann Hesse, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and Friedrich Nietzsche--
all of whom represent a view of morality which, though not intuitionist 
in the strict philosophical sense, displays an emphasis on the individ-
ual and his personal insights into morality which is the hallmark of 
moral intuition. This emphasis on the individual and the emotional 
usually takes the form of rebellion against the rigidness of social, 
conventional and absolute morality. 
The rebellion against the social, the conventional and the 
absolute, as reflected in the works of these men, has been well docu-
mented. The result of this rebellion has been the creation of a new 
literary type commonly called the anti-hero. The anti-hero is a study 
in ambiguity himself. He exudes a strange mixture of immorality and 
moral indignation which is, to say the least, striking. Consider the 
tirade of Goethe's Werther: 
Oh, you sensible people! Passion! Drunkenness! 
Madness! You stand there so calm, so unsympathetic, 
you moral people! ..• Shame on you, you sober 
people! Shame on you, wise men! 2 
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This statement of rebellion against morality and order is echoed in the 
works of a number of men. Another anti-hero, Dostoyevsky's Underground 
Man, begins his musings by proclaiming: "I'm a sick man •.• a mean 
man. There's nothing attractive about me." 3 But he ends them by 
saying: 
As for me, all I did was carry to the limit what 
you haven't dared to.push even halfway-- taking 
your cowardice for reasonableness, thus making your-
selves feel better. So I may still turn out to 
be more alive than you in the end.4 
Such a statement smacks of a strange "moral" superiority. 
This phenomenon of the inversion 0f morality might be referred to 
·as either the "morality of immorality" or the "immorality of morality." 
It explicitly rejects the morality of order and heralds the morality 
of the spontaneous and intuitive individual. Friedrich Nietzsche 
immediately comes to mind in such a context, His works are full of 
vehement disapproval of morality; yet it is interesting to note the 
moral tone with which he urges immorality. It is the safe "reasonable-
ness" and commonality of morality which he abhors. And judging from 
the quotations above, he. is not alone in his disgust and rejection. 
The anti-hero is symbolic of a moral rebellion against the hypocrisy, 
oppressiveness and "immorality" of the moral order. His role in the 
moral world is necessarily ambiguous since what he rejects is commonly 
accepted as "moral." Walter Strauss moves to the heart of this ambi-
guity when he speaks of "Alienation, solipsism, and madness: the 
wandering Rocks and the Scylla and Charybdis of modern literature."5 
The moral sensibility of intuition involves the risk of chaos and 
solipsism, as contrasted with the risk of ossification and externality 
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implicit in the sensibility of order. 
The.modern reaction against morality as exemplified by Nietzsche, 
Mann, and others, has understandably caused some consternation among 
moral philosophers. Ralph Barton Perry expresses his concern in his 
book, Realms of Value: 
Thomas Mann, in his Magic Mountain, had one of his 
characters, ·.the brilliant and voluble Hans Cas torp, 
propound the paradoxical opinion that morality is to 
be loqked for not 'dans la vertue, ce'est-a-dire; 
dans la raison, la discipline, les bonnes noeur, 
l~honnetete', but rather in their opposites-- 'la 
peche', ens' abandonnant au danger, ace qui est 
nuisible, a ce qui nous consume. 1 A similar para-
dox is to be found in Nietzsche's view that morality 
lies 'beyond good and evil. ' • • • Tf such confusions 
are to be avoided it is necessary to distinguish the 
qualities of fidelity, discipline, perseverance, and 
enthusiasm which lend vigor to any cult, from the 
specific content of the moral cu1t.6 
While we can agree with Professor Perry that it is important to 
pay attention to the "specific content of the moral cult," it may well 
be that an investigation into "such confusions" might add a dimension 
to the study of morality which moral philosophers have largely over-
looked. Examples of the peculiar moral sensibility recorded in much of 
modern literature, together with the dominant sensibility of order and 
clarity found in moral philosophy, gives us an insight into moral ex-
perience which helps to explain the illusive and ambiguous nature of 
morality. 
Our task then will be to show how,. in general, traditional moral 
theories have been inadequate to account for moral experience and why 
this has been the case. In addition, we will attempt to give some idea 
of what sort of factors would be needed to account for moral experience. 
Two of these factors, 'intuition and order, will be used to show the 
essential ambiguity of morality and to elucidate two distinctive moral 
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impulses as they interact with each other in moral theory and moral 
experience. The failure of moral theory to come to grips with morality 
will be traced to the impossibility of framing a theory which can clearly 
and adequately balance these factors of intuition and order. 
In the next chapter we will explore morality as a general concept 
while attempting to comprehend and describe moral experience. The 
experience of morality will be seen to contain two qualities without 
which it could not be conceived of as moral. The first quality is that 
of inspiration, The moral experience which urges men to act in 
particular ways is marked off from other lures to action by its 
inspirational quality. This quality canbe identified to some extent 
with intuition. 
The second quality is that of objectivity. The experience of 
morality as inspiring indicates more than a close attention to personal 
desires or social mores. Moral inspiration must be thought of as some-
thing which draws a person out of himself and out of unthinking con-
formity toward something greater and more perfect than himself. Such 
objectivity is expressed in the desire for a transcendent moral order. 
Moral theories, to be true to the moral experience, must find 
some way of accounting for the subjective experience of inspiration and 
the objectivity which the experience connotes. Chapter II takes up 
this theme and attempts to show some of the basic errors of moral 
theorizing in regard to the experience of morality discussed. 
The third and fourth chapters discuss various theoretical 
approaches to morality as exemplified in selected works of Immanuel 
Kant, Jean-Jacques.Rousseau, G. E. Moore, and Edward Westermarck. In 
these works we will find attempts to account for the coincidence of the 
subjective experience of inspiration and the experience of objectivity 
present in the moral experience. These works will all be seen to dis-
play the sensibility of order. Order in the moral world is expressive 
of the desire for objectivity and a recognition of the importance of 
objectivity in morality. However, in seeking order too rigorously, 
the role of intuition or inspiration will be seen to suffer eclipse. 
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The fifth chapter will take up the difficulties involved in a 
total reliance upon intuition and inspiration to produce morality. Here 
the ~henomenon of morality as rebellion against morality will be dis-
cussed. As contrasted with the overly cautious and straitened sensi-
bility of order, the sensibility of intuition insists on the highly 
personal and subjective nature of morality. As in the case of the 
orderly sensibility, it will be seen that the intuitive sensibility 
also has need of its counterpart to safeguard the individual from 
excesses. 
In the sixth chapter, we will discuss "order" and "intuition" in 
a more general way and attempt to evaluate what we have discovered 
about their roles in morality. In exploring these two moral sensibili-
ties, it will be seen that both depend upon each other and yet resist 
each other. It is this strange tension which leads to the ambiguity 
of morality. 
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CHAPTER II 
MORALITY AS A GENERAL CONCEPT 
It seems obvious from the outset that the function of morality 
is to establish some kind of criterion for discriminating between 
different possible actions. Thus, at its broadest, morality represents 
a general outlook on life which shapes the individual lives of men 
through its.po~er to direct their choices. It is a peculiar way of 
"ordering" life. If you want to know what a man values, you must 
notice not only what he says he values, but also the choices he con-
sistently makes. However, it is always possible to value things, or to 
make choices based on grounds which are not "moral." Not every way of 
ordering a life is a "moral" way. 
It seems that most people have certain explicit or implicit 
criteria in mind when they ascribe the term "moral" to their own or to 
another person's actions such that it is appropriate to call some 
actions "moral" (i.e., actions which spring from considerations which 
might properly be called "moral" as opposed to "amoral") and in-
appropriate to so name other actions. William K. Frankena suggests six 
factors whi~h seem to him to mark off the special conditions associated 
with morality. Morality must include: 
(1) Certain uforms of judgment 11 in which "particular" 
objects are said to have or not to have a certain moral 
quality, obligation, or responsibility; (2) the implica-
tion that it is appropriate and possible to give "reasons~' 
for these judgments; (3) some ''rules," ''principles,'' 
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''ideals," and "·virtues'' that can be expressed in more 
'1general judgments" and that form the background against 
which particular judgments are made and reasons given for 
them; (4) certain characteristic natural or acquired "ways 
of feeling~ that accompany these judgments, rules, and 
ideals, and help to move us to act in accordance with 
them; (5) certain 11 sanctions11 or addition~l sources of 
motivation that are also expressed in verbal judgments, 
namely holding responsible, praising, and blaming; (6) a 
11point of view" that is taken in all this judging, reason-
ing, and feeling, that is somehow different from those 
taken in prudence, art, and the like.l 
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If Frankena is right, any morality must at least lay claim to the 
ability to make moral judgments or pronouncements based upon reasons 
that derive from the application of ultimate principles, which are 
accompanied by certain feelings or emotions of "rightness;" and which 
are encouraged by the coirtcidence of social sanctions expressed in the 
form of praise and blame; all of which aim at "something" that is not 
adequately expressed as a prudential, an aesthetic,_ or a logical 
concern. 
A man intent on ordering his life in a moral fashion could then 
be expected to discriminate between different possible actions with 
some or all of these criteria in mind: (1) Is this action the result 
of the application of ultimate moral principles? (2) Does this action 
seem "good," "proper" or "correct" to me? (3) Does my society approve 
of this action? and (4) Is this action truely based on moral considera-
tions or is it more truely the result of prudential, aesthetic or 
logical concerns? 
Morality and the Individual 
In discussing morality and its relationship to the individual 
whose choices it presumably directs, three of these criteria seem 
particularly relevant. They are the second, fourth, and sixth factors 
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dealipg with the kinds of reasons and feelings which accompany moral 
actions, and the way these reasons and feelings differ from other, non-
moral, reasons and feelings. For an individual to direct his life on 
the basis of a "moral" point of view, it is indispensable that he 
think of himself as having reasons for choosing as he does. It is also 
indispensable that he be able to differentiate these reasons from other 
kinds of "non-moral" reasons that might be given for choices. This 
differentiation is based upon the presupposition implicit in moral 
experience that moral reasons cannot be reduced to prudential, 
aesthetic, or any. other non-moral reasons. This is in large part due 
to the fact that moral reasons are accompanied by certain "ways of 
feeling" which can be distinguished from feelings which might accompany 
non-moral reasons. In short, if an individual thinks of his life as 
containing a "moral" element, it is because morality is, for him, a 
distinctive activity for which distinctive reasons may be given, which 
are themselves accompanied by distinctive feelings. 
What kinds of reasons and what kinds of feelings are these dis-
tinctively "moral" reasons and feelings? If they cannot be success-
fully differentiated from other kinds of reasons and feelings then 
there may be good reason to claim that morality itself is a confused 
notion which can and should be subsumed under the heading of other 
human interests -- such as prudence, aesthetics, hedonics, etc. 
To a large extent, many modern theories of morality have done 
something very like disposing of morality as a distinctive activity. 
Curiously enough, this tendency in modern moral theory to "dispose" of 
morality has been accompanied by what has often been referred to as a 
"moral crisis~" "Morality" seems to a large degree to have lost its 
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significance as a shaper of human lives. Perhaps this coincidence is 
more than coincidental. It is, in part, the aim of this chapter to 
show that the modern moral crises is not merely coincidental with this 
tendency in modern ethical theory. 
Traditionally, there have been two types of explanations offered 
to account for the ground and origin of moral experience. The division 
has been between those who ground morality in a transcendent source, 
and thpse who insist that mdrality is a strictly human concern. The 
former believe moral laws are binding because they stem from a transcen-
dent reality. Actions are right insofar as they are consistent with 
this transcendent reality, and wrong insofar as they· are inconsistent 
with it. 
The latter insist that morality has nothing to do with transcen-
dent realities; it has rather to do with the affairs of men. In other 
words, morality is relative to the desires, needs, and wishes of men 
and cannot be determined without reference to these. Since morality is 
relevant to the satisfaction of such desires and needs, it can be 
expected to change when and as human desires and needs change. It can 
also be expected to change according to the situations in which men 
find themselves. Different situations may call for different responses 
in order to secure the objects of.men's desires and needs. 
. It is this latter view which has become more and more accepted in 
the modern world. The prevalence of this view is understandable for 
several reasons. It is understandable in the face of difficulties 
encountered in explaining how it is possible to discover transcendent 
moral laws. It is understandable seen as a reaction to the existence 
of contradictory moral laws each claiming to be 11 true. 11 It is under-
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standable in the face of the need for differing applications of moral 
rules which seem appropriately keyed to differing circumstances. And, 
finally, it is understandable within the modern framework of change and 
adaptability. Moral "relativity" fits the secular, scientific, and 
2 
social mood of the age. 
However, it is important to distinguish two kinds of relativity. 
One type of relativity claims an objective status. Morality, according 
to this type, is relative, but it is relative to the desires and needs 
of men; and these desires and needs are objectively grounded in man's 
nature. Not every possible desire or need could be the basis of moral-
ity. Certain desires and needs are "truly" human and "truly" satisfy-
ing to human nature as a whole, whereas others are not. Further, it is 
possible for individuals to be mistaken about the things which are 
really conducive to their own well-being. 
The second type of realtivity is one which Ralph Barton Perry 
describes as a "viciously relativistic view." 3 This view claims that 
all judgments of comparative value are relative to the preference of 
the one judging them. It is of this type of relativity that W. T. Stace 
claims: 
If taken seriously and pressed to its logical conclusion, 
ethical relativity can only end in destroying the concep-
tion of morality altogether, in undermining its practical 
efficacy, in rendering meaningless many almost universally 
accepted truths about human affairs, in robbing human 
beings of any incentive to strive for a better world, in 
taking the life-blood out of every ideal and every aspira-
tion which has ever ennobled the life of man. In short, 
the charge against it is that it revolts and outrages 
man's moral feelings.4 
If Stace is correct, it may mean that it is impossible for anyone 
to be a moral relativist in this "vicious" sense. Such a theory simply 
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is not "moral." It is also inherently inconsistent. If morality were 
anything anyone claimed it to be, the effect would be to make the 
concept of morality meaningless. If nobody could ever be "wrong" then 
nobody could ever meaningfully be said to be "right" either. Morality 
depends upon the coherence of its opposite. If there is nothing which 
is immoral then there is nothing which is moral. 
Most "vicious" relativists attempt to avoid this latter objection 
by considering morality in its social aspect and basing the "rightness" 
or ••wrongness" of individual positions. on their agreement or disagree-
ment with majority opinion or social custom. This does give morality a 
kind of objectivity -- but Stace' s objection goes beyond the problem of 
objectivity. He claims that this type of relativism is unacceptable 
because it cannot supply men with the incentive needed to motivate them. 
As a moral theory, it is not sufficiently inspiring to direct men's 
lives effectively, and is therefore lacking Josiah Royce's criterion 
that men seek not only the truth, but the "inspiring truth."5 
While agreeing with Stace's condenmation of "vicious" relativism 
as a moral theory, it is still possible to claim that the other variety 
of relativism (of which Stace himself is a proponent) fails in similar 
ways ta·satisfy men's "moral feelings.•.• It is possible that "vicious" 
relativism and the objective version of relativism have more in common 
than is immediately evident. Some of these common traits will be 
discussed in the fourth chapter, but the matter of inspirational and 
motivational power bears directly on the individual and his relation-
ship to morality, and will help to clarify the possibility of under-
standing morality as a distinctive activity. 
It is important always to keep in mind that when we speak of 
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morality we are speaking of how a man can or will order his life. We 
are speaking of the commitments which will inform his actions. This 
is, for most men, a question of great importance. Men like to feel 
that their commitments have "moral" significance -- that peculiar, as 
yet undefined significance of which all we know is that it must differ 
from other kinds of significance. 
When an individual asks, "Why should I be moral?" -- the answers 
given by'objective relativists come back, "Because it is the best 
policy;" "Because you can be happy in no other way;" "Because none of 
us can survive if most of us don't conform to general rules;" 
II , 
Because 
it is in all of our best interests to do so;" and so on in a similar 
vein. 
This type of relativism does not just explain morality, it 
explains it away. Morality is found to be ultimately, reducable to 
other pursuits. There is no such distinctive pursuit as "the p~rsuit 
of morality." There is, for instance, nothing peculiarly "moral" about 
a man seeking to fulfill his own best interests. Nor are the equations 
of morality with the perfectly natural desire to survive, or the desire 
to maintain a minimum of security, or the desire to obtain happiness 
and satisfaction peculiarly "moral." In fact, all such equations might 
be seen as good reasons to deny to morality a peculiar "point of view" 
' ' 6 
different from those taken in "prudence, art, and the like." Granted, 
all these goals are acceptable, even connnendable -- but they are not 
themselves "moral" goals. 
When morality becomes, by definition, majority opinion or 
customary behavior, as it must in the case of "vicious" relativity; or 
when it becomes so prosaic as to be equated simply and completely with 
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practicality, survival, or self-interest, as it does in the case of 
objective relativity, it no longer has the ability to allure or inspire. 
It no longer inspires, because it is an activity indistinguishable from 
other mundane activities. 
Morality, dissected in either relativist fashion says "no" to 
the existence of personal virtues. An insistence on honesty becomes 
a habit of good policy. A desire to abstain from extra-marital affairs 
becomes a socially inculcated hang-up. A compulsive rieed to keep 
promises reflects a convenient social convention. A charitable act 
towards another is translated as a method of obtaining self-esteem. 
Such analyses make of moral behavior a cautious, conforming, self-
regarding, pragmatic monster. 
In brief, the modern answers to "Why should I be moral?" have 
been framed in terms of individual interests and human p_sychology rather 
than in terms of obedience to transcendent values. Even the impulse of 
altruism is ultimately explained as a means to personal happiness and 
satisfaction in order to justify it. One ought to be altruistic 
because men are made in such a way as to be happy only on condition of 
being altruistic. Morality can be founded on the "facts" of human 
existence and on the psychological analysis of the concept of human 
7 happiness. 
Oddly enough, as was mentioned earlier, such answers have not 
seemed to make people more eager than ever to be moral, even though they 
hold out such strong personal incentive. In some cases they have seemed 
8 to drive people in the opposite direction. Many consider the question 
of "Why should I be moral?" to stand in more urgent need of an answer 
than ever before. However, now the question might be rephrased, "Why 
I 
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ought I submit myself to the tyranny of sociological and psychological 
impulses?" Joseph V. Dolan investigates such an attitude: 
Here a person who has formed the judgment that some 
particular action was "right to. do 11 and experienced an 
obligation to perform it is now reflecting on the genesis 
and implications of that experience and wondering whether 
there are objectively verifiable grounds which warrant 
it -- making the obligation, so to speak, de jure -- or 
whether the necessity experienced as moral has a merely 
psychological origin, say as the product of a superego or 
as a survival in the collective unconscious. If that be 
the case, the ''ought," however deeply imbedded in nature, 
is a tyrant without any genuine authority, and we may then 
deal with it as with any neurosis or mere de facto condition 
of nature and can start the elaboration of a liberating 
morale sans peche '\ Ought we -- I mean really and truly 
ought we -- to do what is 11 good,'' i.e., what perhaps because 
of a collective neurosis, we are compelled to judge as good?9 
Doestoevski's Underground Man puts the matter in a similar light: 
Who was it that first said that man does nasty things only 
because he doesn't know where his real interests lie, ·that 
if he were enlightened about his true interest, he would 
immediately stop acting like a pig and become kind and 
noble? Being enlightened, the argument goes on, and seeing 
where his real advantage lay, he would realize that it was 
in acting virtuously. And, since it is well established 
that a man will not act deliberately against his own 
interests, it follows that he would have no choice but to 
become good. Oh, the innocence of it! Since when, in these 
past thousands of years, has man acted exclusively out of 
self-interest? What about the millions of facts that show 
that men, deliberately and in. full knowledge of what their 
real interests were, spurned them and rushed in a different 
direction? They did so at their own risk without anyone 
advising them, refusing to follow the safe, well-trodden 
path and searching for another one, an unreasonable one, 
stubbornly working their way along it in the darkness.lO 
That which inspires men to shape their lives according to a moral 
point of view is not necessarily their own happiness and security. Nor 
is it possible to be inspired by one's own (or one's society's) 
inexplicable, subjective preferences. One can give into such 
preferences, but that is a question of being shaped rather than of 
shaping. The peculiar and distinctively "moral" reason for choices is 
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the personal apprehension of a real and inherent "rightness" or "wrong-
ness" connected with an attitude or a course of action. And the dis-
tinctive moral feeling is the feeling of "oughtness" surrounding such 
apprehensions. The moral experience is the personal experience of a 
"rightness" and "oughtness" which transcends the individual. 
In denying transcendence both types of relativity leave the door 
open to accusations of tyranny. In the case of "vicious" relativism it 
is the tyranny of custom, or of the majority. In the case of objective 
relativism, it is the tyranny of nature. If man's behavior can only be 
justified by reference to what he cannot help but want -- what it is 
"natural" for him to want -- then he is a slave to those natural 
impulses, just as in the case of "vicious" relativism he is a slave to 
majority rule or. to custom. Instinct is. a brute fact which cannot be 
got around. No· wonder Doestoyevsky's Underground Man feels a sense of 
revulsion and rebellion when confronted with the "stone wall" of 
. 11 
inescapable fact. 
Thus from the point of view of either type of relativism, men 
are mere pawns. They are subject either to their own inescapable 
desires, or to the no less inescapable desires of the majority. These 
desires can provide no claim to "worthiness" as their credentials. 
They "are," and that is all that can be said of them. Man is what he 
is, and we can only work with those "facts" in elaborating a moral 
theory. 
But "facts" alone are not adequate to produce morality. It is,. 
of course, practical to consider "facts" in elaborating theories, but 
it is just t;his "practical" approach to morality that some men find 
repugnant -- witness the response of the Underground Man. Men have 
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been known to reject practicality, happiness and well-being in search 
of something else. But what else is there? At this point it is 
impossible to say, but whatever it is, it cannot be considered 
"immanent" in the sense outlined by the relativists. Morality can not 
be dependent on contingent, brute, inexplicable and inescapable facts 
of existence. It must instead depend upon an unrealized, perhaps un-
realizable, ideal. But, strangely enough, this ideal cannot be 
"imaginary" as opposed to "factual." If it is, the ideal falls back irtto 
inexplicable preference. Why does a man have certain ideals and not 
others? If his only answer is "Because." -- then such ideals are no less 
brute facts of his psychological and sociological makeup than are the / 
"facts" of human happiness. Moral ideals must occupy a strange space 
somewhere between the brute facts of existence and the completely 
imaginary world of what is not. They can be neither as solid as a 
concrete bodily urge, nor as ephemeral as a purely imaginary whim. 
Moral ideals must "transcend" the world of brute facts; they must 
transcend it in two ways. They must transcend the natural world of 
psychological, physiological and sociological "facts;" and they must 
transcend these things in the direction of reality. Transcendent ideals 
must be thought to possess a type of reality, and hence a peculiar type 
of "appropriateness." 
It seems then that part of the moral attitude and feeling is the 
attitude and feeling of transcendence. If the element of transcendence 
is removed, then morality becomes obedience to that which cannot be got 
around. The element of "uniqueness," of nobility and inspiration so 
necessary in marking off morality from other concerns is whisked away 
by purely'inunanent explanations of morality. When morality ceases to 
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be "experienced" as a special obligation, there seems little sense in 
retaining an empty word. 
According to the failure of·the non-transcendent, relative 
approach to provide for the special experience of morality, it would 
seem that the alternative approach to morality, the transcendent 
approach, must inevitably lead to the special reasons and the special 
feelings of the moral experience. The answer· is "yes~' and "no." 
When transcendence comes in the form of rules whicn seem just as 
inexplicable and arbitrary as the preferences of individuals and 
majorities, then to refer choices back to a transcendent ground is just 
to shift the tyranny to a higher level, not to end it. Answering the 
question "Why should I be moral?" by reference to a transcendent realm 
of rules has the savour of "stone wall" as surely as does answering it 
by reference to personal and communal preferences. Such a realm is 
just another brute fact -- a peculiar kind of fact, no doubt, but a 
"fact" nevertheless. Once these transcendent rules are disclosed, they 
are fixed and no amount of fist pounding on the stone wall will serve 
to move the.m one inch. No "feelings" will change the "facts." Men can 
only acquiesce to the facts in dumb obedience -- or else -- mount a 
foolish and definitionally "immoral" opposition. 
Here is the twist. What is it such opposition might seek if not 
some "higher" good? Why mount an opposition at all if not for the 
personal experience of "oughtness?" Joseph Dolan remarks: "We can no 
more withhold the judgment that good must be done and evil avoided than 
12 we can resist the principle of contradiction." Thus, even a revolt 
against morality may be undertaken in the name of morality -- and both 
morality and the revolt from it are based upon a personal intuition of 
appropriateness or "oughtness." 
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Morality loses its inspirational power to shape lives if it is 
conceived of as something extrinsic to the individual, as something 
which weighs on him from above or from without. An action done under 
duress, no matter how subtle the duress, no matter whether the source of 
the duress is transcendent or social, is an action done from other than 
a moral motive. Morality must be intrinsic to the individual. It must 
have something to do with his own "feelings." Morality cannot be 
reduced to a set of intractable rules which issue impartial commands to 
a generalized "man11 independent of the particularity of individualmen 
and their feelings. If a man does not participate in the moral event, 
it is not for him a moral event at all. It might well be considered 
an experience of force and imposition rather than an experience of 
morality. Morality is the result of the meeting of individual men with 
an obligation they take to be transcendent of them. 
This may seem at first glance to be a relapse into the "viciously" 
relativistic stance; but it is not. Morality is not just the ex-
perienced obligation of the individual. "Right" is not defined as any-
thing anyone experiences as obligatory. Morality has none but a 
psychological or emotional meaning if such experiences of obligation 
are to be considered infallible. In order for the concept of morality 
to have substance, it must be possible to be wrong about what one feels 
to be moral. There must be something objective about morality. 
Here it might be helpful to refer to Gabriel Marcel's notion of 
the impossibility of positing an opposition between the immanent and 
13 
the transcendent. Unless these two are considered capable of meeting, 
morality is a chimera. Th~ important word to note in the description of 
morality given above is the word "meeting." In the moral experience 
I 
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the elements of inunanent "feeling" and transcendent reality are equally 
necessary. These two elements must meet and recognize each other if 
morality is to emerge. If there are such things as transcendent good 
and evil, but men are incapable of discovering the difference between 
the two, morality is impossible. If men can discover the difference 
between good and evil, but remain indifferent to it, morality is 
irrelevant. If there are no such things as transcendent good and evil, 
but yet men have experiences which suggest them, morality is illusory. 
Without positing transcendence, morality is reducible to 
practicality and preference. Without taking individual feelings into 
account, morality is extrinsic and imposed from without. As the 
practical or the preferred, morality has no need of encouragement 
only enlightenment, and the important notion of obligation drops out. 
As a merely suppressive imposition, morality can be justifiably ignored 
whenever it is feasible and profitable to do so, and the notion of 
personal obligation is again misplaced. 
If transcendence is to count as a "moral" feature it must come in 
the form of personal intuition. This is so whether the intuition is 
that it is appropriate to obey rules in general, or whether the intui-
tion is that one "ought" never to obey rules which seem arbitrary or 
inappropriate. In short, morality must come in the form of a feeling 
of personal obligatoriness. It is not so important.that a generalized 
theory be affirmed as it is that a particular and personal obligation 
be experienced. 
On the other hand, if personal intuition is to coUilt as a "moral" 
feature it must reveal itself as an insight into transcendent truth. 
If it does not, its importance is purely psychological. 
The peculiar and distinctive activity which is experienced as 
moral activity is activity undertaken in response to the personal 
apprehension of a transcendent appropriateness. The distinctive 
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reasons given for such activity presuppose the objective status of the 
transcendent realm which is intuited in the moral experience. Here 
objectivity is taken to mean existence outside the mind of the individual 
or individuals who experience the moral imperative. If morality is not 
taken to be such, it can only be taken to be impossible, irrelevant, or 
illusory. 
The Two Paths 
So far, we have discovered this important thing about morality: 
morality is the act of ordering a life in response to the personal 
apprehension of truths which are (or appear to be) both appropriat~ and 
transcendent. But, although the experience of morality points towards 
both personalism and transcendence, the conjunction of these two 
qualities may be experienced in more than one way -- just as a life may 
be ordered in more than one way. As was implied earlier, a personal 
intuition of "6ughtness" may come in the form of rule-abiding behavior. 
It is possible to find it both transcendently appropriate and personally 
obligatory to obey rules and laws even when such laws and rules seem 
opaque to the individual. On the other hand, it is possible to find 
it both appropriate, and personally obligatory to refuse to obey such 
opaque rules, and to insist on being guided by personal understanding 
and feelings. The former is the mediated path of "order;" the latter 
is the immediate path of intuition. Hans Castorp calls the first path 
"the regular one, direct, honest" and the second one, the one which is 
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"bad," the one which "leads through death." Safety is to be found 
in the externality of laws, and in their imposed order. Danger is to 
be found in the internality of emotions, and in individual discretion. 
In the next two chapters we will examine some attempts on the 
part of moral philosophers to account for the moral elements of 
,,., 
personally experienced obligation and the objectivity such experiences 
seem to imply. It will be seen that moral theory leans heavily in the 
direction of "order" whether imposed by transcendent or immanent 
realities without being quite able to reject the lure of "feeling." 
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CHAPTER III 
THE TRANSCENDENT PHILOSOPHERS 
Putting aside for a moment the question of "Why ought I to act 
morally?" and taking up the question of "How am I to act morally?11 
wefind philosophers offering various solutions ranging from the 
advice to absolutely obey transcendent laws to following one's own 
conscience; and from obeying the rules of society to following one's 
own inclinations. In the next two chapters, we will examine a few 
representative answers to the question of how an individual can act· 
morally. In this examination, we will pursue the modern pattern of 
movement from moral transcendence to moral immanence; rather than 
following a strictly historical account. Thus, this chapter will 
examine the. transcendent theories of, first, Kant and then Rousseau. 
The following chapter will discuss the immanent philosophies of Moore 
and Westermarck. 
The Problem 
The movement of moral theory from transcendence to immanence 
(from heaven to earth) is largely based on the general philosophical 
problem of "knowledge." What kinds of things can men know? In many 
·respects, the shift in emphasis from transcendence to immanence is 
simply a product of the epistemological skepticism of modern philosophy. 
Such skepticism includes at its most extreme a wholesale desertion of 
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metaphysical claims as "meaningless~" At its most lenient, it stresses 
.1 
empiricism as the measure of "truth." 
On one hand, value claims of all kinds are dismissed as "meaning-
less," since they are incapable of being empirically verified. A. J. 
Ayer maintains such a view with regard to morality when he claims: 
For in saying that a certain type of action is right or 
wrong, I am not making any factual statement, not even a 
statement about my own state of mind. I am merely express-
ing certain moral sentiments.2 
On the other hand "truth" is taken to be that which "works." 
According to William James, "'The true', to put it very briefly, is 
only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right 1 is 
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only the expedient in the way of our behaving." 
The first view reduces morality to irrational emotivism; the 
second fosters a thoroughly pragmatic and immanent view of values. 
The first suggests that no reasons can be given in support of moral 
judgments, since it is impossible to have "knowledge" of moral values. 
The latter suggests that moral judgments are entirely "reasonable" 
since our "knowledge" of moral values has to do with empirical facts 
and measurable results. 
The last chapter dealt with the failure of both these attitudes 
to account for morality as a distinctive pursuit, and the equal failure 
of both to account for the "inspirational" power of moral feelings. It 
was pointed out that the moral feeling of obligation is actually 
illusory unless it is somehow grounded in transcendent reality. But if 
transcendence is important in retaining morality as a distinctive 
activity and attitude, it is equally important that men be able to 
discover what this transcendent morality requires of them. It is more 
than a little ludicrous, ~nd it is certainly impractical, to tell men 
that there is a transcendent ground of morality, and then supply them 
with no access to it. 
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It is this problem of finding an acceptable access to transcendent 
morality which encouraged more and more philosophers to turn to 
immanent and intelligible "signs" of morality, rather than to author-
itative decrees, as a measuring stick of morality. It is only if 
immanent experience somehow reflects transcendent reality that the 
moral experience is a meaningful one. There cannot be an absolute 
break between the two. But, how does this reflection take place, and 
how can we be sure that it is indeed a transcendent reality which is 
being pointed out? 
The Western tradition had long accepted certain attitudes, goals, 
and beliefs as constituting the obviously correct and moral ones; but 
with the challenge to "prove" the moral obligatoriness of these beliefs, 
philosophers began to fumble. 
If "truth" consists only in what men are able to prove in an 
indubitable way -~ in the way that they can prove that 2 + 2 = 4, or 
that fire burns and water boils at 212 degrees Farenheit -- then moral 
knowledge of a t;ranscendent kind is unobtainable. But, philosophers 
seeking this kind of indubitable justification for moral obligation 
scorned dogmatic assertions and attempted to found morality on grounds 
that were susceptible to either complete rational agreement or 
definitive empirical evidence. Morality came to be considered in view 
of certain "tests" which could be applied to guarantee its correctness. 
How can man know (with certainty) what he ought to do? In the 
very act of posing the question; dogmatic absolutism begins to lose its 
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grip. Religious absolutists have long insisted that they know the will 
of God through revelat'ion and thus they claim to be able to organize 
their lives according to this ultimate transcendent standard. But what 
basis have these claims to knowledge? Is it enough to maintain that 
such "knowledge" is based on faith in divine revelation? With such a 
proliferation of religious sects, each insisting that it has the "truth," 
it seems a bit frightening to place one's trust in a single religion 
and deny all others without some more substantial proof. But what would 
connt as proof in such a situation? How could the claim of the divine 
inspiration of the Bible ever admit of final unambiguous proof? Even 
given such a proof, how could we arrive at a single, unambiguous read-
ing of the Bible? 
For men facing this deadend, there seem to be three alternatives. 
It cannot be that knowing the will of God through revelation is the 
only possibility of acting rightly. For instance, the command of God 
could not make cruelty moral and mercy immoral; and if it is possible 
for a man to understand the truth of the preceding claim, then it must 
be that God Himself (if He exists) is bound in His decrees by a still 
higher law. This higher law, the "natural law" must be something 
which men have the power to know either by direct intuition, by the 
use of their rational powers, or through their own experiences in the 
world. 
Beginning with Kant, we will examine some of the answers given to 
the question of the possibility and content of moral knowledge. Through 
this examination we should begin to notice the peculiar moral bias 
involved in ethical theories. We will also examine the inherent 
problems in reconciling the bias of the orderly sensibility with moral 
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experience as it was outlined in Chapter II. How successful are these 
moral theories in reconciling transcendence and immanence, objectivity 
and subjectivity? Can they adequately account for both the personal 
and the extra-personal element in moral experience? 
Immanuel Kant 
According to Kant, the path to moral knowledge is to be found by 
reason. It is necessary that rationality and rationality alone be the 
basis for morality. He urges: 
Is it not of the utmost necessity to construct a pure moral 
philosophy which is completely freed from everything which 
·may be only empirical and thus belong to anthropology? 
That there must be such a philosophy is self-evident from 
the common idea of duty and moral laws ..• the ground of 
obligation here must not be sought in the nature of man or 
in the circumstances in which he is placed, but sought a 
priori solely in the concepts of pure reason, and that 
every other precept which rests on principles of mere ex-
perience, even a precept which is in certain respects 
nniversal; so far as it leans in the least on empirical 
grounds (perhaps only in regard to the motive involved) 
may be called a practical rule but never a moral law.4 
Kant seems here to be confirming some of our own findings in the 
first two chapters. He affirms that morality must be differentiated 
froi:n practical rules based on empirical findings arid anthropology. He 
also insists that this necessity is self-evident, in regard to man's 
common moral experience. 
In addition Kant agrees that morality must be peculiarly related 
to the individual in order to retain its status as "morality." He 
clearly differentiates between the non-moral status of a rule or law 
obeyed in order to obtain some personal end; the equally non-moral 
status of a rule obeye,d from compulsion; and the truly moral status of 
a rule or law obeyed in response to one'$ own recognition of the 
validity of the rule and one's own will in accordance with that rule: 
For if one thought of him[self] as subject only to a law 
(whatever it may be), this necessarily implied some in-
terest as a stimulus or compulsion to obedience because 
the law did not arise from his will. Rather, his will was 
constrained by something else according to a law to act in 
a certain way. By this strictly necessary consequence, how-
ever, all the labor of finding a.supreme ground for duty 
was irrevocably lost, and one never arrived at duty but 
only· at the necessity of action from a certain interest. 
This might be his own interest or that of another, but in 
.either case the imperative always had to be conditional 
and could not at all serve as a moral comrnand.s 
At this point, however, our agreement with Kant is at an end. 
Whereas we have stressed the importance of moral sentiment, Kant 
insists that morality can have no more to do with "moral feelings" 
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than it can have to do with empiricism. He dismisses moral sentiments 
as a possible constituent of morality on two counts. First, he 
insists that "feelings" cannot be commanded while actions can be 
the imJiication being that morality must be susceptible of conscious, 
. 6 
self-controL · Second, he points out that. " ••• feeiings naturally 
differ so infinitely in degree that they are incapable of furnishing a 
117 uniform standard of the good and bad •... 
To begin with, it is not self-evi'dent that "feelings" are beyond 
human control; but more importantly for our purposes, it is with the 
use of the words "uniform standard" that Kant's orderly bias becomes 
evident. Kant assumes that morality, in order to be objective and not 
" •.• a mere phantom of the mind ..• " must be uniform, and uniformity 
demands that morality be based on reason alone and unconcerned with 
. . 8 
differing situations, consequences or emot1ons. "Feelings," as he 
rightly points out, differ from person to person. Likewise, con-
sequences can varj independently of an individual's will and are 
35 
contingent on many uncontrollable circumstances. Reason alone, by its 
very nature, is unvarying, superior to peculiarities of circumstance or 
personality, and identical in all rational beings. In basing morality 
solely on reason, Kant attempts to create a uniform standard which can 
be applied indifferently to persons and situations -- one which can be 
trusted to give infallible directives for moral action. He attempts 
to make morality "orderly." 
Still, however indifferently rules must be applied to and by 
individuals, Kant agrees that the application of the rule cannot itself 
be experienced as a matter of personal indifference. He is well aware 
of the danger of morality falling to the level of mere external 
constraint, and it is in reason that he hopes to bring the necessary 
objectivity of constraint and the equally necessary subjectivity of 
obligation together. Morality, as he sees it, is not and could not be 
an external restraint (which could never produce morality); rather, it 
must be an internal restraint. The force of moral laws must be grasped 
internally as a personal obligation. Morality is, for Kant, the 
recognition of duties, discovered through reason, as binding on the 
individual in so .far as he is a rational being. It is respect for 
these rational laws and for oneself as a rational being which consti-
tutes the moral attitude. 
For though there is no sublimity in him in so far as he is 
subject to the moral law, yet he is sublime in so far as 
he is legislative with reference to the law and subject to 
it only for this reason.9 
A13 should be apparent by now, Kant's morality is ·not without its 
own feeling. He speaks feelingly of the "sublimity" of man's existence 
as an autonomous moral agent. Respect for the moral law is yet an-
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other type of feeling Kant connects with the moral attitude. What he 
hopes to do in relying primarily on reason rather than emotion is to 
lift morality above mere inclinations and feelings and ground it in 
something more solid, less susceptible to human frailty, ,less intensely 
personal (and so less prone to solipsism) while·still retaining 
. I 
morality's necessary link between the individual and his subjective 
experience. "Feelings" alone seem too uncertain, too idosyncratic to 
be trusted with theimportant job of constructing a morality. Ration-
ality, on the other hand, is neither idiosyncratic, nor is it totally 
unrelated to subject;ive experience. It too involves a personal 
recognition of appropriateness akin to the internal "click" of intuition. 
Kant sees a grave danger in allowing morality to stand or fall 
with the absence or presence of emotional "feelings" and inclinations. 
How are such feelings to be objectivised? Granted an individual 
"feels" as though some action or attitude "ought" to be taken, how cari 
he know whether or not this feeding "ought" to be obeyed? For Kant, 
feeling is just as apt to lead men to do something in conflict with 
duty as .in accordance with it. 
It is his claim that it is only respect for, and obedience to 
duty which constitutes morality. Duty is discoverable solely by the 
light of rationality which uncovers the form of the categorical 
imperative: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the 
. . 11 
same time will that it· should become a universal law." Since 
rationality (unlike feeling) is the same in every ~erson, every person 
should discover the same duties. Thus jllorality is made "orderly," 
regular, and objective. It does not differ from person to person and 
time to time. "Duty" is iitdeed the result of the moral freedom of the 
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individual, but reason belongs both to the individual acting as an 
autonomous moral agent, and to men in general as rational beings; so 
that what holds for any man holds for all men, and even for all 
rational beings. 
According to Kant, philosophers in the past have mistaken the 
source of morality either by making morality dependent on the feelings 
of the moral agent and/or by making the legitimacy of morality rest 
with some external force such as God or society, rather than grounding 
it in reason and in the autonomous individual: 
Man was seen to be bound to laws by his duty, but it was 
not seen that he is subject to his own, yet universal, 
legislation, and that he is only bound to act in accordance 
with his own will,. which is however designed by nature to 
be a will giving universal laws.l2 
The guide to rrriral action must be internal, but the type of internality 
required must be an internality which is shared universally on the 
basis of a priori and apodictic rational laws. Only thus can moral law 
be both.subjective and objective, inunanent and transcendent. 
The rational law upon which Kant grounds morality is the law of 
· non-contradiction. Non-contradiction ties morality to the intelligible 
and noumenal world rather than to the emotional and phenomenal world 
because of its status as an analytic a priori law. Morality must be 
based on participation in the transcendent, ideal, intelligible world 
rather than on shared .experiences in the real, empirical world. It 
is only in so far as morality rests upon purely and formally logical 
grounds that it can be separated from relativism and practicality. 
Moral rules founded on the application of the categorical imperative, 
which is itself founded on the law of non-contradiction, are not only 
valid for the individual who experiences the obligation (if they were, 
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they would possess only a subjective necessity) -- they are obligatory 
on all rational beings. They are true not only for this phenomenal 
world (if they were, they would possess only a hypothetical necessity)--
but for any world whatsoever. 
It would seem that Kant has managed to successfully bridge the.gap 
between transcendence and immanence; objectivity and subjectivity with 
the rule of reason. But has he? In relying solely on reason and on the 
logical principle of non-contradiction, he knowingly and purposely cuts 
himself off from all appeals to "feelings" and psychological principles. 
But, no matter how sympathetic one may be with his efforts to demonstrate 
the logical contradiction involved in immorality, the results yielded by 
the application of the categorical imperative to many "immoral" impulses 
are not as apparently contradictory as Kant presumes. He claims; 
When we observe ourselves in any transgression of a duty we 
find thatwe do not actually will that our maxim should become 
a universal law. That is impossible for us; rather the contrary 
of this maxim should remain as a law generally, and. we only take · 
the liberty of making an exception to it for ourselves of for · 
the sake of our inclination, and for this one occasion. 13 
Now Kant has come up with a powerful psychological insight, but 
logically it is less successful. It is not obvious (to use one of Kant's 
own examples) that it :i..s logically contradictory to will not only one's 
own destruction, but the destruction of everyone else as well. It may 
well be possible to will one's own suicide without contradiction of any 
sort. If willingness to commit suicide logically implies a willingness 
for everyone else to do the same, then Birkin, a character in D. H. 
Lawrence's novel, Women in Love, demonstrates the possibility of such a 
willingness when he claims he would "die like a shot" if and only if he 
thought it would bring about the total destruction of mankind: 
"You yourself, don't you find it a beautiful clean 
thought, a world empty of people, just uninterrupted grass, 
and a hare sitting up?" 
The pleasant sincerity of his voice made Ursula pause 
to consider her own proposition. And really it was attrac-
tive: a clean lovely, humanless world. It yes the really 
desirable, Her heart hesitated and exulted .. 
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If Kantcannot base his system on strictly logical contradiction, 
he must base it on psychological contradiction, and even that will not 
always suffice to prove something (such as suicide) to be contradictory. 
Birkin shows no contradiction of either a logical or psychological kind 
in willing universal suicide. At any rate, psychological contradic-
tion is verifiable only empirically; and Kant cuts the lifeline of his 
own theory if his categorical imperative is based on what men can in 
fact be expected to consistently will. If the duty to refrain f"rom 
suicide still remains, it must be based on some other kind of "ought" 
than the psychological or rational "ought." The only "ought" left is 
the "ought" of personal intuition and feeling -- but Kant has already 
rejected it as being too unstable, It seems his only recourse is to 
admit the non-moral status of suicide while maintaining that the 
standard of non-contradiction is still the only way of ascertaining 
morality, But how many accepted moral maxims will have to be discarded 
if all appeal to "feeling" and to consequence is to be cut off? 
If it can be shown that men in one society can consistently will 
to universalize that which men in another society cannot consistently 
will to universalize, then Kant's claim to bind up objectivity and 
subjectivity in reason, avoiding empiricism on one side and "feeling" on 
the other, falls apart. He can give us a consistent form for morality, 
hut not a consistent content. The content must be provided by differing 
psychological, sociblogical, and emotional considerations. 
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For instance, it is easily possible to conceive of a person in a 
primitive culture being psychologically.and emotionally willing to 
universalize the practice of infanticide without involving himself in a 
logical contradiction. It is not the case that such a person wishes to 
make an exception of himself -- he is willing to acknowledge the right 
of others to practice infanticide too, Similarly. it is possible to 
1 think of a number of other such practices which, though considered to 
be immoral by Western standards, in no way involves one who holds them 
in a contradiction. If it is possible for two groups to be acting 
"morally" (in spite of the fact that one group affirms as "moral" 
exactly that which the other group shudderingly rejects as "immoral") 
then moralit~ must be relative. 
The only solution which might help Kant here is to acknowledge 
that even though persons can logically and without contradiction will 
such things as universal suicide or infanticide, they ought not .!£• 
The categorical imperative may hold good universally, but it need 
not discover the same duties for every society, nor even for every 
individual within a society. If it does, its doing so depends either 
on a general psychological truth, or on a generally shared emotional or 
practical rejection of consequence. Provided that an individual is 
capable of willing the results of universal application of a maxim, in 
most cases, the maxim-- no matter how immoral it might seem to be --
has the credentials to pass Kant's test of universalizability. 15 Reason 
without emotion and desire to direct it is empty -- and it is certainly 
too vague to qualify as an absolute and universal moral system. The 
same form can be used to justify widely diverse and even conflicting 
moral maxims. Kant intended the categorical imperative to escape the 
trap of emotional sentiments, but it does not. 
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On top of these difficulties, add the commonly noticed discrepancy 
between the moral actions which Kant understands the categorical imper-
ative to command and our intuitions concerning what constitutes a moral 
action, and the plausibility of Kant's claim to have found the basis for 
an objective, universally valid, non-empirical morality grows dim. 
The most famous example of this discrepancy involves the situation 
presented to Kant of a man who, after sheltering a friend from a would-
be assassin, is forced to choose between lying or telling the truth when 
asked by the murderer whether or not he is concealing his friend. Kant's 
reply is that it is the man's duty to tell the truth. He concludes that: 
''Hence it is a holy -- unconditionally commanding, and by no conveniences 
to be limited-- Imperative of reason to be 'truthful' that is, 
1 ' "16 1onest -- in all our statements. 
Kant's use of rationality leads him to insist on the inviolibility 
of the rule itself, even when its application seems counter-intuitive. 
The general rule of truth-telling can have no exceptions because reason 
points out the fallacy of such exceptions. If it is our rationality 
which demands right action, and not our emotions, any exception here is 
wrongly made on the basis of an emotional rejection of the consequences 
of truth-telling rather than on any logical inconsistency in truth-
telling; and Kant, of course, thinks that the force of moralfty depends 
on its being completely isolated from appeals to consequence. "Right-
ness'' is a property of actions and intentions determined by rationality 
alone and not by feelings or results. Results and feelings depend on 
various uncontrollable ele~ents; rational actions do not. 
It is, however, just this callous refusal to take feelings and 
consequences into account that offends many people's moral intuitions. 
Most people would take very little time to decide that in the case 
presented to Kant, it was the man's duty to lie in order to save his 
friend. 
Looked at from one angle, there seems to be no very good reason 
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for Kant to insist on applying the categorical itnperative·in the strict 
way that he does, and a lot of good reasons for applying it more 
liberally. It seems possible to formulate maxims which conform to the 
rule of universalizability and still take peculiar circumstances into 
consideration. For instance, could not one will to universalize the 
maxim that one ought never to lie -- except when doing so would save the 
life of an innocent man? Is it strictly a case of all or nothing at 
all, as. Kant would have us believe? 
Marcus George Singer claims that the logic of the categorical 
imperative does not compel us to accept such uethical rigorism. "17 
Singer claims that the original distinction between categorical and 
hypothetical imperatives was not one between duties unconditioned by 
any circumstances whatsoever and duties conditioned by circumstances; 
rather it was a distinction between duties unconditioned by the desires 
and purposes of the moral agent and duties so conditioned. "Thus what 
he [KantJseems to have done is to have shifted from thinking of a 
categorical imperative as one not conditional upon any purposes of the 
agent to thinking of it as not being conditional upon anything at all. "18 
If indeed Kant does make such a shift' the interesting question is 
"Why?" What did he hope to gain from such a shift? To answer that 
question,.we must return to our earlier observations concerning Kant's 
orderly bias. 
The most obvious answer is that pure reason can only be retained 
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as a guide to moral action in the absence of qualifying circumstances. 
If circumstances are included in the working out of the categorical 
imperative, it is clear that elements of experience and emotion have 
crept in. What kinds of circumstances should qualify as special excep-
tions? How can one be sure that he has come across a case genuinely 
deserving of exception? Pure reason could be of no help here. In 
order to decide, one would have to appeal either to the practical 
consequences involved in making an exception, or to one's "feelings" as 
to whether an exception would, on the whole, be more in.line with 
morality. 
Kant flatly refused to consider the first alternative, and while 
he admits that, " ••• the moral feeling is nearer to morality and its 
dignity .•. 11 he still refuses to sanction feelings as a guide to moral-
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ity. Obviously he feels that the losses incurred by allowing "feel-
ings" to settle moral questions would be greater than any possible gains. 
Perhaps the key to his insistence on pure rationality can be 
found in his desire for simplicity, clarity, certainty, and order. 
Reason is an appealing basis for morality because of the externality 
and objectivity it connotes. The principle of non-contradiction is not 
suceptible to charges of being based on mere whim or fancy. With logic 
in command, problems can be handled neatly and cleanly by slotting the 
appropriate words into the universalization formula. Personalities, 
feelings, situations, conseq~ences .•. all such things blur distinctions. 
They are messy, irregular and stubbornly resist set patterns. They lend 
themselves to error, confusion, and self-deceit. 
Kant's insistence on the moral rigorism of the categorical imper-
ative can be linked to his peculiar moral sensibility. His moral theory 
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displays the sensibility of order. While he agrees that morality must 
he the product of the interaction of a free agent and a transcendent 
realm, he prefers the path of order, and the safety of uninvolvement to 
the path of intuition and the danger of involvement. He provides a 
prime example of the personal intuition of "oughtness" which comes in 
the form of rule-abiding behavior. His is the "mediated" path of order, 
and the mediator in his case is reason. 
Feelings are dangerous because they can never be trusted to be 
only what they are~ One can never be sure that.his feelings have not 
hetrayedhim into immorality .. Kant writes: 
It sometimes happens that in the most searching self-examina-
tion we can find nothing except the moral ground of duty 
which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or 
that good action and to such great sacrifice. But from this 
we cannot by any means conclude with certainty that a secret 
impulse of self-love, falsely appearing as the idea of duty, 
was not actually the true determining cause of'the will. 
For we like to flatter ourselves with a pretended nobler 
motive, while in fact even the strictest examination can 
never lead us entirely behind the secret incentives, for, 
when moral worth is in question, it is not a matter of actions 
which one sees but of their inner principles which one does 
not see.20 
Kant is rightly suspicious of feeling. It is incapable of providing men 
with the certainty they crave in making moral decisions. Only reason 
based on a priori principles could provide such certainty. It is the 
search for order and certainty which drives Kant to such stern lengths 
as he displays in the case of the hidden friend. 
Two things of particular interest to us surface in studying Kant's 
moral theory. First, it becomes apparent that it is impossible to 
avoid reference to moral sentiments in formulating a morality. This is 
so if for no other reason than that the moral law is powerless, unless 
it can produce in men a desire to obey it. Thus, if the reverence which 
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he accords duty can count as a moral sentiment -- and surely it can --
Kant inakes important use of feeling in his own moral theory. One might 
well be aware of the moral law without respecting it. 
In addition, even at those times when Kant presumes that he is 
appealing to rationality only and not feeling, it is apparent that 
feelings have slipped in despite his efforts. In the examples cited 
earlier, it seems to be something other than strictly logical contradic-
tion which makes the actions immoral. 21 If the universalization prin-
ciple makes sense at all, it is because we "intuit" that even though a 
person could logically will to universalize many "immoral" activities, 
he ought not ~· 
Furthermore, in the few cases in which the universalization of a 
maxim does produce a logical contradiction, it is far from evident that 
Kant's principles otitline one's moral duty. Universalization of lying 
promises produces an easily noted logical contradiction; nevertheless, 
there seem to be times when lying promises are not merely expedient, 
but "moral." In isolation, "r:ationality" seems inadequate to convince 
men that there are universal duties which are in themselves absolutely 
inviolable, and so must be adhered to regardless of consequence. In 
fact, it seems immoral to smugly repeat moral maxims as though the 
concrete consequences of those maxims did not matter, or as though one 
was merely a pawn in the hands of reason and therefore not responsible 
for the consequences of his actions. This immoral attitude of smugness 
is certainly the impression many get when first confronted with.Kant's 
adamant insistence on truth-telling. 
One might, at this point, recall the Underground Man's "stone 
. 22 
wall." · Kant's categorical imperative has something of that about it. 
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It is a formal, impersonal, legalistic, unbending stone wall; and it is 
this characterization which leads to the second discovery in Kant. It 
appears that at least part of Kant's theory is determined by a certain 
aversion to emotion. He almost seems to be repelled by a quality 
involved in moral sentiment best described as "messiness." Feelings are 
ambiguous and thus misleading. Kant fears the uncertainty that 
accompanies reliance on emotional response to guide moral actions, and 
tries to provide a method for determining moral actions regardless of 
personal feelings. However, he does not succeed in dismissing "feeling" 
from the moral realm. He does not succeed because his own drive for 
clarity might be seen as the result of a peculiar moral sentiment. 
Kant's orderly sensibility results in a strict legalistic ~orality, but 
even so it displays the features of a personally experienced obligation 
based upon the intuition of a transcendent reality. If Kant's moral 
theory fails to satisfy, or to coincide with our own moral experiences, 
it is because he fails to balance the role of personal feeling and 
intuition with the need for a stable and objective moral order. In 
attempting to secure the one, he suppresses the other. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
It is interesting to note that in spite of their diverse theories, 
Kant had a great deal of respect for the moral philosophy of Rousseau. 23 
According to Charles Frankel, "Kant's conception of the rational will 
as the will to act.so that one's action may be taken as a universal rule 
of conduct is the formal development of Rousseau's general will."24 We 
should expect then to find Kant and Rousseau in agreement on several 
issues. Most importantly, they agree on the necessity of morality 
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springing from the moral autonomy of the individual, rather than from 
his personal desires or inclinations. Rouseau writes: " •.• it is 
slavery to be under the impulse of mere appetite, and freedom to obey a 
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law which we prescribe for ourselves," Such a statement could easily 
be attributed to Kant. Thus they would both seem to agree that the 
principle task of ethical theory is to demonstrate how men can be both 
free and obligated. Both insist on the importance of individual 
autonomy, but agree that autonomy must be tied down or objectivised so 
that it does not fall into sheer subjectivity and personal appetite. 
Morality must have both an objective and a subjective pole. 
Kant turns to reason to accomplish this task, and it is here that 
Kant and Rousseau end their agreement. Rousseau is convinced that 
reason alone could never discover moral truths. 
Although it might belong to Socrates and other minds of the 
like craft to acquire virtue by reason, the human race would 
long since have ceased to be had its preservation depended 
only on the reasonings of the individuals composing it.26 
How then can men discover within themselves the springs of moral 
action without falling into the trap of solipsism? Rousseau suggests 
that the need for stabilization and objectivity -- the need for some 
ultimate authority which transcends mere subjectivity -- is to be found 
in the community. But, it is important to keep in mind that he is not 
seeking a purely practical resolution to the moral disagreements of 
individuals; he is seeking a moral principle. A community is not merely 
a political and social entity, it is a moral entity. Rousseau, on the 
other hand, insists: 
What is good, and·conformable to order, is so from the 
nat~re of things and independently of human conventions. 
All justice flows from God, He alone is the source of it; 
and if we knew how to receive it from on high we should 
require neither government nor laws,27 
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The problem, of course, is how to "receive it fromon high." Rousseau 
turns to "government and laws," and for him, the moral problem becomes 
one of locating the legitimate power to govern and make laws. 
Distrusting rationality, Rousseau looks to intuition to provide 
the link between man and the transcendent. He has great faith in the 
natural goodness of men. He agrees with Kant that the only unqualifiedly 
good thing is a "good will" -- and he considers that every man naturally 
and intuitively wills the good. However, this natural, intuitively good 
will can be corrupted (though not destroyed) by private will directed 
by private appetite. Even when uncorrupted, it may sometimes err in its 
' Judgments, since to will the good is not necessarily to know what the 
28 good is that is willed,, Thus private will alone is not a safe path 
to morality. 
The natural, private will of each man, insofar as it wills the 
good, is in agreement with the wills of other men. It is only when 
the private will mistakes itself, or when it is seduced by the private 
appetite that it fails to coincide with other wills. Thus the general 
will of the community can be taken as the yardstick of morality, and 
the failure to coincide with the general will can then be taken as a 
sign of immorality. In the case of such non.,..coincidence, the individual 
who disagrees can only conclude that, though he cannot detec·t it in 
himself, at a fundamental level he really wills in accordance with the 
others and it is in agreement with them that his true freedom of will 
lies. If he were to manage to assert his private will in such a situa-
tion, he would only succeed in violating both the moral law and his.~ 
free will. 
It is in the social realm of the communal will that the immanent . ' 
49 
sign of the transcendel}t and ultimate authority is to be found. And it 
is in the individual's self-acknowledgment of this moral authority that 
ethical autonomy is found. Thus Rousseau reconciles the subjectivity 
of the individual and the objectivity of the transcendent law with the 
immanence of social data. 
It is at the point of this victory that Rousseau's theory begins 
to founder. He is genuinely seeking a moral power, not just the power 
of social numbers and social pressure. That this is the case is apparent 
by his careful differentiation between private will and the will of all 
on one side, and the general will on the other. The first two have no 
moral significance, they refer to the appetites of men. It is only the 
"general will" which has a moral significance. The "general will" is 
not equivalent to majority vote. Majority vote refers to the "will of 
all" which is the sum of private wills. The "general will" transcends 
private will. 29 But unless the "general will" corresponds to something 
which men can locate and experience in the world, it can be of little 
help to Rousseau in making the transcendent knowable an-d socially 
accessible, 
Rousseau seems loath to make the simple equation of majority 
op:f,nion and "the Good" and hopes to provide a safeguard against such an 
equation by appealing to the "general will" as being the authority 
which marks the boundary between right and wrong. Still, it is not 
clear what kind of thing the "general will" is, nor how it is to be 
arrived at. If it cannot be had by counting, how can it be discove·red? 
If it is true, as Rousseau assumes, that 
It is therefore necessary to make the people see things as 
they are, and sometimes as they ought to appear, to point 
out to them the right path which they are seeking, to guard 
them from the seducing voice of private will.,,30 
so 
then the paramount question is, who is going to undertake this project, 
and on what authority? 
According to Rousseau, the power to legislate comes from the 
people through their participation in the general will. The people are 
both sovereign and subject. They both make and obey the laws. Thus it 
is that Rousseau settles the question of how men can be both free and 
obligated. However, this sovereign power has its source, not in the 
will of all or majority opinion, but in the general will. The Sovereign 
power is the expression of the general will which can never be wrong as 
opposed to "majority opinion" which may well err • 
••• the Sovereign, being formed only of the individuals who 
compose it, neither has, nor can have, any interest contrary 
to theirs; consequently, the sovereign power need give no 
guarantee to its subjects, because it is impossible that 
the body should seek to injure all its members; and we shall 
see presently that it can do no injury to any individual in 
particular. The Sovereign, by its nature is always every-
thing it ought to be.31 
Though Sovereignty rests with the people as a whole, "the whole" 
is not a matter of discreet entities lumped together, it is conceived of 
as a living, breathing power which functions with one will. But how is 
that one will to be determined? It is not immediately apparent that 
"the whole" displays any· such solidarity as Rousseau contemplates. 
Charles Frankel points out in his introduction to The Social Contract 
that Rousseau's concept of popular sovereignty can be seen differently 
depending upon .how one understands the "general will." Rousseau is 
used not only to support the morality of democracy in its purest form, 
but also the morality of authoritarianism in its purest form. 32 
It may well be that in the process of collecting the majority 
opinion the "general will" will surface and be generally recognized. 
But then again, it may be that some one individual or group of individuals 
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will correctly intuit the "general will" and so have a duty to " •.• make 
the people see things as they are ••• "33 Rousseau seems here to advocate 
the use of external force as a "moral" tool. Depending on the inter-
pretation preferred, the majority, or the man or men who perceive the 
general will, have absolutely coercive power. The general will becomes 
the "stone wall" of morality beyond which dissenting individuals have 
no recourse. As in the case of Kant's Categorical Imperative, personal 
feelings are here irrelevant. Rousseau starts from a position of 
reliance upon sentiment and personal intuition and ends with a theory 
which must disregard all personal feelings and intuitions which conflict 
with the general will. 
Shigalov, a radical socialist revolutionary in Dostoyevsky's 
novel, The Possessed, makes this striking comment: "I am perplexed by 
my own data and my conclusion is a direct contradiction of the original 
idea with which I start. Starting from unlimited freedom, I arrive at 
unlimited despotism." 34 Such, it seems, is the plight of the social 
contract theory. The general will, whichever way it is interpreted, 
is absolutely despotic. Its will is both the legal and the moral law; 
no appeal can be made to its decrees since every individual in his 
capacity as legislator of the general will, wills the law whether £E_ not 
he recognizes himself as doing so. 
This notion of the will of the people as law is similar to the 
religious absolutist's notion of the will of God as law. Rousseau even 
takes the requisite step of deifying the general will, referring to the 
Sovereign power as "sacred" and "inviolable."35 Still under the guise 
of transcendent morality ~- since Rousseau never ceases to profess 
belief in a divineauthority who marks the true boundary of good and 
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evil -- he has moved from an authoritarian God-Centered morality to an 
authoritarian man-centered morality.· As Albert Camus puts it: "It is 
evident that, with The Social Contract, we are assisting at the birth 
of a new 'mystique' 
36 Himself." 
the will of the people being substituted for God 
Not only does the general will possess "a universally compulsive 
power, for moving and disposing each part in the manner most convenient 
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to the whole;" the .power it possesses is sanctioned as "moral." The 
general will is always morally right, not. just strong enough to do what 
it pleases right or wrong. Not only should individuals who run afoul 
of this "will" resign themselves to any punishment they receive, they 
should themselves condone and decree their own punishment as "right" 
since they are a part of the general will even when their private will 
runs counter to it. In this strange fashion, men are "forced to be 
f 1138 ree. 
Rousseau confounds the usual distinctions between the secular and 
the religious, force and right, liberty and servitude, morality and 
legality. What he arrives at is a society whose secular religion 
defines "right" because it has the force to do so, but has the force 
only because it must, by definition, be right. "Besides, in any case, 
the people are masters, and may change even the best laws, fo:t, if that 
body is disposed to injure itself, who has a right to prevent it?" 39 
Such ambiguous comments as these make it unclear how one should 
understand the general will. It is never clear whether it is a suppres-
sive force or a persuasive moral power. Nor is it clear whether or not 
it can be detected by such signs as majprity agreement or prosperity, 
as Rousseau himself sometimes suggests in comments such as the following: 
What is the end of political association? The preservation 
and prosperity of its members. And what is the most certain 
sign that they are preserved and that they prosper? Their 
numbers and their population. We need seek no further for 
the sign in dispute. That government is infallibly the best, 
all other things being equal, under which ... the citizens 
increase and multiply. That is the worst under which they 
lessen and decay. Calculators, it is now your affair; count, 
measure, and compare them.40 
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On one side, the general will seems to correspond to a transcendent 
truth available only through intuition; on the other side, the general 
will seems to be discoverable only by reference to the completely 
immanent and practical consideration of numbers. The first has the 
inherent difficulty of subjective solipsism. Who is it that sees 
rightly, and how can we know that he does? The latter has the practical 
advantage of wielding the power of numbers and also of being open to a 
socialmeans of verification. 
In the final analysis, modern morality has leaned in the direction 
of interpreting morality as immanent and practical -- as something which 
can be had by counting. In that respect, Rousseau's is the preeminent 
modern transition morality. On one hand, the general will seems to 
reflect an ideal conception of transcendence and has a certain almost 
mystical quality about it; on the other, it seems quite 9own to earth. 
Some Conclusions 
Strangely enough, it is the interpretation of Rousseau which 
advocates the immanent, clear-cut method of majority vote and the 
equally immanent appeal to social welfare which links him to the same 
moral sensibility found in Kant. Frankel seems to be on the right track 
in pointing to the principle of universality ':as bei11g "the formal 
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development of Rousseau's general will." The aim of both the 
universalization principle and the general will is to give a definite 
form and shape to the concept of morality. In the final analysis, 
Rousseau seems to trust personal intuition and feeling as little as 
54 
Kant. Kant uses formal logic to keep individual feelings and impulses 
in check; Rousseau uses the general will to do the same thing. Both 
are devices for eliminating the uncertainty of the personal emotional 
elemerit while still claiming the importance of individual moral autonomy. 
Theoretically, they are at least partially successful in this, but in 
actual moral experience the personal element in both their moral 
theories is frustrated. Imagine the personal frustration of clearly 
seeing where your duty lay only to be told that despite your "feelings" 
it lay in the opposite direction. Such is a very real possibility in 
the theories of Rousseau and Kant. 
In Rousseau's theory, private intuition and will are wholly sub-
servient to the suppressive force of majority will. In many ways (and 
in spite of his efforts to the contrary) it seems as though Rousseau's 
attempts to secure objectivity result in turning private impulse over 
to publi.c impulse. In spite of his talk of the general will it is not 
clear that there is such an identifiable thing as an infallibly moral, 
and socially unified will. In spite of his efforts, the suspicion 
lingers that The Social Contract is a thoroughly immanent document 
which .seems to. advocate a modified program of "might makes right" where 
"might" is taken to mean the power of·numbers. 
Kant, of course, thoroughly rejects the connection of morality 
with social data of any kind. In his case, the individual is over-
whelmed, not by society, but by intractable "reason." Nicolas Berdyaev 
remarks: 
Kant's theory of autonomy has no bearing on human freedom. 
It is the moral law that is autonomous and not man. Freedom 
is needed solely for carrying out the moral law. Kant's 
autonomous ethics really ignores man: all that exists for 
it is the moral and intellectual nature which ·suppresses 
man as a concrete individual.42 
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In both Kant and Rousseau the personal connection to morality is 
thoroughly mediated through an impersonal force. Like Kant, the 
sensibility displayed by Rousseau is the sensibility of order. This is 
true despite his appeal to emotions, feelings, and intuitions. In the 
final analysis all such personal sentiments are used only to endorse 
the surrender of personal feelings to an impersonal higher realm. In 
neither case are the elements of personal intuition and transcendence 
completely abandoned, they are merely transmuted into a safer form; 
but in both cases it is this transmutation which leads to actions and 
attitudes which run counter to many basic moral intuitions. Rousseau, 
like Kant, demonstrates the mediated path of order; but in Rousseau's 
case the mediator is social rather than rational. Both mediators serve 
the purpose of making moral actions relatively accessible and stable; 
and both succeed in escaping the dangers of misapprehension and con-
fusion inherent in relying on personal intuition and feeling; however, 
insofar as they relegate personal intuitions to a secondary status, 
they fail to adequately account for the role of personal intuition in 
morality. Intuition is sacrificed to order. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FROM-GOD"TO MAN 
On top of all their other difficulties, the supposed link between 
immanent arid transcendent reality is questionable in both K~mt 's and 
Rousseau's moral theory. The connection between rationality and a 
transcendent realm is asserted on the basis of the exemption of 
rationality from natural law, but Kant himself admits that this is not 
a formal proof so much as a practical presupposition} 
The connection between the general will and the will of God is 
even more hypothetical. Rousseau is ambiguous on this matter. Even 
though he hangs onto the notion of God as the final arbiter, God is no 
longer a real factor in deciding cases of morality -- that function has 
been (for all practical purposes, if not for all of Rousseau's moral 
purposes) usurped by "the people." He implies that there is a real 
connection between a transcendent realm and 'the general will, but never 
quite explains how this connection is possible. Rousseau asserts the 
existence of~a transcendent authority almost as a matter of course, 
but as a hypothesis it serves no useful function; and ·since it possesses 
no additional explanatory power it is, in keeping with Ockham's Razor, 
duly deleted bj later relativist's accounts of morality. 
Kant's theory might well be seen as an attempt to stern the tide of 
irnrnc:mence, practicality, and morality by majority vote (unleashed by 
Rousseau and others) but his arguments fail to convince us that 
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consequences and sentiments are irrelevant. And if "feeling" and 
acceptable consequences are the chief factors in determining morality, 
then men should be able to determine their moral duty without reference 
to any world other than this one. If the immanent "signs" of transcen-
dent morality include such things as personal feelings, majority 
preference, and practical cons·equence, why presume that there is a 
transcendent side to morality at all? Is it not possible that morality 
only has an immanent side? 
Among Rousseau's most important contributions to modern moral 
theory is this shift in emphasis from the transcendent and the indi-
vidual to the immanent and the social. He brings into focus the 
utility and feasibility of the social concept of morality and thus 
ushers in a new age of moral reasoning. With rare exceptions, 
society -- rather than the individual -- now becomes the focus of 
morality. If the basis of morality is social and society provides the 
only "objective" measure of morality, then an individual's morality 
must be measured by a social standard, and the concepts of majority 
opinion, practical consequence, custom, etc. become important parts of 
the moral vocabulary. 
In the next two sections -- using the ethical theories of G. E. 
Moore and Edward Westermarck -- we hope to point out three things about 
the rise of immanent morality. First, we hope to point out the 
similarity of objective relativism and 'vicious' relativism. Second, 
we hope to point out the peculiar habit non-transcendent morality has 
of implicitly pre-supposing transcendence. Third, we hope to point out 
the sensibility of ord~r displayed by these immanent theories of 
morality. 
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G. E. Moore 
Moore represents the coming together of two modern moral tradi-
tions, those of intuitionism and utilitarianism; but in bringing them 
together, he modifies both. His intuitionism is primarily a reaction 
against the problems involved in holding the traditionally hedonistic 
utilitarian view. His utilitarianism is formulated, at least in part, 
in response to the difficulties of holding an intuitionist view. As a 
utilitarian, Moore argues that the goal of ethics must be to achieve 
"good" consequences; while as an intuitionist, Moore argues against the 
utilitarian attempt to define "good" as a natural, empirical property. 
Utilitarians argue that morality is merely a problem of discover-
ing what is humanly good and then determining how it can best be 
obtained. Unlike Kant, who insists that the consequences of an action 
are irrelevant in determining moral duty, theutilitarians insist that 
they are the most relevant factor in determiningmoral duty. The 
utilitarian response to Kant is to point out the absurdity of maintain-
ing the obligatoriness of an action from which absolutely no good 
consequence emerges. If it is impossible to discover any positive 
effects a moral action has, what possible point could there be in 
acting morally? Moral actions must be aimed at bringing about some 
good consequence. So far, our own findings have confirmed this 
observation. We noted in the last chapter the counter-intuitiveness of 
completely ignoring the consequences of an action. However, consequences 
can be of more than one type. For instance, a distinction might be 
made between "exterior" and ''interior" consequence. Exterior con-
sequences have to do with visible or otherwise "public" effects in the 
environment. Interior consequences have to do with less tangible 
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effects on one's character or spiritual life. 
Further, it seems only fair to point out that the basic presump-
tion of the utilitarians is not as far as is generally supposed from a 
hidden preswnption in most transcendent theories. That preswnption is 
this: "If all men were to follow the rules and standards laid down by 
this ethical, moral, or religious view, the world would be the best 
possible world it could be." Of course the transcendent moralist 
insists that it is a man's duty to obey s.uch rules regardless of how 
other men act, or how the world actually is; while the immanent 
relativist insists that duties are subject to change accordingly as 
men can be expected to act, or as the world is in reality. 
Still, .it is not quite fair to claim that the transcendentalist 
ignores consequences altogether while· the utilitarian takes them into 
. account. It is oore. the case that one places greater emphasis on the 
consequences of an action in developing personal, moral traits; and the 
other places more emphasis on social consequences regarding the general 
public welfare. Thus, there are at least two levels of consequence 
which may be considered -- and not only the social level of consequence 
as is often implied by the utilitarians. Utilitarians generally regard 
the development of personal moral traits only in relationship to their 
value in promoting public welfare, but they need not be s9 considered. 
The development of personal moral traits may be thought of as a 
desirable consequence in itself apart from any positive effect such 
traits might have upon society. 
Despite this difference in emphasis, however, it is not in the 
acknowledgment of an ideal aim that the two groups disagree; rather it 
is in their method of determining what kinds of things are truly good 
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and truly worth having. The transcendentalist claims that there is an 
ultimate, transcendent guide to such goodness and worthiness, and that 
individual men and societies are not always correct as to what is good 
and worthy. According to them, men'must often submit to a wisdom 
greater and truer than their own desires and inclinations in order to 
produce goodness. 
In dismissing the reality of a transcendent guide, utilitarians 
are totally dependent on the conceptions of goodness actually present 
in actual ·people. They believe that the only reasonable way of dis-
covering moral duties is to notice the results which actions tend to 
produce, and name those actions which produce desirable consequences 
"moral" and those which produce undesirable consequences "immoral." 
This appears to be a fairly straightforward approach to morality, until 
it comes to the point of identifying and discriminating between good 
and bad, desirable and undesirable consequences. On their own grounds, 
something which no one thought good could ever be good; and something 
which everyone thought good could never be bad. So far their criterion 
remains fairly clear. But what happens when there arise disagreements 
about what is desirable and what is not? Moore's argument with 
utilitarianism and his flirtation with intuitionism starts at this 
point. 
John Stuart Mill maintains that: " .•. actions are right in 
proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to 
produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure 
and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of 
. 2 
pleasure." He arrives at this conclusion in the following manner: 
first he assumes that the only way of discovering what is desirable or 
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good is to find out what it is that men actually desire; second, he 
claims that the one thing all men desire above all things and as an end 
in itself is pleasure. Even though he admits that men desire other 
things as well, he insists that all other things are desired because 
3 they provide a means to pleasure. Third, from the fact that all men 
singly desire their own happiness, Mill draws the doubtful conclusion 
that all men must therefore desire the general happiness. 4 Thus, Mill 
uses four terms as though they were interchangeable. The good is the 
desirable; the desirable is the desired; the desired is pleasure; and 
so the final good at which all moral actions aim must be pleasure. 
Mill's theory contains several debatable issues, but the important 
issue to which Moore takes exception is Mill's first step which claims 
that the desirable is merely that which is desired. 5 Moore insists: 
The desirable means simply what ought to be desired or 
deserves to be desired; just as the detestable means not 
what can be but what ought to be detested and the damnable 
what deserves to be damned.6 
Moore is concerned primarily with two issues. First, he is concerned 
to discover how men come to know what is desirable if it cannot be 
simply identified with the desired. In other words, he is interested 
in the meaning of the word "good." Second, he is concerned with the 
question of how men can effectively aim at producing "the Good" --
which he, as a utilitarian, claims is the final end of all moral actions. 
Rejecting the identification of "goodness" with wh~t is desired 
by arguing that the two could never be sensibly interchanged without 
vastly changing the meaning of sentences in which they are used, Moore 
concludes that "goodness" can only be described as a simple, indefinable 
property (like yellow) which can only be detected by direct intuition. 7 
So far, this tallies with some observations of our own made in earlier 
65 
chapters. "Goodness" in Moore's theory is intimately connected with 
personal cognition of goodness. Moore also believes that the attempt 
to identify goodness with some particular ''natural" property such as 
pleasure, survival, evolution, etc. is destructive of morality. He 
. explains: 
I have thus appropriated the name Naturalism to a particular 
method' of approaching Ethics -- a method which, strictly 
understood, is inconsistent with the possibility of any 
Ethics whatsoever. This method consists in substituting 
for 11 good '1 some one property of a natural object or of a 
collection of natural objects; and in thus replacing Ethics 
by some one of the natural sciences.B 
Just as we were in Chapter II, Moore in concerned with the 
necessarily unique quality of the moral term "good". He determines that 
when goodness is reduced to some natural quality (as is the case in 
classical utilitarianism) one of two things happens: (1) either 
morality ceases to be a distinctive activity and is absorbed into 
other human affairs; or, (2) it is discovered that despite the 
description of what "is," the question of what "ought" to be remains 
open. Ally description of what exists in reality is, for ·Moore, 
logically distinct from the question of what ought to exist -- just as 
the question of what "is" done is logically distinct from the question 
of what "ought" to be done, and the question of what "is" desired is 
logically distinct from the question of what "ought" to be desired. 
At least part of the problem Moore sees in identifying the 
desirable and the desired, is that in such an identification the only 
possibility of being wrong about what is good is for a man to misunder-
stand what it is he actually desires -- and it might be a considerable 
task to convince anyone .. that he has made such a mistake. This identifi-
cation of the desired with the desirable also implies that it is 
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possible for different people to hold radically opposing views on what 
is good -- each of which would, nevertheless, be correct. Thus the 
utilitarian concept which was meant to insure a level of objectivity 
to morality ends up relying, in its most important aspect, upon a very 
subjective criterion. In many ways, it begins to sound like a version 
of the "vicious" relativism criticized earlier. 
Of course the limiting factor for the hedonistic utilitarians is 
9 the notion of the greatest good for the greatest number. But this 
means that the desirable is no longer defined as the desired, rather it 
is defined as that which the greatest number desire. This makes the 
objective model of morality the "conunonly desired" and, as in Rousseau, 
the oppressive weight of the majority is again felt by the dissenting 
individual. Social "force" takes the upper hand froin moral "right" in 
this formulation. 
Another problem in identifying the desirable and the desired is 
that the use of the moral "ought" seems entirely misplaced in such a 
theory. To say that one "ought" to do what he already wants to do, or 
will do anyway, sounds at best rather strange. It helps very little to 
explain that what is really meant is that an individual ought to do 
what the majority wants to do regardless of what the individual himself 
desires. Why "ought" an individual promote the general welfare at the 
expense of his own? In what is such a command grounded? It can't be 
·justified on the basis of what is in fact desired because what the 
individual in fact desires is his own happiness. Even if it is based 
' 
on what the individual really desires (in spite of what he thinks he 
desires) the problem of .duty is not ended, merely postponed. We again 
find ourselves at odds with the notion of obligation. In differentiating 
between "superficial" and "deep" desires the problem is once-removed, 
but still related. 
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Owing to such problems and inconsistencies, Moore believes that 
the concept of hedonistic utilitarianism cannot account for man's actual 
experience of morality. But he is far from evading all problems by 
insisting on the intuitive quality of goodness. His problem is one met 
with previously in Rousseau. If the desirable is not merely that which 
is desired, either by a single individual or a majority of individuals, 
who or what is the true standard of the desirable? 
Moore is a utilitarian, but he insists that morality is not simply 
that which produces the greatest pleasure for the greatest number, but 
rather that which produces the greatest amount of good. -"Good," for 
Moore, is not reducible to pleasure, or any other natural quality, 
although he is willing to admit that pleasure is a good. According to 
Moore, when we say that something is "good" we are claiming nothing 
more than that it possesses the intuitive property of goodness. 
"The Good," on the other hand, is not simple but complex. It, 
unlike "goodness," can be analyzed into its component parts such that 
pleasure may be a part of the "Good" but is certainly not equivalent to 
it. Nor can the "Good" be abstracted into a number of experiences, 
objects, or actions each of which possesses the indefinable character-
istic of goodness, rather it is a complex whole which may or may not 
include things which possess "goodness," but which as ~ whole does 
possess "goodness." In the final analysis, then, not only "goodness" 
but the "Good" as well can only be known through intuition. In other 
words, intuition and intuition alone is the true standard of the 
desirable -- both as a ~eans and as the final end of morality. 
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It is with this reliance upon individual intuition that Moore 
begins to have troubles of his own. His trouble is due, in part, to 
the difficulties of any intuitionist theory, but this trouble is corn-
pounded first, by his refusal to ground intuition in any transcendent 
reality and second, by his own account of how men should best go about 
obtaining the "Good." 
Moore observes that not only does the equation of morality with 
any "natural" feature of reality fail to produce morality -,... the 
equation of morality with any supernatural feature of reality fails as 
well. He admits that metaphysical schemes of morality are superior 
insofar as they recognize, " ... that for perfect goodness rncuh more is 
required than any quantity of what exists here and now or can be 
i f d 1 k 1 f .. 10 n erre as i e y to exist in the uture. However, metaphysical 
schemes imply that an " ••• ethical proposition follows from some 
proposition which is metaphysical; that the question 'What is real?' 
11 has some logical bearing upon the question 'What is good?'" Meta-
physical schemes shift the "is" from here and now to some eternal 
reality, but still make the mistake of trying to obtain an "ought" 
statement from an "is" statement. Just as Moore claimed that the 
question of what the world is like is logically distinct from what the 
world ought to be like, so he claims that the way any ultimate reality 
11 is" is logically distinct from the way this world "ought" to be. 
Moore cannot anchor intuition in some transcendent reality, nor 
does he want to. However, if he is neither willing to ground morality 
in naturalism or supernaturalism, what objectivity could his notions of 
the good or of goodness have? How does an appeal to intuition help him 
to differentiate between the desirable and the desired if there is no 
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ultimately objective criteria against which these essentially subjective 
intuitions can be measured? 
Moore claims that imaginative formulations of utopian schemes are 
far more helpful in determining what ought to be than are investiga-
tions into the metaphysical question of what is. 12 
-
Nevertheless, as 
was mentioned in Chapter II, a moral ideal must be something more than 
13 
"imaginary." If it is not, it is impossible to appeal to ideals as 
better or worse, right or wrong -- they merely ~· By what right does 
a man claim that his ideal is better than another man's? What makes a 
man have a certain ideal? What makes it seem ideal to him? If ideals 
do not transcend the natural world of psychological, physiological and 
sociological."facts" in the direction of some kind of reality, then 
ideals are no less brute facts than that which they pretend to trans-
cend. No ideal could, ·in itself, claim to be the inherently correct or 
right ideal except insofar as it could claim to be the ideal held by 
most people. 
Moore, in attempting to avoid the identification of the desired 
and the desirable appeals to intuition, but in his refusal to indicate 
for intuition a transcendent status, it is unclear how intuition 
avoids the extreme form of subjectivism which makes the "desired" 
unsuitable as a standard of morality. Just as desires differ from 
person to person, so too, it seems, do intuitions. Just as it proved 
impossible to speak of good and bad, better or worse desires; so it 
proves impossible (even in theory) to differentiate good and bad, 
better and worse intuitions. 
If intuitions are the only standard for the truly desirable, 
then each individual intuition must be infallible and it is again 
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possible for conflicting goals to all rightfully insist upon being 
the truly desirable. Once again, the similarity of such a view to 
"vicious" re1ati vism cannot be overlooked. 
Moore seems to be aware of the problem of solipsism inherent in 
relying on intuition, and constructs the other half of his moral theory 
with that problem in mind. But it is hard to reconcile his practical 
moral conclusions with his original statements about the relationship 
between individual intuition and goodness. It is even harder to under-
stand how he can consistently maintain his theoretical·stance on "the 
Good" and "goodness;" his ideal stance on the true nature of the Good; 
and his analysis of the practical application of ethics at one and the 
same time. They seem determined to fly off into separate corners. 
Moore attempts to account for the personal and emot~onal element 
of morality by reference to intuition, but intuition·isolated from a 
transcendent reality cannot account for the objective element in moral-
ity. Thus, in his ideal ethics, intuition provides men with a universal 
guide to roorality binding upon all men; while in his practical ethics 
intuition at best furnishes a warning to individuals to stay within 
their own limited social customs. 
Moore believes that the ideal goals of men must be, and are, 
self-evident. This is very much in keeping with his intuitionist 
theory of the Good. According to Moore: 
By far the most valuable things which we know or can imagine, 
are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly 
described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the 
enjoyment of beautiful objects. No one, probably, who has 
asked himself the question has ever doubted that personal 
affection and the appreciation of what is beautiful in Art 
or Nature, are good in themselves; nor, if we consider 
strictly what thi'ngs are worth having purely for their own 
sakes, does it appear probable that any one will think that 
anything else has nearly so great a value as the things which 
are included under these two heads.l4 
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This would lead us to understand that Moore is claiming that all 
men do universally desire these two things as ultimate ends. However, 
he cannot mean by this that these two values are merely. descriptively 
urtiversal, or else he becomes a victim of his own rtaturalistic fallacy. 
The "pleasures of human intercourse," and the "enjoyment of beautiful 
things" cannot be good because they are valued universally. By 
describing these ideal goals as universal, Moore must have something 
else in mind than descriptive universality -- though he may also believe 
that these ideals are descriptively universal. 
Being unable to base this universalistic claim on what "is" the 
case, Moore attempts to find this universal formula for morality by 
relying on intuition. His theory rests on an appeal to social utility, 
but it is based upon the pursuit of an intuitive social ideal, rather 
than on the pursuit of pleasure or the mere survival of a community. 
This social ideal is, he thinks, universal. Societies in general should 
pursue a moral program which has as its aim the ideal of the enjoyment 
of friendship and beauty. 
Moore's problems begin when he attempts to give definiteness to 
the concepts of friendship and beauty. In so doing, he seems to imply 
that. these concepts are not only descriptively universal in their 
applications, but also transcendent in scope. This becomes apparent in 
his discussion of the relevance of truth to his categories of the 
experience of personal affection and the appreciation of the beautiful. 
Since this problem is seen most clearly in his discussion of the 
beautiful, we will use it to illustrate the point. 
When Moore attributes intrinsic worth or goodness to the whole 
phenomenon of appreciation of beauty, he has several things in mind. 
"Appreciation" and "beauty" cannot be taken to mean any emotion of 
72 
approval or attraction in the case of "appreciation;" nor merely per-
ceived or imagined beauty in the case of beauty. "Appreciation" means 
here the precisely appropriate emotional response to the correctly 
cognized object. Moore goes on to say: 
But it is important to observe that these wholes are organic, 
and that hence, it does not follow that the emotion Ez 
itself, would have any value whatsoever, nor yet that, if 
it were directed to a different object, the whole thus formed 
might not be positively bad. And, in fact, it seems to be 
the case that if we distinguish the emotional element in any 
aesthetic appreciation, from the cognitive element, which 
accompanies it and is, in fact, commonly thought of as a 
part of the emotion; and if we consi9er what value this 
emotional element would have, existing EY itself, we can 
hardly think that it has any great value, even'if it has any 
at all. Whereas, if the same emotion be directed to a 
different object, if, for instance, it is felt towards an 
object that is positively ugly, the whole state of conscious-
ness is certainly often positively bad in a high degree.l5 
Beauty, both by implication of the meaning of appreciation, and 
by explicit statements of his own, seems to mean to Moore what is 
honestly and truly beautiful (one might say, objectively beautiful, in 
the sense that an object can actually be said to possess beauty) and 
not merely what seems to some, or even most, people to be beautiful. 
Moore gives to both "appreciation" and "beauty" status as being 
capable of being true or false. It is possible to accuse someone of 
responding to an object "incorrectly." It is possible to deny that an 
object, which others perhaps admire, has any "real" beauty. Thus, 
"truth" is important in deciding which things are beautiful and what 
sort of emotional response is appropriate to different objects. Not any 
appreciation of any object will do. The ideal of "appreciation of the 
beautiful" would be the proper emotional response to an object which was 
properly cognized and really existed in the mode in which it was cognized. 
This clearly seems to implicate Moore in the belief that not only should 
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men strive to appreciate beautiful things, but ideally they should strive 
to appreciate properly the true beauty of truly existing things. 
It follows that one should not only enjoy personal intercourse 
with persons, but that one should properly enjoy appropriate inter-
course with persons who are truly worthy of friendship, and who are 
correctly cognized as being truly worthy of friendship. Not any kind 
of personal intercourse is truly. worthy of enjoyment. 
This manner of looking at values is certainly in line with his 
criticism of hedonistic utilitarianism. He clearly supports his belief 
that the desirable is not only what is desired, but what ought to be 
desired. But it is hard to reconcile this disregard of empiricism 
with his refusal to ground morality in metaphysics. This "thing" which 
ought to be desired and against which actual desires must be measured 
is for Moore an "ideal" yet to be achieved. But where does the ideal 
get its status as the correct ideal if it is not simply that which men 
do, in fact, think ideal? In insisting that values are not reliant 
upon an individual's valuing them, and that "truth" can be applicable 
in statements of value, Moore seems to give transcendent status to 
values. Values are discovered, not invented. They do not rest solely 
upon the fact of desire, but upon an apparently inherent "ought." If a 
person could be found who honestly did not desire to appreciate beauty 
in art and nature, or who did have a feeling akin to appreciation 
of beauty, but applied it improperly or to improp~r objects, it would 
be appropriate to claim that, regardless of the emotions he did in fact 
have, there were other, different emotions he ought to have. 
If it is conceded not only that a particular aim is the truly 
moral aim, but also that that aim can only correspond to values that 
74 
have a "real" existence outside of our private apprehension of them, it 
seems but a short step to the conclusion that the Good must be transcen-
dent, and that it must refer to a really existing state of affairs. If 
it is possible for an object to contain beauty outside 1of human recogni-
tion of it, then the beauty of that object must exist independently 
of men's thoughts, needs, and wishes. The only other possibility of 
being wrong resides in the definition of beauty as that which a 
majority of people find beautiful or pleasing. That gi~es a type of 
objectivity to beauty such that a man can be said to be wrong if he is 
in the minority. Outside of these two possibilities, "right 11 and "wrong" 
seem to be meaningless apart from their subjective, emotional content • 
. Moore firmly rejects the move to d~fine beauty according to 
majority opinion. He also refuses to consider morality as being purely 
emotive. This would seem to leave him no choice but the first; but he 
rejects the possibility of the transcendent existence of the Good on 
the grounds that it is merely another way of obtaining an "ought"· from 
an "is." Moore obviously believes that there is substantially no 
difference between a transcendent "is" and an immanent one. In the 
same way that it is pointless to rebel against nature if morality 
depends on immanent reality; if morality depends upon a transcendent 
reality, then reality becomes the "stone wall" against which it is 
useless to rebel. 
The problem is this: if Moore wants to hold onto the ideal he 
formulates as being the only valid aim of morality, such an ideal 
implies that there is a truly existing state of affairs that does not 
depend for its reality on men's thoughts or desires -- in other words, 
there is a sense in which the truly good transcends mankind, and 
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insofar as morality hopes to attain that which is truly good, it is 
aimed at this transcendent. No objectivity is possible for morality if 
it cannot be anchored in some reality, either natural or supernatural. 
I 
But even if Moore were to admit the transcendent status of intui-
tion, he would still not find an end to his difficulties, for he now 
shines a light on one of the most frustrating elements of morality: 
It is often pointed out that I cannot at any moment distin-
guish what is true from what I think so: and that is true. 
But though I cannot distinguish what is true from what I 
think so, I always can distinguish what I mean by saying 
that it is true from what I mean by saying that I think so. 
For I understand the meaning of the supposition that what 
I think true may nevertheless be false. 16 
In other words, though the truth may be independent of my thoughts and 
desires, my thoughts and desires are the only possible access I have to 
discovering the truth. So that while what I "feel" or intuit to be the 
"Good" may not in fact be so, the fact that I think it: so, is, for me, 
all important. Thus, Moore casts doubt on the possibility of ever 
assuring the commensurability of personally experienced obligation and 
objectively obligatory "duty," yet gives us no access to the objectively 
obligatory other than the subjective experience of obligation. 
Moore's practical ethics are based upon this dichotomy between 
truth and what is thought to be true. It is here that his morality 
becomes noticably immanent and relativistic. In practical ethics, he 
believes that it is quite possible for a person to be mistaken not only 
about those t~ings which are intrinsically good, but also about the way 
in which it is possible to attain what is felt to be intrinsically good. 
From the beginning then, Moore feels it is only reasonable to forget 
about attai~ing the "absolute good" and aim for the "human good" since 
it is the only kind of good to which we have direct access. In fact, he 
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believes the "absolute good" is far too abstract a notion to have any 
meaning for men in practical ethics. 
Moore's reasoning leads him to conclude that due to the relation-
ship between "goodness" as a simple property, and the "good" as an 
integrated and complex whole, " ••• it follows that the best whole may be 
one, which contains none of the positive goods with which we are 
17 acquainted." Thus, there is no practical way to use the absolute good 
as a guide to conduct. It may be beyond our means to obtain it, since 
we must aim at goodness which we do perceive as goodness, and not that 
which we do not perceive as such. If the absolute good were something 
of which we were not aware, it would be irrelevant to men in conducting 
. 18 
their lives. 
Of necessity, the goal of practical ethics is to discover, 
" ••. which among a few alternatives possible under certain circumstances, 
will, on the whole, produce the best result."19 But at this point, 
Moore discovers yet another problem. It is not all that easy to decide 
which, among the alternatives men can be reasonably expected to take 
into account, is the best possible action to choose. We can never be 
completely sure that the action we take is, in the long run, the best 
one open to us. The range of our knowledge of the consequences of our 
actions is limited both in time and space. Our actions, however, are 
not so confined in their effects and reverberations. The only mitiga-
tion to this claim is the likelihood that our actions will not adversely 
affect the Universe since, " ••• there may be a probability that after a 
certain time all the effects of any particular action become so nearly 
indifferent, that any difference between their value and that of the 
effects of another action, is very unlikely to outweigh an obvious 
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d ff h 1 f h • d' ff u20 i erence in t e va ue o t e 1mme 1ate e ects. For Moore, then, 
although we can never be sure, we can have good reasons for supposing 
that one action will probably produce better results than another 
action in the immediate future; and that the difference between their 
long-range effects will be so negligible as to be of no-concern to us. 
But here, again, Moore must somewhat amend his .original goal of 
producing the greatest amount of actual good possible. The probability 
of producing better results can only arise within a particular social 
context. We cannot hope to produce universal maxims which will always 
and everywhere produce the·greatest balance of good in the future, we 
can only aim at those maxims which will generally produce good in the 
particular social context in question. 
Moore concludes that under the pressure of this very vague arena 
in which moral actions take place, we can only prove the probability of 
an action generally producing good in the immediate future within the 
circumstances of a given context. From this, he draws the further 
implication that the only ru.les of which it is possible to prove the 
general utility are those which are both generally acknowledged and 
practiced. The correlate of this is that for those laws not generally 
practiced it is •i ••• very doubtful whether a case for their general 
21 utility can ever be conclusively made out." Therefore, despite his 
original goal of universality, we have no way of comparing the differ-
ing rules societies may have-- those are simply "givens." All we can 
do is consider the effectiveness of those rules in realizing a 
particular socially defined end, and even here we are limited in our 
ability to predict th~ consequences of rules not practiced. 
A further and even more startling implication of this view is 
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thnL gJven the improbability of being certain that any particular action 
wl.ll il<lve better over-all effects than another alternative, no individual 
Ii:; ever just [ fJed ln acting otherwise than in accordance with those 
rules generally practiced in his society -- even though his rule-
defying action would seem to tend to bring about better over-all results. 
The reason: 
It seems, then, that with regard to any rule which is generally 
useful, we may assert that it ought always to be observed; 
not on the ground that in every particular case it will be 
useful, but on the ground that in any particular case the 
probability of its being so is greater than that of our being 
likely to decide ri~htly that we have before us an instance 
of its disutility.2 
By now, it should be evident that· Moore's practical ethics have 
lost all contact with his prior delineation of "goodness" and the "Good." 
Goodness, as a simple intuitive property, is no longer the sdle 
criterion of judgment~ The Good is no longer an objectively real ideal 
to be universally pursued, but a socially determined goal which may 
differ radically from society to society. In short, he ends up advising 
men to disregard the intuited goodness of particular cases in order to 
bring about a broader probability of utility based upon a generalized 
intuition, that is in turn mediated through a society's actual 
practices. The direct and individual intuition of an idepl (which he 
originally uses to justify morality) has somehow got lost in the 
shuffle. 
Men are first told that their only true duty is to aim at bring-
ing into existence those things which are self-evidently good: 
... it is only for the sake of these things-- in order that 
as much of them as possible may at some time exist -- that 
any one can be justified in performing any public.or private 
duty; that they are 'the ''raison d'etre 11 of virtue; that it 
is they ~- these complex wholes themselves, and not any 
constituent or characteristic of them -- that form the 
rational Ultimate end of human action and the sole criterion 
of social progress: these appear to be truths which have 
been generally overlooked.23 
Perhaps Moore is guilty of overlooking these truths as well, for he 
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proceeds to declare that though these are the only legitimate aims of 
duty, they are aims which men cannot pursue in practical ethics except 
insofar as they agree with generally accepted and practiced moral codes. 
And this because, although there is a distinction between seeming and 
being, an individual can never be certain·whether he is pursuing what 
"is" good or what "seems" to be good. Theoretically, we can differen-
tiate these two, but practically, we cannot. So, it becomes necessary 
for practical ethics cautiously to pursue general rules aimed at a 
probable general utility, rather than individual actions aimed at the 
absolute good. 
Regardless of the claims made by his ideal ethics, Moore's 
practical ethics seem entirely snared in the status quo. And, in spite 
of his own protests against it, the "is" of his practical ethics in 
large part determines the "ought" of his ideal ethics. An individual's 
actions are not, in the final analysis, based upon what is thought by 
him to be good -- that is disallowed as a possible criterion. Moore's 
theory leaves the individual as straight-jacketed by rules as Kant's 
theory of the categorical imperative, without Kant's justification of 
intrinsic goodness. Moore gives up any notions of that kind when he 
admits: 
The question whether the general observance of a rule not 
generally observed, would or would not be desirable, cannot 
much affect the question how any individual.ought to act; 
since, on the one hand, there is a large probability that 
he. will not by any :means be able to bring about the general 
observance; and, on the other hand, the fact that its general 
observance would be useful could, in any case, give him no 
reason to conclude that he himself ought to observe it, in 
the absence of such general observance. 24 
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Might we conclude that although Moore believes friendship to be 
intrinsically good, it would not be incumbent upon anyone to act from 
motives of friendship unless he had good reason to believe that such 
actions were generally condoned and acted upon? In that case friendship 
is dependent for its goodness and not good in itself. In Moore's view, 
·the only consideration which finally decides our duty must be custom 
and observance. Though there may be something which can be said to be 
the absolutely good, it is not "practical" to act upon such suppositions. 
Here again, we run into a morality which insists on mediating 
between the individual and his intuitions and feelings concerning 
morality. This time, "general observance" becomes the "stone wall" of 
morality beyond which individuals must not go, despite their own personal 
perceptions. The sensibility of order is once again in evidence. Moore 
rejects individuAl intuition because of its uncertainty and danger, and 
accepts the safer path of custom. His fears seem to be much the same 
as those voiced by Walter Stace: 
But to allow my mind to be in.this way entangled in the endless 
ramifications of future circumstance, in the maze of all 
possible, probable, or improbable consequences -- this is a 
profoundly dangerous proceeding. It is so fatally easy to 
twist such considerations into an excuse for.doing what I 
want, a justification of myself for deviating from the straight 
and narrow path. It is better to avoid all this, to keep my 
eyes fixed upon the safe rule -- "Do not lie" and to tum them 
steadily away from all else. It is generally better to do what 
the rule tells us is right, and to let the consequences be what 
they may. 25 
The experience of a personal obligation to obey rules regardless 
of their apparent obtuseness is particularly evident in this passage. 
The obligation appears to be not only a practical one, but a moral one. 
It is immoral to knowingly put oneself in the ambiguous position Stace 
I 
describes. This same moral element is evidenced in many of Moore's own 
statements, such as the following: 
For it is impossible for any one to keep his intellect and 
sentiments so clear, but that, if he has once approved of 
a generally wrong action, he will be more likely to approve 
of it also under other circumstances than those which 
justified it in the first instance. 26 
Moore also seems to think that reliance upon personal intuition is a 
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dangerous proceeding, and one that cannot be trusted to produce moral-
ity. Intuition must be mediated through custom. 
Two things of especial importance have surfaced in this look at 
Moore's ethics. First, it becomes evident that unless some appeal is 
made to a transcendent ground of moral judgments, moral distinctions 
collapse into being the products of subjective emotional preferences, 
and the only claim to objective status comes from an appeal to what 
"mostu people like, prefer, or feel is right. Insofar as moral claims 
do more than describe a peculiar emotional state or a "normal" psycho-
logical profile, they seem to imply transcendence. 
Second, we again discovered the particular moral sensibility 
which finds it desirable to avoid the difficulties and danger of rely-
ing on individual moral intuition and feelings to discover moral duties. 
Moore bases his fear of intuition on two grounds. First, he agrees with 
Kant that emotions being what they are, we can never be certain of the 
purity of our moral decisions. It is always possible for selfish 
motives to slip unaware into what we take to be strictly moral decisions. 
Second, Moore points out that it is never possible for an individual to 
distinguish what ~ true from what he thinks to be true. The distrust 
of intuition is particularly striking in Moore, since his theory is in 
large part dependent upon intuition. He does not succeed in banishing 
it, but he does succeed in mediating it through the customary. However, 
it is this mediation of custom and social order which leads Moore to 
make such claims as this: 
There is, therefore, a strong probability in favour of 
adherence to an existing custom, even if it be a bad one.27 
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Here, order triumphs over the personal intuition of the individual to 
·an extent which seems· at first glance, "immoral." 
Edward Westermarck 
As we saw in the last section, Moore is unwilling to build his 
moral theory on top of a metaphysical and transcendent reality. His 
reasons are compelling inasmuch as his idealistic ethics emphasize 
morality as what should be rather than as what is. But he is caught 
between the need to account for man's personal relationship to morality 
implied by the word "ought" -- and the need to account for an impersonal 
element in morality which is "there" regardless of what men desire or 
feel. 
Moore's determination to keep morality free of the "stone wall" 
syndrome is one with which our own observations have been sympathetic. 
It is futile to imagine morality as being a "fact" entirely tnlrelated 
to human sentiments. Further, when morality is imagined to be indepen-
dent of that which is experienced as moral, the notion of "obligation" 
becomes problematic, and the line between "force" and "right" is 
blurred. On the other hand, when morality is totally unrelated to an 
exterior reality of some kind, it becomes a flimsy and highly subjec-
tive concept. 
In rejecting both naturalism and supernaturalism, Moore finds 
himself in a dilemma. It is-hard to understand how the morality he 
describes can be in any sense "objective" without falling into either 
· naturalism or supernaturalism. 
A. J. Ayer, in his work, Language Truth and Logic, similarly 
8.3 
rejects naturalism and supernaturalism; however, he does not continue 
to insist that morality is in any way objective. Explains Ayer: 
In admitting that normative ethical concepts are irreducible 
to empirical concepts, we seem to be leaving the way clear 
for the 1' absolutist 11 view of ethics -- that is, the view 
that statements of value are not controlled by observation, 
as ordinary empirical propositions are, but only by a 
mysterious "intellectual intuition.'' A feature of this 
theory, which is seldom recognized by its advocates, is 
that it makes statements of value unverifiable. For it is 
notorious that what seems intuitively certain to one 
person may seem doubtful, or even false, to another. So 
that unless it is possible to provide some criterion by 
which one may decide between conflicting intuitions, a 
mere appeal to intuition is worthless as a test of a propo-
sitions validity. 28 
Ayer obviously would agree with our own indictment of Moore. He 
agrees that the search for a non-naturalistic, objective ethics seems 
to inevitably lead to a theory of intuition as insight into ultimate 
reality. However, he rejects such a theory because of the impossibil-
ity of verifying such a claim. At this point, instead of clinging to 
an unjustified and unverified notion of morality as objective, he 
turns in the only direction left him, that of a non-naturalistic, 
emotivist ethics. He continues his explanation: 
We can now see why it is impossible to find a criterion for 
determining the validity of ethical judgments. It is not 
because they have an 1' absolute '1 validity which is 
mysteriously independent of ordinary sense-experience, but 
because they have no objective validity whatsoever.29 
Ayer insists that moral statements are nothing more than " ••• expressions 
of emotion which can be neither true nor false." 30 
Given the inconsistencies inherent in Moo;re'~ view, Ayer's seems 
the more internally consistent. Despite the fact that men "feel" they 
are referring to something beyond their own feelings; if morality can 
be neither naturalistic nor supernaturalistic, it can have no claims to 
objectivity at all. 
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Ayer retains the uniqueness of morality (since, according to him, 
morality cannot be reduced to non-moral statements) and the individual-
ity of the moral experience of obligation (since morality is based on 
personal perceptions of obligation) but he does this only at the cost 
of making morality completely meaningless, except as an interesting 
psychological phenomenon. Internally consistent as his theory is, it 
is inconsistent with men's perennial experience of morality. Could 
Ayer, himself, regulate his own life on the basis of the intellectual 
convictions he espouses in Language Truth and Logic? Is it possible 
for men to think of morality as being merely an interesting psycho-
logical phenomenon and still continue to take their own moral convic-
tions seriously to shape their lives in obedience to demanding and 
difficult moral claims? Could a man "enlightened" on the subject of 
morality continue to consider his own actions in the light of duty and 
obligation? Would not a thorough-going familiarity with Ayer's 
ethical theory effectively destroy the inspirational power of morality, 
and morality itself, as most men experience it? It would seem so. And 
yet, objects; actions, and attitudes stubbornly persist in presenting 
themselves as right and wrong, good and bad -- even to men so enlightened. 
Edward Westermarck provides an interesting example of the 
ineradicability of the moral response. He could adequately be described 
as a "vicious'' relativist. He clarifies this ethical stance when he 
explains, 
••. the same act can be both good and bad, according as it 
is approved of by one individual and disapproved of by 
another. 31 
The important thing about such a claim is that he is not merely observ-
ing with Moore that what seems good to one person may~ bad to 
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another, he is claiming that there is no objectively correct claim 
independent of seeming. To "seem" good is the equivalent of "being" 
good. Westermarck accounts for the "feeling" of moral transcendence in 
this way: 
The only reasonableexplanation of the intimate connection 
between so-called intuitions and the presence of emotional 
tendencies is, so far as I can see that the intuitions 
actually·~ these tendencies formulated as judgments 
that are calculated to give moral values an objectivity 
that they do not in reality possess. 32 
Further, Westermarck claims that since morality is based solely 
upon irrational, emotional responses, individuals have no real control 
over their attitudes of approval and disapproval. He states, 
We approve and disapprove because we cannot do otherwise; 
our moral consciousness belongs to our mental constitution, 
which we cannot change as we please .••. 33 
Here is the ultimate "stone wall." Individuals cannot help but 
experience these feelings of approval and disapproval even though they 
understand that these "feelings" correspond to no objective reality 
beyond the "objective" reality of their subjective feelings. Though 
this explanation of morality is designed with the unique place of 
personally experienced obligation in mind, it does not adequately 
express the individual's experience of morality as being meta-subjective. 
In fact, in the final analysis, such an explanation is acceptable 
neither to societies nor to individuals within them. Westermarck him-
self well illustrates both these points. 
The most obvious complaint to be brought against this concept of 
morality is the chaotic social implications of such a personal and 
subjectivist doctrine. No individual could ever, on this account, be 
"wrong" in the usual sense of the word. Thus, it would seem difficult 
to ever justify public censure or moral disapproval. Though it seems 
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plausible to censure an action which is erroneously thought to be 
right, it is harder to justify censuring an act which "is" right. No 
matter how outrageous a person's behavior, chances are, he would only 
claim to be doing what was "right" in Westermarck's special sense. 
However, as many relative theorists quickly point out, it is not 
the case that societies do (or even could) operate upon such an 
individualistic basis. In actual point of fact, soc.ieties designate 
actions, etc. as "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong" on the basis of 
general approval and disapproval. Rewards and punishments are meted 
out on the basis of how closely an individual conforms to the norms of 
his group. Westermarck explains: 
It must not be supposed that, by deriving the characteristics 
of moral disapproval from its connection with custom, I 
implicitly contradict my initial proposition that moral 
emotions are at the bottom of all moral judgments. Custom 
is a moral rule only on account of the disapproval called 
forth by its transgression. In its ethical aspect it is 
nothing but a generalization of emotional tendencies, applied 
to certain modes of conduct and transmitted from generation 
to generation. 34 
But try as he might, Westermarck cannot disguise the fact that on this 
second formulation, what is right or wrong for an individual no longer 
precisely coincides with his moral emotions or what he personally 
approves or disapproves, rather, it coincides with what his society 
approves or disapproves. The personal perception of obligation has 
be.en replaced with a more objective and orderly version of morality. 
Unfortunately, unlike the similar shift in Moore's case, Westermarck's 
shift to the social concept of morality cannot be based upon the claim 
that the customary is 100re likely to be right than the view point of 
any dissenting individual owing to the fact that his initial definition 
of right and wrong is based upon individual approval and disapproval 
and not upon some objective version of morality. The most that 
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Westermarck can claim is that the group perception of morality usually 
coincides with individual perceptions since society molds personal 
.sentiments. With the standard of personal approval or disapproval as 
the only background for morality, the fact of majority approval or 
disapproval can only relate to superior force, not to superior 
insight -- or even superior probability of insight. 
In fact, given its emphasis on conformity, this social formulation 
of relative morality would seem inevitably to lead to the strictest 
suppression and repression of individuals, and the most stringent form 
of social reactionism. Nonetheless, Westermarck advocates the adoption 
of his thesis because he feels that it would be beneficial in "liberal-
izing" the otherwise repressive absolutistic notions of morality. He 
e:xplains: 
... it seems to me that ethical subjectivism, instead of 
being a danger, is more likely to be an advantage to moral-
ity. Could it be brought home to people that there is no 
absolute standard in morality, they would perhaps be on the 
one hand more tolerant and on the other hand more critical 
in their judgments. 35 
This statement is confusing in several respects. It is confusing 
in regard to the social aspect of morality raised by Westermarck. By 
its very nature, a society cannot tolerate any and all attitudes, 
actions, and dispositions without ceasing to function as a society. 
How is a society t·o discriminate allowable differences from unallowable 
ones? If custom is the only standard of morality, anything outside of 
the customary is definitionally immoral. 
On the other hand, if each individual is his own standard of 
morality, and each individual feels it incumbant upon him to tolerate 
every other individual's concept of morality, then the application of 
moral terms becomes gratuitous. Tolerance would lead to the ludicrous 
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position of insisting upon the acceptability of even those things which 
"are" wrong. With no criterion for discriminating between them, we 
would have to tolerate murderers and thieves as well as homosexuals and 
prostitutes. 
The former attitude is too strict to admit of tolerance at all, 
and the latter is too liberal to make any critical discrimination 
between the acceptable and the unacceptable -- one would even have to 
tolerate intolerance as a legitimately "moral" attitude. 
Westermarck's statement is additionally strange when juxtaposed 
against his claim that people approve and disapprove of things on the 
basis of mental dispositions over which they have very limited control. 
In advocating the moral attitude of tolerance, he seems. to be advocating 
the kind of change in mental attitude which, he indicates in other 
statements, is largely .beyond the control of individuals. 
Perhaps most puzzling of all are the value claims implicit in his 
statement. It is difficult to interpret exactly what Westermarck has in 
mind by claii:ning that the acceptance of ethical relativity woUld prove 
an"advantage to morality." From the tone of his comments it is easy 
to suppose he means that ethical relativity is "better" than ethical 
absolutism, or even that men "ought" to adopt the relative viewpoint. 
He seems to be claiming that ethical relativity is morally superior to 
ethical absolutism, but on the basis of ethical relativity alone, he 
has no grounds for such a claim. 
According to his own moral theory his claim might be reduced to 
either one of two statements. It might be reduced to: "Relativity is 
better because I have an etootionally approving attitude towards it" or, 
it might be reduced to: "Relativity is better because most people in my 
society have an approving attitude towards it." The question is, does 
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either reduction serve as a good reason for encouraging others to adopt 
a similar moral position? 
While the first interpretation may reveal something about Wester-
. marck himself, it reveals nothing about what the rest of us "ought" to 
do. And while the second interpretation tells us something about what 
is "right" :for men who happen to be a part of that particular society 
which approves of tolerance and critical thinking, it says nothing 
about what is right for anyone outside that society, and, presumably, 
it is toward these people that Westermarck aims his suggestion·. In 
addition, it explains nothing about the place of a dissenting indivi-
dual's own feelings of approval or disapproval. 
If Westermarck's claim is simply an appeal to "connnon sense," if. 
he means something like, "Well of course it's better to be tolerant and 
critical than to be intolerant and uncritical," does.he only mean it 
is better to be tolerant and critical if we happen to approve of those 
attitudes or if we happen to approve of the kind of world such character-
istics would foster? Or does he mean that we ought to approve of those 
characteristics and seek the kind of world they would foster? If it is 
the latter, what reasons could he bring forth to support this claim? 
Why ought we to want that kind of world or approve those characteristics? 
Because Westermarck does? Because it is somehow inherent in men to 
approve those things? Because most people approve them? 
Westermarck finds it irresistible to make statements of comparative 
moral value. The problem is to discover exactly what he means by 
calling one thing "better" than another. Even more important is to 
discover whether or not his "reasons" constitute valid grounds for 
expecting others to share his views. 
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If morality is anything like the kind of thing which Frankena 
described in Chapter II, it must be possible to give reasons for moral 
36 judgments. On the other hand, if morality is simply an irrational, 
emotional response, as Westermarck and Ayer seem to indicate, an 
individual could not be expected to produce reasons for his moral 
beliefs and that would put an effective end to any rational discussion 
of morality. But on what grounds and for what reasons could any man 
urge that others adopt or share his own emotional preferences? As 
C. S. Lewis claims in his work, The Abolition of Man, such urging 
" ••• would be either a fool's or a villain's undertaking unless they 
held that their approval was in some way valid or correct. " 37 
Since we have no reason to suppose that Westermarck is either a 
fool or a villain, it seems he cannot recommend certain actions or 
attitudes to others without implying that there is something really 
commendable about them; And not every reason is sufficient to call 
one's own personal approvals and disapprovals ''good" in more than a 
private sense. The fact that we approve something is not, in itself, 
a good reason for others to approve it. Most of us can remember at 
some point in our lives being reprimanded for excusing our behavior by 
reference to a friend's approval or with cries of "But everybody does 
it!" 
In recommending that people "ought" to be more tolerant and 
critical, Westermarck betrays his own moral convictions ~- and these 
are out of joint with his expressed ethical theory. Westermarck 
illustrates the tenacity of the feeling of moral transcendence. Even 
if we grant the relativity of other person's moral values, it seems 
that our own retain the special "feeling" of bei.ng really correct, good, 
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and appropriate. Why else would we hold onto them? Why else recommend 
them to others? If we did succeed in convincing ourselves that our own 
values were likewise relative, there would be very little standing 
between us and a totally nihilistic view of the world. Why remain 
enslaved to an irrational emotional response? Why bother to obey an 
illusion? Westermarck uses the words "good" and "bad," "better" and 
"worse" as though they are meaningful for others and not for himself 
alone. 
Some Conclusions 
Westermarck's ethical theory points up quite well the difficulty 
of coordinating and accounting for the ·subjective and the objective, 
the intuitional and the orderly in morality. His attempt to order 
. morality by reference to custom jars with his attempt to base morality 
on personal approval or disapproval. In securing one, the other is 
lost. In this problem, he is reminiscent of Moore who also ends by 
justifying what can only be interpreted as a reactionary concept of 
morality. 
Time and again during the course of this investigation the vote 
has come down in favor of "order" -- at the expense of personaL 
sentiments and intuitions. We saw it happen in Kant, in Roussea4, in 
Moore, and in Westermarck. In Kant, the individual is overwhelmed by 
reason; in Rousseau, by the general will; in Moore and Westermarck, by 
custom. The thing these men would seem to have in common is their 
insistence that order is a necessary part of morality, and even the most 
important aspect of morality. Without it, morality becomes a chaos of 
conflicting feelings, opinions and emotions. Absolute morality induces 
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order by making all individuals subservient to transcendent and 
absolutely binding laws. Both 11 vicious 11 and objective relativism 
dismiss the idea of such an absolute law as being, at the same time, 
philosophically unwarranted and .a stifling intrusion on individual moral 
freedom. However; the strange consequence of relativity lies in the 
fact that, in order to escape the charge of turning morality into a 
simple subjective egoism. and ~ social chaos, it is forced to be 
rigorous in enforcement of rules, and hesitant to make exceptions. 
This is true in regards _to vicious relativism (as was seen in discussing 
Edward Westermarck) but (as may be less evident) it is also true of 
varieties of objective relativism. 
For instance, much of the criticism leveled at utilitarianism is 
to the effect that it opens the door to pure subjectivism. Many 
utilitarian reformers (including G. E. Moore) insist -that a direct 
application of utilitarian principles on the part of individuals would 
defeat the point of utilitarianism. As John Rawls explains: 
Practices are set up for various reasons, but one of them 
is that·in many areas of conduct each person's deciding 
what to do on utilitarian grounds case by case leads to 
confusion, and that the attempt to coordinate behavior by 
trying to foresee how others will act is bound to fail. 
As an alternative one realizes that what is required is 
- the establishment of a practice, the specification of a 
new form of activity; and from this one sees that a practice 
necessarily involves the abdication of full liberty to act 
on utilitarian and prudential grounds. 38 
Such reasoning obviously must stifle individual initiative and discre-
tion in favor of the utility_of generalized rules. Utilitarianism is 
thus a social tool aimed at generalized social morality and is not a 
tool to be used by individuals except insofar as it forms the back-
ground for their acquiescence to the need for order. Individuals must 
more or less limit themselves to obeying the rules already set out for 
them. 
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Here it is that ethical absolutism and ethical relativity join 
hands. Just as there can only be one absolute and universal truth for 
absolutism; general social conformity is the parallel requirement of 
relativism. Faction and disagreement are the enemies of relativism 
because of the importance placed on general agreement in establishing 
an objective basis for morality. If morality is ultimately traced to 
majority opinion -- regardless of whether such opinion is based on 
what most men desire, think good, or approve -- then the moral man 
can only be the man who conforms. Even if morality claims to be 
objectively based on "human nature," how is the content of "hmnan 
nature" to be discovered except by reference to most men? Once again 
the key is in commonality. 
If one does not believe· in goodness which transcends both· indivi-
dual and collective beliefs he would seem to have two options: (1) he 
can either submit himself to irrational emotivism, in which case 
morality is ultimately seen as a psychological delusion from which men 
suffer, or (2) he can admit that morality is ultimately reducible to 
non-moral concerns where "right" is synonomous with the status quo, 
majority opinion, social power, or more usually, a combination of these 
three. What is important about these two options is that they both 
mark the death of "morality" as a personally significant experience of 
obligation. 
In the first option, there is an implicit denial of the moral 
dimension to life. Such a moral::! .. ty constitutes a "de facto" description 
rather than a "de jure" obligation. Values are purely subjective in 
the sense that they are matters of individual or cultural taste and 
have no claim to any other objective reality. A preference for 
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beating children becomes just that, a preference. A preference for 
being kind to children is neither a better nor worse preference, it is 
merely a different preference. 
Of course, no society which acted on such a conviction could long 
endure as a unit. Societies are defined by a certain amount of unity 
and solidarity; thus, in the name of civilization, some rules must be· 
established. 
This leads us to the second option in which, for the sake of 
making "morality" more orderly and more substantial, the strong 
emphasis placed on individual feelings and emotions in emotivism gives 
way to a type.of morality in which individual emotions do not count, 
unless they coincide with some predetermined definition of morality. 
This definition may be something like: "Moral actions include all 
actions which tend to produce more happiness for more people than any 
other alternative action;" or, "Morai actions are those actions which 
most people approve;" or even, "Moral actions are those actions which 
will bring into existence more good than any alternati;ve actions" 
but as long as these definitions cannot refer to any transcendent 
guidelines they all come down to the same thing, "Morality is whatever 
a majority of people in any one society say it is." 
What has become more and more evident in the course of this study 
is that in any immanent relativistic moral scheme, the most important 
criterion for calling actions and attitudes. "moral'' is the very 
criterion that is rejected by the transcendent absolutists, that is, 
the criterion of social sanctions. Moore and Westermarck seem miles 
apart when they begin their inquiries, but they end on a surprisingly 
similar note, that of conformity to commonly accepted practices. If 
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order is to be maintained, if morality is not to be a "name" applicable 
to any and all behavior, then there must be strict guidelines which 
personal feelings are helpless to change. 
On this point, all of the moral philosophers we have looked at 
(with the exception of Ayer) agree. In order for the concept of moral-
ity to make sense, there must be rules defining proper attitudes and 
actions which apply at least on an intra-social level. But the need 
for moral order goes beyond the social level. For an individual, the 
lack of strict guidelines leads to confusion about motivations, aims, 
and desires. Without rules, the individual can never be certain about 
what is the "right" thing to be done. A lack of rigorous moral order 
leads to the possibility ~- perhaps even the probability -- of self-
deception. Kant, Moore, and Stace in particular stress this feature of 
morality. 
For all these men, at the heart of the meaning of morality is the 
concept of order. If the world is to be considered as a pla_!:e in which 
morality is possible, it must be ordered. If men are to have the 
possibility of acting morally, they must be capable of "ordering" them-
selves and their actions on the basis of known and accepted rules. 
However, as w·as pointed out in the second chapter, not every way 
of ordering life is a moral way. Even if we grant that order is a 
necessary condition of morality we need not grant that it is a 
sufficient one. Some ways of ordering life come into conflict with the 
other important condition for morality, the intuition of personal 
obligation. 
Morality involves an imposition of duties and requirements that 
is at least theoretically (if not actually) distinct from natural 
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inclination. In that sense, morality must be an "objective" and 
external ordering. But the required manner of objective imposition in 
morality is quite unique. Morality cannot be imposed from above or 
from without regardless of the sentiments, needs, and welfare of those 
upon whom it is imposed. Morality must be self-imposed, and so must 
arise from an experience of personal obligation. 
Transcendent theories of morality suffer from the defect of 
exterior imposition when they insist that individual cases, situations, 
personalities, and sentiments have absolutely nothing to do with 
discovering what our moral duties are. 
' . 
Immanent theories of morality suffer from the defect of exterior 
imposition when, in order to insure a meaningful cont,ent to morality, 
they enshrine such objectivizing features as majority decree, customary 
behavior, or unbending law. 
If the rigorous, law-abiding interpretation of morality is to be 
upheld, there can be only one explanation which will reintegrate this 
type of moral theory with the moral experience of personal obligation. 
That is, of course, the moral sensibility of order, which includes the 
experience of a personal, moral obligation to obey general laws even 
when the point of the particular law, or the application of the law in 
a particular instance is not clear. This is the path to life that 
. 39 
Hans Castorp describes as "regular •.• direct, honest." · 
Such an explanation accounts for the experience of morality as 
being personally obligatory as well as accounting for the complementary 
need for the obligation to transcend the merely personaL It is 
personal in that order itself is experienced as a desirable moral state 
which should appropriately be sought by the individual. It transcends 
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the merely personal in that the need for order comprehends all peoples, 
and calls for the renouncement of all desires which conflict with the 
possibility of "orderliness.,. 
The sensibility of order displays the characteristics of moral 
experience. It includes activity undertaken in response to the personal 
apprehension of a transcendent "oughtness." In.the case of Kant, this 
"oughtness" includes the conviction that individuals "ought" to respect 
the dictates of the universal categorical imperative regardless of 
their own feelings. In the case of Rousseau, this "oughtness" includes 
the conviction that individuals "ought" to will as the general public 
wills regardless of their own private will. In the case of G. E. Moore, 
this "oughtness' includes the conviction that it is better to conform 
to existing norms than to risk the unlikelihood of having correctly 
intuited a better response. In Edward Westermarck, the "oughtness" of 
social morality is indicated by his admission that individual approval 
and disapprovalis inextricably tied to social customs and cannot be 
severed except at the expense of one's being culturally and socially 
disinherited. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE IMMORAL MORALISTS 
In the last two chapters, the question of "How am I to act 
moralLy?" was answered by recommending obedience to general laws 
regardless of the various ways by which these laws were discovered. 
Such obedience, however, is devoid of moral significance unless it is 
motivated by a personal recognition of a moral obligation to relinquish 
personal feelings, needs, and intuitions in the name of some "real" and 
transcendent moral value. With this stipulation in mind, the achieve-
ment of social and personal order and the clarity and certainty such 
order brings may well be judged to be a moral value, and the urge for 
order demonstrated by Kant, Rousseau, Moore, and Westermarck may be 
judged to be a moral urge. 
Yet, there is another urge which is found in morality, orie which 
is a constituent part of the urge for order, even though "order" often 
suppresses it. That is the urge of personal intuition. The orderly 
sensibility rests upon the personal intuition of an obligation to fix 
a stable method of mediation between the individual and his impulses. 
But the moral sensibility dominated by intuition rejects as an encum-
brance any form of mediation between the individual and his personal 
·moral insights. Nicolas Berdyaev expresses one such approach to 
morality when he claims: 
Moral life must be eternal creativeness, free and fiery, 
i.e. perpetual youth and virginity of spirit. It must 
rest on primary intuitions free from the suggestions of 
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man's social environment which paralyzes the freedom of 
his moral judgments •• ,. The ethics of creativeness is not 
the ethics of development but of youth and virginity of 
the human spirit, and it springs from the fiery first 
source'of life-- freedom. Therefore true morality is 
not the social morality of the herd. 1 
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This view of morality rejects the possibility of simply conforming 
to an ihtractable rule, or merely reiterating patterns of living. It 
assumes that every situation and every person is different. For every 
unique situation and every unique person there is a personal and 
appropriate response. It is the duty of the individual to be open to 
the invitation of this particular appropriateness, and since each 
invitation is personally extended, it is not adequate to follow general 
rules it may even be necessary to step outside the realm of general 
rules in order to be able to hear the call. 
To step outside the circle of light cast by general rules and 
social sanctions is, as both Kant and Moore point out, to step into 
shadows and doubts, 
Thus far, we have emphasized the morality of order and such 
traits as conformity, certainty, safety, reasonableness, and caution. 
This chapter, dealing with the morality of intuition, will emphasize 
such traits as doubt, danger, unreasonableness, and risk. It will deal 
with those who, as Dostoyevsky's Underground Man puts it: 
..• refuse to follow the safe, well-trodden path and 
search for another one, an unreasonable one, stubbornly 
working their way along it in the darkness. 2 
The morality of such men usually takes the form of rebellion 
against morality interpreted as conformity to general rules. Such 
"morality" is considered by them to be the domain of the dumbly con-
forming masses, of the average, and even-- of the sanctimonious 
hypocrite. "True IJ10rality" is seen to lie in a rejection of all that 
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is "safe," "conforming," and "prudent." True morality lies in the 
willingness to open oneself up to and t-o act upon those deeply felt 
intuitions and "feelings" and in so doing, risk everything. 
To understand the repugnance experienced by individuals of the 
intuitive sensibility towards. all that seems fearful, "small-souled" 
and begrudgingly parsimonious in the moral philosophers previously 
discussed is to grasp what Hans Castorp might have had in mind when he 
said that morality is to be found" ••. in sin, recklessness, what is 
3 
hurtful, what destroys us." 
The Spiritless Morality 
The state of modern morality is such that men, by and large, have 
rejected absolute morality based on authority, and find it impossible 
. 4 to base it on such a thing as "pure pract1.cal reason." They are 
apparently left to account for morality by reference to social custom, 
majority opinion, prudential concerns. However, none of these can 
possibly account for the special feelings which accompany morality and 
mark it off from other concerns men may have. No kind of relative 
morality can account for the presence of such feelings in the total 
absence of a final, non-hypothetical, intuitive "ought," unless the 
account. refers to such feelings as "illusory residue." If men really 
come to believe that such feelings are sheerly superstitious, then 
morality will lose its unique position as a motivator. Without the 
personal sanction of moral sentiment men are not obliged to act or be 
in any way but the way which pleases them -- unless "obligation" takes 
the guise of force, They may conform to moral rules from fear of the 
consequences of non-conformity, but such conformity is not "moral" in 
content. 
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Once men have rejected the transcendence of morality there is 
nothing that binds them to act in cer-tain ways except a concern for 
their own welfare. Since "welfare" does not consist in the relationship 
between the individual and the transcendent, it must consist in the 
relationship between the individual and his environment. "Welfare" 
becomes the satisfaction of desires. But desires are only subjective 
experiences. Anything anyone desires is desirable and constitutes a 
legitimate end to be pursued. What could be sufficient to stop a man 
from pursuing a desired goal? Only force, or the appeal to a more 
basic goal. If the welfare of the group coincides with his own welfare, 
then and only then can a man be reasonably obliged to take it into 
account. Still, the word ''obliged" seems too strong. It would be 
"prudent" of him to promote his own welfare by whatever means seem 
best; but it is in no way required of him to do so, except under 
duress. 
To say that morality is relative is only to say that all moral 
actions are hypothetical. All a man needs do is reject the end in 
order to be able to reject the means as well. Now, while· this can be 
equally said of absolute morality; to reject the end of absolute 
morality is tantamount to rejecting the ''truth" and it is certainly 
easier to reject ends which are believed to be symptomatic of instinct 
and majority preference than ends which are believed (rightly or 
wrongly) to be indicative of the "truth." 
To accept ends based on instinct and majority opinion is to be 
ruled by our instincts and other peoples preferences. The instincts are 
not something which w~ can choose to ignore, so it makes no sense to 
speak of duty in respect of them. Likewise, the preferences of the 
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majority have no more obvious right to obedience than do our own 
preferences. In either case, man is a slave of appetite -- either his 
own or other people's. Thus seen, there can only be three reasons for 
accepting the moral codes of society. A man could accept them because: 
(1) he is, as yet, unaware of the nature of such codes; (2) they happen 
to exactly coincide with his own wants and needs; or (3) he could 
accept them even though his own des·ires and needs are frustrated by 
social codes, simply because to refuse to accept them would be to 
insure himself a life of hardship and 0stracism. In this latter situa-
tion, a man is liable to violate in secret what he upholds in public. 
Thus men may be seen to direct their lives in conformity to social 
codes either through ignorance, prudence, cowardice, or hypocrisy. 
If morality is supposed to direct our lives, if it is to form the 
center of our being, the source of our conviction; if all our actions 
are to be seen as springing from this vital source; if who we are is 
largely determined by the ideals and goals which lead us on, then it 
seems repugnant that morality be illusory or that it stern from con-
formity, unthinking habit, or mere prudence. If morality is to remain 
a vital and driving force in human lives it must be because it is 
personal, significant, and clearly faced. 
If morality is really impersonal, insignificant, or illusory, 
then perhaps immorality (the opposite of conformity, unthinking habit, 
and prudence) constitutes the truly inspiring life. Immorality would 
thus become the project which could be said to be personal, significant 
and clearly faced. With this shift in attitude we can see the strange 
phenomenon of the morality of immorality emerging. In one definite 
sense, those who reject morality reject it because they see it as 
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immoral. It is immoral because men accept it primarily because it 
would be uncomfortable to reject it. They are no longer inspired by 
it, it is simply easier to flow with the tide than to swim upstream. 
Morality is seen as cowardice and a refusal to accept the challenge of 
freedom. · 
Hermann Hesse gives us one description of such a conforming 
morality: 
Now what we call "bourgeois," when regarded as an element 
always to be found in human life, is nothing else than 
the search for a balance. It is the striving after a 
mean between the countless extremes and opposites that 
arise in human conduct. If we take away any one of these 
coupled opposites, such as piety and profligacy, the 
analogy is immediately comprehensible. It is open to a 
man to give himself up wholly to spiritual views, to seek-
ing after God, to the ideal of saintliness. On the other 
hand, he can equally give himself up entirely to the life 
of instinct to the lusts of the flesh, and so direct all 
his efforts to the attainment of momentary pleasures. 
The one path leads to the saint, to the martyrdom of the 
spirit and surrender to God. The other path leads to the 
profligate, to the martyrdom of the flesh, the surrender 
to corruption. Now it is between the two, in the middle 
of the road, that the bourgeois seeks to walk. He will 
never be a martyr or agree to his own destruction. On the 
contrary, his ideal is not to give up but to maintain his 
own identity. He strives neither for the saintly nor its 
opposite. The absolute is his abhorence. 5 
The "bourgeois" chooses conformity to rules, because to do otherwise 
would be to give up his moral comfort for the hard demands of the 
absolute. It would be to surrender to the formlessness of a world 
without "given" values. The bourgeois is incapable of doing either, 
and calls this incapacity "morality." 
It is this view of morality as "incapacity" which is so offensive 
to the moral consciences of those who lean in the direction of the 
intuitive sensibility., Such morality has no spirit, no vision, no 
vitality. Nietzsche gives expressive voice to this sense of repugnance: 
And thus spoke Zarathustra to.the people: "The time 
has come for man to set himself a goal. The time has come' 
for man to plant the seed of his highest hope. His soil 
is still rich enough. But one day this soil will be poor 
and domesticated, and no tall tree will be able to grow in 
it. Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer 
shoot the arro.w of his longing beyond man, and the string 
of his bow will have forgotten how to whir! 
. "I say unto you: one must. still have· chaos in one-" 
self to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say 
unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves •.. 
"Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer 
give birth to a star. Alas, the time of the mostdespic-
able man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise 
himself. Behold, I show you 1 the last mari.. 1 
"'What is love? What is creation? What is longing? 
What is a star?' Thus asks the last man, and he blinks. 
"The earth has become small, and on it hops the last. 
man, who makes everything small. His race is as ineradic-
able as the flea-beetle; the last man lives longest. 
"'We have invented happiness,' say the last men, and 
they blink." 6 
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The "last men" settle for safety, security and happiness. They 
are the ones who have become convinced that "happiness," in 
Dostoevsky's words, is "an answer.to all this talk abo~t virtue and 
duty, and other ravings and superstitions."7 
Immorality can be seen as a moral project when it is un?ertaken 
in response to the "immorality of morality." But, to constitute a 
moral project, immorality must be undertaken in response to a "felt 
appropriateness" and as a duty and a discipline. If it is merely the 
result of indulgence, whim, or prudence, it cannot qualify as any kind 
of a moral conception. 
Nietzschean Morality 
For instance, Nietzsche takes the defiance of the morality of 
"the herd" as his starting point and urges ~en to glorify the individual. 8 
According to him, most deplorable of all is the mediocrity which 
results·from both relative and absolute morality when they submerge all 
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individualism in favor of generalized rules. It is the "duty" of the 
individual to fight against this pressure to conform; to be "good." 
However, it is worthwhile to point out that by individualism, Nietzsche 
does not have in mind the claim of moral equality which results in the 
unqualified assertion of the right to do just as one pleases. He does 
not intend to construct an ethic of indulgence. His moral man still 
lives under the regimen of duty. As George A. Morgan explains: 
"'Duty,' for the elite at least, consists in self-dictated means for 
9 
the attainment of self-chosen ends." 
Nietzsche's glorification of the morality of individualism 
depends upon his conviction that morality cannot be justified by 
reference to a transcendent realm, and his unwillingness to just~fy it 
on the grounds put forth by the immanent relativists. In his rejec-
tion of transcendence, he exceeds what have been established here as 
the dual requirements for morality -- that is, the meeting of the 
immanent and the transcendent in the moral experience. According to 
Nietzsche, transcendence is an "illusion" which had been necessary to 
inspire men to discipline themselves to take morality upon their own 
10 shoulders. It is yet to be seen if Nietzsche can himself throw off 
the "illusion" of transcendence. 
Nietzsche, as we know, rejects the morality of mediocrity which 
utilitarianism fosters. Nietzsche's "morality" is not to be undertaken 
in the name of comfort and convenience. It is egoistic, but he does 
not believe that egoism entails the identification of pleasure with 
duty. Nietzsche still identifies duty with the need for order, effort, 
and discipline. Nietzsche's "moral" man discipli.nes himself with the 
aim of reaching a self-defined goal., To meekly accept a goal given in 
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transcendence (as with absolute morality) or given by social mores (as 
in relative morality) is slavish. 
But how does the individual pick a goal toward which to aim? 
Any goal here seems to be a possibility. What reason does a man have 
for selecting one goal over another? And once he has selected it, is 
it not slavish to submit to it? To avoid slavery here seems to be to 
opt for complete irrational indulgence, and is not that a type of 
slavery too? 
Nietzsche apparently thinks that such self-defined goals are not 
slavish because they require a continual reassertion of will to attain 
them. 11 But what purpose might there be in attaining these goals? 
Nietzsche must claim that the attainment of these goals is good in 
itself, and such a claim points in the direction of transcendence. If 
he wants to claim these ideals are good because they make men better, 
it would be legitimate to ask, "Better than what?" Without a standard 
provided by transcendent reality, or an empirical, objective standard 
provided by majority opinion, human nature, etc., Nietzsche's use of 
"better" or any other evaluative term seems particularly suspect. The 
similarity of Nietzsche 1 s stance to the vicious relativist's stance is 
hard to ignore. Yet it is harder still to classify him with theorists 
like A. J. Ayer. Despite his rejection of transcendence. Nietzsche 
seems to insist upon a "real" value, and a "real" merit to (for 
instance) the type of life his hero, Zarathustra, lives. Zarathustra 
is "better" than other men. But where does the "reality" of this merit 
come from? It cannot come from social norms. Zarathustra scorns them, 
and is in turn scorned by those who uphold them. It cannot come from 
transcendent aP,proval, or coincidence with a transcendent reality; 
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Zarathustra rejects such fictions. Nietzsche rejects transcendence, 
majority opinion, and custom and is left only with the bare assertion 
of value. The "better" man is the man who is best able to assert his 
inexplicable preference. The "better" man is the man who prevails. 
This morality (it almost goes without saying) is not open for 
everyone. The vast majority of people will have to continue to obey 
the commands of others, rather than their own. The vast majority will 
' 
continue to be slaves -- only now they will not be slaves to the 
"truth" or even to the majority welfare, but slaves to the inexplicable 
preference of strbng individuals -- slaves to whatever forces hold sway 
in the-world. 
Something is dreadfully wrong with this conception of morality. 
It asserts individual meaningfulness only to have it limited to those 
few individuals capable of dominating, and then (limited as it is) 
devoured by the arbitrariness of value .. Nietzsche may claim that the 
ideals chosen by individuals are completely nonrational and that the 
only meaningfulness that can be assigned them resides in the eventual 
success or failure of the man who holds them. But, if he does that 
he would seem to imply that that which prevails ought to prevail; and 
this notion is inevitably tied to the status quo, since what is now, 
ought to be. But the fact that a thing "is" a certain way is no 
reason (and certainly no "moral" reason) for asserting that it o~ght to 
be that way. Such a moral theory reduces to claiming that the sky 
ought to be blue merely because it is. Even a superficial acquaintance 
with Nietzsche disabuses one of any illusions regarding Nietzsche's 
acceptance of the status quo. 
On the other hand, Nietzsche may claim that values are completely 
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irrational and meaningless, in which case any value judgments he makes 
regarding the relative merits of Zarathustra a"J.d the common man are 
likewise irrational and meaningless. Here again we are faced with the 
problem of interpreting morality as being one of two unappealing 
extremes. Either it is solidly tied to inescapable facts which render 
moral terms ludicrous; or else morality is not tied down to any objec-
tive thing at all, in w~ich case moral terms become equally gratuitous. 
In either case, Frankena's criterion that moral actions should b-e 
accompanied by moral reasons seems to go by the wayside. Nietzsche 
rejects rationality, intuition, even "common sense" and so cannot 
provide what are normally recognized as "reasons" for the selection of 
moral ideals and values. 
Like Moore, in rejecting both absolute and relative. morality, 
Nietzsche rejects any explanation that would make it understandaQle 
for a person to choose one set of values rather than another. For 
Nietzsche "morality," i.e., that which is appropriate and good, is the 
assertion by men of strong will of their irrational preferences. How-
ever, Nietzsche's claim is still "moral" by virtue of the fact that he 
insists.that men "ought" to assert their will. He sees a certain 
appropriateness and goodness in asserting one's will, and urges it upon 
men as a "duty." 
Nietzsche's morality is "created" by the individual out of his 
"will to power." Like Berdyaev's, it stresses the creativity of the 
individual. Karl Schmid explains the moral significance of this concept 
of creativity: 
Thus it comes about that the concern with the unhampered 
creativity of the psy:che finds its antagonist in the ethical 
decrees of the social consciousness, or more exactly, in 
the acts which purport to postulate morality. Where concern 
for the fullness and vitality of the human psyche predom-
inates, and where its narrowing and atrophy are regarded 
as the foremost danger ... the question of what is good or 
evil in the eyes of the collectivity is bound to lose its 
cogency. All thinking oriented toward "the creative" is 
inevitably "beyond good and evil." 12 
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Schmid goes on to say further that this conception is linked with " .•. a 
definite feeling that 'the creative, 1 and hence, of course, 'the 
creative unconscious,' is good, in fact, the summum bonum, while the 
consciousness of the collectivity, the 'they' who posit morality, is 
bad."13 So, in fact, Nietzsche's conception~ not "beyo~d good and 
evil" at all. He merely redefines good and evil and in so doing goes 
beyond commonly accepted accounts of the two concepts. 
Nietzsche takes creativity one step beyond the realm of creativity 
Berdyaev spoke of earlier. Berdyaev associates the creativity of 
morality with direct and individual intuition of the transcendent. 
This association gives him a firmer judgmental base to work from than 
has Nietzsche. For Berdyaev there is a final objectifying element, the 
truly Good. Beyond the sphere marked off by this concept, an individual's 
creativity becomes misguided. The truly good marks the boundary beyond 
which no man dares go. A man cannot use his power of creativity and 
his ability to dominate to do absolutely anything at all. 
On the other hand, Nietzsche seems compelled to draw the conclu-
sian which the transcendent moralists reject -- the limits of morality 
coincide only with the limits of power. Nothing can be said about 
what a man should or should not prefer, only about what a man can and 
cannot do. For Nietzsche there can be no objectifying element except 
the limits of the will to power. The only justification for any course 
of action is its success. It can be measured against no other exterior 
limit. 
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According to Schmid, the conception of the creative individual as 
"good" and the social realm, which limits and defines him, as "bad" is 
14 
a disastrously dangerou~ notion. In the light of our comments on 
Nietzsche, it is not difficult to see what would lead him to this con-
elusion. Such a conception is dangerous because it releases the 
individual from the restraint of laws and codes and gives him a "moral" 
justification for indulging his desires. It is evident that Nietzsche's 
conception of morality in which the creative individual is limited by 
nothing outside himself is (to the extent to which it is less limited) 
more dangerous than Berdyaev's. The individual cannot be a law unto 
himself. Morality is more than passion, and more than disciplined 
striving. Again we must refer back to the two essential features of 
morality, intuition and order. Order is itself an intuition. The 
virtue of disciplined striving is an intuition of order. How can 
Nietzsche reject the meaningfulness of intuition and still accept his 
goal of individual fulfillment through disciplined striving? If there 
is no transcendent better and worse (nor even any immanent better or 
worse based upon survival, social norms, happiness, etc.) then the life 
of individualism is no "better" than the life of the herd -- it is only 
different. We, as individuals, are certainly under no obligation to 
prefer one sort of life to the other, and the mere fact that we do can 
create no obligation in us. Nietzsche's morality becomes the morality 
of might makes right. Such. a morality is only a denial of the meaning-
fulness of "right." There is no "right'' and no "duty". there is only 
power. 
The Nietzschean account of morality is not simply a reinterpreta-
tion of morality, it destroys what men have meant by morality and then 
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attempts to replace it with an entirely different schema. 
However, Nietzsche does help us to understand morality by point-
ing out what we cannot mean by morality. He emphasizes the individual 
in morality, and properly shows that morality is oppressive when it is 
impersonal and intractable, and decadent when it consists solely in the 
indulgence of passions. He also properly points out the importance of 
passion and emotion in morality and the uninspiring and belittling 
nature of that on which the relativists wish to base morality. He 
sneers at the superficiality of lives dedicated to conformity and 
prudence. As he sees it, such morality either becomes a knee-jerk 
response, or a piously spouted hypocrisy which is forgotten as soon as 
it becomes difficult or unprofitable. Morality is meaningless when it 
becomes something which is not personally and profoundly related to the 
individual. However, Nietzsche (unwittingly) demonstrates that that 
which is personally related to the individual, and which inspires him 
to act and ''be" in certain .ways, cannot be only a subjective part of 
the individual. The dangers inherent in such a position of subjectivity 
are legion. The only discriminations possible in a world where such an 
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attitude prevailed would be made on the bas1s of power. Subjective 
sensibility must be thought to reflect an appropriate "objective" 
order which transcends the individual and stands as an arbitrator 
between conflicting subjective desires; otherwise the equation of 
morality with passion plus power cannot be avoided. 
However, the dangers inherent in relying so heavily upon subjec-
tive experiences and feelings to direct morality (the dangers of 
·arrogance, solipsism, and indulgence) are not'restricted to Nietzsche 
alone. Berdyaev makes the individual's unmediated confrontation with 
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the absolute and transcendent appear very innocent through his use of 
terms like "youth" and "virginity." On the contrary, such a confronta-
tion (or at least the possibility of such a confrontation) takes place 
in a strange and foreboding atmosphere. During such a confrontation 
there can be no socially or generally .imposed boundaries on which to 
depend. The emphasis on morality as individual and unique questions 
the need for individuals to be subordinated to a universally binding 
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law. ·Though Berdyaev does limit the individual by submitting his 
will and actions to judgment by a transcendent and absolutely good 
being, access to this being is a slippery and ambiguous affair. Such 
access must reside in the individual's intuitions since it cannot be 
had by reference to codes of law, majority opinion, or the like. Any 
project of morality which rejects reliance upon general moral formula-
tions is subject to .dangers ~ if the original aim of the morality 
is taken to be correspondence to an objective ideal. The failure to 
recognize this danger, is itself a great danger. In his comments, 
Berdyaev displays something of this dangerous naivity. 
It is the danger of the path of personal intuition which makes 
the rejection of the mediated path of order an ambiguous affair. 
Reliance upon individual moral intuition can be a "profoundly dangerous 
proceeding."17 It is to set oneself above and beyond the rules given 
by a communal moral code. Against the communal certainty and safety 
of majority opinion, tradition, or the concrete demands of law, the 
individual posits his own dubious "sentiments." Ought he to act on the 
basis of these? Is it "moral" to let oneself be guided by these? 
On one hand, it would seem to be sheer cowardice to ignore these 
feelings out of fear -- either fear of public reaction or fear as a 
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lack of faith in yourself. On the other hand, is it not moral arrogance 
anJ pride to disregard the opinions of others, the traditions of society 
and the demands of law in favor of one's own (always doubtful) insights? 
The very obscurity of transcendence and its even more obscure 
relationship to personal intuition is a lure and a snare for the unwary. 
To view morality as an individual invitation to personal growth 
independent of social sanctions is not as unambiguously positive as 
either Nietzsche or Berdyaev make it sound. It involves risks. It is 
the sense of this "risk;" the sense of "traffiking with evil," which 
gives much of modern literature its strange combination of moral 
superiority and immorality mentioned in the opening chapter of this 
thesis. 
In his novel, The Magic Mountain, Thomas Mann describes some of 
the risks of creative morality while he explores the ambiguities and 
the "questionableness" of the path of unmediated intuition. Although 
the novel is both long and complex, and its symbolism plentiful, an 
examination of. a few of Mann's interwoven themes (no matter how 
inadequately they represent the novel as a whole) will help us to 
better understand the virtues and demerits of the intuitive sensibility 
.as contrasted with those of the sensibility of order. 
The Magic Mountain 
The Magic Mountain is the story of Hans Castorp, a somewhat frail 
and unambitious, upper middle class orphan who has been raised by his 
Grandfather and his Uncle, Consul Tienappel, to take his place in the 
busy commercial world of Hamburg. He is about to begin his apprentice-
ship as an engineer with a ship building firm when his chronic anemic 
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condition requires a three week period of rest and recuperation. 
Sensibly enough, it is decided that Hans should spend these three 
weeks visiting his cousin, Joachim Ziemssen, who is recovering from a 
bout of tuberculosis at the International Sanatorium Berghof, high in 
·the Alps . 
. As the novel opens, Hans impatiently sets off to wait out the 
three week interruption. However, once there he is taken captive by 
the liesurely pace of life, and the freedom from social restrictions 
offered to those who lead their lives isolated from the everyday 
concerns of life below. He is also captivated, by the "Kirghiz" eyes of 
Clavdia Cauchet, an undisciplined and aristocratic patient at the 
18 sanatorium. Subtly drawn toward the voluptuous life of passion and 
indulgence, of which Clavdia is the symbol, Hans suspiciously enough 
contracts tuberculosis and remains·on the Mountain for seven "hermetic" 
years; drawn away only by the shock of the beginning of World War I. 
During his seven year stay on the Mountain, Hans is drawn in two 
essentially contrasting directions. On one side there is the Mountain, 
Clavdia, passion, mystery, and indulgence. On the other side is the 
Flat-land and home, clarity, duty, and rationalism. For our purposes, 
these two may be equated with the creative morality of intuition and 
the law~abiding morality of order. The Mountain is associated with 
the freedom which is necessary for individual and creative morality 
and its dangers. The Flat-land is associated with the safety, security, 
and reasonableness of social codes, and the order such codes betoken. 
The story of Hans' education is the story of the battle waged between 
these two sensibilities over possession of his being. Involved in the 
battle are, in addition to Clavdia, Hans' fellow patients, Ludovico 
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Settembrini, Leo Naphta, Joachim Ziemssen, and Mynheer Peeperkorn. 
Settembrini is a Freemason, a humanist, and a man of letters. He 
stands for progress, democracy, enlightenment, rationalism and clarity. 
He strongly opposes Hans' attraction to Clavdia and all for which she 
stands. Immediately upon Hans' arrival on the Mountain; Settembrini 
urges him to return to the Flat-land. Naphta is a' Jesuit dialectician 
who opposes Settembrini and upholds mystic community, passion, and 
spirit. He disdains the bourgeois notions of morality embraced by men 
in the Flat-lands. Joachim, Hans' cousin, longs to resume his military 
career in the Flat-lands and is a model of devotion to health, discipline 
and duty. And finally, Mynheer Peeperkorn, a latecomer to the sanatorium, 
is a magnificently imposing (-if somewhat incoherent) "personality" who 
stands in contrast to the "cerebralism" of Naphta and Settembrini. He 
is a lover of the "simple gifts of life." According to him, not to 
"feel" to the utmost is a sin against those gifts. He represents the 
mentality of the creatively moral person at its best. 
During his prolonged visit, Hans is exposed to a world of ideas, 
emotions, and experiences about which he knew nothing in the world 
below. His stay on the Mountain changes him profoundly; but for the 
better, or for the worse? The answer one gives might well rely upon 
one's own moral sensibility. At any rate, his transformation is worth 
following. 
In the.opening of the novel, Thomas Mann describes the situation 
of his hero, Hans Castorp, as being that or an ordinary and practical 
young man, well-settled in his orderly routine and well-satisfied with 
his situation in life. However, Mann goes on to tell us, this practical 
and satisfied young man has stirrings of something else deep inside 
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him -- something which he hardly knows he possesses -- a sense of 
rebellion against his own and his society's complacent mediocrity. 
During the course of the novel these secret stirrings are unfolded and 
given articulation. Mann, however, hints at a larger, symbolic meaning 
to Hans' situation: 
A man lives not only his personal life, as an indivi-
dual, but also, consciously or unconsciously, the life of 
his epoch and his contemporaries. He may regard the 
general, impersonal foundations of his existence as de-· 
finitely settled and taken for granted, and be as far from 
assuming a critical attitude toward them as our good Hans 
Castorp really was; yet it is quite conceivable that he may 
none the less be vaguely conscious of the deficiencies of 
his epoch and find them prejudicial to his own moral well-
being. All sorts of personal aims, ends, hopes, . prospects, 
hover 'before the eyes of the individual, and out of these 
he derives the impulse to ambition and achievement. Now, 
if the life about him, if his own time seem, however out-
wardly stimulating, to be at bottom empty of such food for 
his aspirations; if he privately recognizes it to be hopeless, 
viewless, helpless, opposing only a hollow silence to all 
the questions man puts, consciously or unconsciously, yet 
somehow puts, as to the final, absolute, and abstract mean-
ing in all his efforts and activities; then, in such a case, 
a certain laming of the personality is bound to occur, the 
more inevitably the more upright the character in question; 
a sort of palsy, as it were, which may even extend from his 
spiritual and moral over into his physical and organic part. 
In an age that affords no satisfying answer to the eternal 
question of "Why?" "To what end?'' a man who is capable of 
achievement over and above the average and expected modicum 
must be equipped either with a moral remoteness and single-
mindedness which is rare indeed and of heroic mould, or 
else with an exceptionally robust vitality. Hans Castorp 
had neither one nor'the other of these; and thus must be 
considered mediocre, though in an entirely honorable sense.l9 
Hans Castorp represents the "average" man in the modern secular 
age. His life is a comfortable affair of unoffending routines and 
habits. He conforms to the expectations of his family and friends 
without an excessive amount of exertion. He obeys the laws, except 
in those small and harmless cases (such as smuggling duty-free 
cigarettes) where he can benefit himself without risking.disapproval. 
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He accepts and lives by standard social practices without questioning 
them. He indulges in small pleasures without infringing the pleasures 
of others. In short, by all standard measurements, he is a "good" man. 
Yet Mann describes the circumstances in which Hans lives as 
being "prejudicial to his own moral well-being." 20 
Why? 
Hans Castorp is a man reared in a world imbued with the immanent, 
relativistic view. This encourages him to believe (if he thinks of it 
at all) that "morality" consists in conforming to prevailing social 
standards while still providing, as best he might, for his own comfort. 
Hans does what he must to get along comfortably in the world, b~t 
little beyond that. He drifts in the direction of least resistance. 
As Mann explains: " ••• strain, indeed, was something to which he was 
quite definitely disinclined, whatever the circumstances of the object 
of his effort; less out of fear of hurting himself than because he 
positively saw no reason, or more precisely, saw no positive reason, 
·. 21 
for exertion." · 
Immanent, relativistic morality pushes inevitably in the direction 
of morality as mediocrity. Such an ethic is obviously not oriented 
towards the extraordinary. The extraordinary can only be elicited by a 
"singlemindedness which is rare indeed and of heroic mould" or else by 
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"an exceptionally robust vitality." Hans' epoch is prejudicial to 
his moral well-being becaus·e it is uninspiring. As a result, Hans is 
less than he could be. He has nothing to which to dedicate his life. 
Nothing for which to strive. 
William James distinguishes two different moral moods which might 
help illuminate the modern moral predicament which Hans illustrates: 
The deepest difference, practically in the moral life 
of man is the difference between the easy-going and the 
strenuous mood.. When in the easy-going mood the shrinking . 
from present ill is our ruling consideration. The strenuous 
mood, on the contrary, makes us quite indifferent to present 
ill, if only the greater ideal be attained.. The capacity 
for the strenuous mood probably lies slumbering in every 
man, but it has more difficulty in some than in others in 
waking up. It needs the wilder passions to arrouse it, the 
big fears, loves and indignations; or else the deeply 
penetrating appeal of some one of the higher fidelities, 
like justice, truth, or freedom. Strong relief is.a 
necessity of its vision; and a world where all the mountains 
are brought down and all the valleys are exalted is no con-
genial place for its habitation.23 
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Immanent, relativistic morality is a great leveler. It has no standard 
of measurement beyond the norm. It takes the shock of the mountain and 
the strength of his feeling for Clavdia to awaken the strenuous mood in 
Hans. 
Hans begins his journey as an ordinary young man -- having no 
reason to be otherwise but he ends it as rather an extraordinary one. 
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Mann describes Hans as an unlikely hero. This is true in two senses. 
It is true in the beginning because he is so ordinary, so bourgeois. 
It is also true at the end of the tale, but now it is true because 
Hans' behavior is more.reminiscent of an "anti-hero" than a hero. He 
is not a "good" man any longer; and he could not be considered 
"heroic." 
realm Mann 
He dabbles in suspiciously immoral doings and dwells in a 
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describes as "highly questionable." Hans rejects tradi-
tional moral codes and seeks his own kind of creative morality. His 
life on the Mountain is experimental, and like all experiments, it is 
liable to failure. The Magic Mountain tells of his growth; .it is the 
story of his journey from the "Flat-lands" to the heights. It is a 
journey fraught with dangers and risks. Sometimes it is uncertain 
whether Hans will survive at all, and it is always open to question as 
to whether the journey is made for good or evil. 
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Mann expresses this ambiguity in a number of ways-- in fact, 
ambiguity could be said to be a major theme of the novel. Even the 
title of the novel hints at this ambiguity. "Magic" is a subtle but 
pervading theme, and conjures up two contrasting types. On one hand, 
there are t.he black arts, witchcraft,· sorcery, and evil. On the 
other, there is beauty, enchantment, airiness artd light. 
In the context of the novel, the reference to the mountain also 
takes on a tone of ambuguity. Mountains usually signify goodness, 
majesty and health. This mountain is inhabited by "sick" people. 
Mountains usually represent an. 11up" as contrasted with the "down" 
symbolic of evil. Nevertheless, during the first meeting between Hans 
and Settembrini there are allusions which indicate that in spite of 
the heights Hans now seems to inhabit, he has actually gone downward. 
First, Settembrini refers to the Director of the Sanatorium, Hofrat 
Behrens, and his assistant, Krakowski, as Minos and Rhadamanthus --
26 two of the judges of the lower world. And if that is not specific 
enough, the dialogue continues: 
'~ou are bold indeed, thus to descend into these 
depths peopled by the vacant arid the idle dead--" 
"Descend, Herr Settembrini? I protest. Here I have 
climb.ed up some five thousand feet to get here--" 
"That was only seeming. Upon my honour, it was an 
illusion," the Italian said, with a decisive wave of the 
hand. "We are sunk enough here, aren't we, Lieutenant?" 27 
From the very beginning both Rans and the reader discover that, 
in the world of the Magic Mountain, things are not always what they 
seem, appearances may mask another, deeper truth. Nothing is as 
straightforward and open as it is in the Flat-lands. Everything is 
riddled with ambiguity. 
Hofrat Behrens also hints at the ambiguity of the Mountain when 
he explains to Hans: 
"Now: our air up here is good for the disease -- I mean 
good against the disease, you understand -- you think so, 
don't you? Well it is true. But it is also good for the 
disease; it begins by speeding it up, in that it revolu-
tionizes the whole body; it brings the latent weakness 
to the surface and makes it break out." 28 
The ambiguity and danger; the "questionableness'" of Hans' 
sojourn on the Mountain is summed up in a very brief conversation 
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between Naphta and Hans a conversation about alchemy. According to 
Naphta, the chief goal of alchemy went far beyond the turning of base 
metal.into gold; such a quest was only the allegorical statement of 
the true goal which was, " ••• purification, refinement, metamorphosis, 
b . i i. h • h . t. . rr29 transu stantlat on nto a lg er sta e, •.. And the primary symbol 
of alchemic transmutation " ••• was 30 par excellence the sepulchre." 
Naphta goes on to explain: 
''The path of mysteries and purification was encompassed by 
dangers, it led through the pangs of death, through the 
kingdom of dissolution; and the learner, the neophyte, is 
youth itself, thirsting after the miracles of life, 
clamouring to be quickened to a demonic capacity of 
experience, and led by shrouded forms which are the 
shadowing-forth of mystery. ''31 
Naphta might well be describing Hans' own journey to the mountain; a 
journey which Settembrini describes as a visit to the realm of the 
dead. The goal of Hans' journey is transubstantiation and the path of 
the journey leads through dangers -- death and dissolution. 
In short, the Mountain and its atmosphere are capable of producing 
health, but also, disease. They are capable of turning ordinary base 
metal into "gold" -- but also of destroying and dissolving the original 
material. In Hans they first produce disease. There is no question of 
that. The ,question is whether or not this "disease" is a stage on the· 
way to a higher health. Read on both a literal and symbolic plane, 
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Hans' body and soul are ripe for revolution, and the Mountain brings 
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this "latent weakness to the surface and makes it break out." On one 
hand, he contracts tuberculosis; on the other, he "contracts" dis-
satisfaction with life in the Flat-land. The danger in both these 
diseases lies in the fact that he may succumb to them. Disease may 
lead only to disease; to tuberculosis and to an idle and self-indulgent 
life isolated from the world and productive activity. 
The ambiguity of the Mountain takes on a further nuance d4ring a 
discussion between Hans and Peeperkorn on the nature of poisons. 
Peeperkorn claims: 
••• the truth was, in the world of matter, that all substances 
were the vehicle of both life and death, all of them were 
medicinal and all poisonous, in fact therapeutics and 
toxicology were one and the same, man could be cured by 
poison, and substances khown to be the bearers of life 
could kill at a thrust, in a single second of time._33 
Finally, Hans himself comments on the ambiguity of the Mountain 
when, in reference to the drunken Peeperkorn, he remarks, ''Still, his 
drunkenness was not debasing, there was no loss of dignitj; rather it 
combined with the nobility of his nature to produce an immense and awe-
inspiring effect ••.• Everything depended upon who was drunk-- a 
drunken personality was far from being the same as a drunken tinker. 1134 
The Mountain and its freedom from normal restrictions are like 
poison and drunkenness: their effects differ. For some, it is 
disastrous. Setternbrini describe.s for Hans what may happen: 
''Six months at most after they get here, these young people 
-- and they are mostly young who come -- have "lost every 
idea they had except flirtation and temperature. And if 
they remain a year, they will have lost the power of 
grasping any other; they will find any other '1cruel" --
or, more precisely, ignorant an.d inadequate."35 
The release from the bonds of "form" and exteriorily imposed restraint 
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may lead to such a phenomenon as Caroline St~hr, a fellow patient about 
whom Hans states: "no, illness and affliction had had no power to 
II 36 refine Caroline Stohr.'' She represents the disgusting possibility of 
vulgar self..;..indulgence. Mann illustrates the undisciplined indulgence 
of her nature in the following excerpt: 
She began to talk about how fascinating it was to cough. 
It was a solid satisfaction, when you felt a tickling come 
in your chest, deep down, .and grow and grow, to reach -down 
after it, and get at it, so to say. Sneezing was much the 
same thing. You kept on wanting to sneeze until you simply 
couldn't stand it any longer; you looked as if you were 
tipsy; you drew a couple of breaths; then out it came, and 
you forgot everything else in the bliss of sensation. 
Sometimes the explosion repeated itself two or three times. 
That was the sort of pleasure life gave you free of charge. 
Another one was the joy of scratching your chillblains in 
the spring, when they itched so gorgeously; you took a 
furious pleasure in scratching 'til the blood came; and 
if you happened to look in the glass you would be aston-
ished to see the ghastly face you made. 37 
Such self-involved voluptuousness is one of the crit.ical dangers of the 
Magic Mountain and Hans acknowledges this danger to his own moral well-
being as reflected in Frau sd~hr: "Caroline St3hr was dreadful. If 
anything had power to distract our young Hans Castorp, in the course of 
his sincerely felt spiritual strivings, it was the personality, the 
very existence of this woman."38 
Yet another dang~r of this indulgent life is represented by Herr 
Wehsal. "Wehsal" is German for suffering, and suffering is what 
Wehsal does best. He, like Hans, is in love with Clavdia Chauchet. 
He, like Hans, indulges these feelings. He represents that which Hans 
himself might well become -- a voluptuary. Wehsal enjoys his torment 
and hugs it tightly to-him. He represents a more refined and "spirit-
. II 
ualized" voluptuousness than Frau Stohr's, but a voluptuousness still 
to be avoided. He comments to Hans: 
''There are many kinds of torture, Castorp, and whichever one 
you are under, your one desire and longing is to be free of 
it. But the torture of flesly lust is the only one you can 
never wish to be free of, except through satisfaction. 
Never, never in any other way, never at any price.''39 
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When Hans admonishes him for his excesses, he insists on his right to 
dwell on and to express his "feelings." Hans replies: "And every 
human being has the right to do it, too, if you like. But my dear 
Wehsal, it seems to me there are certain rights a man simply does not 
assert." 40 Seeing himself in Wehsal, Hans begins to see the desirabil-
ity of discipline in the matter of emotions and feelings. 
On the other hand, a release from the social bonds of form need 
not lead to self-indulgence of either kind; it may lead to a Pieter 
Peeperkorn. Whereas Frau Stghr's excess is petty and Herr Wehsal's is 
41 morbid, Pieter Peeperkorn's excesses are "on the grand scale." The 
words repeatedly used in connection with him convey this "grandness" _...: 
words like: kingly, regal, imposing, noble, majestic, over-whelming, 
and commanding. Hans, in attempting to describe the awe-inspiring 
quality of Peeperkorn comments to Settembrini: 
"But I ask you. Can you deny that he puts us all in his 
pocket? That's expressing it crudely, perhaps -- but, so 
far as I can see, you can.' t deny it. He puts us all in 
his pocket; somehow or other, he has the right to laugh· 
at us all -- but where does he get it? Where does it come 
from? How does he do it? Certainly it's not that he's so 
clever. I admit that you can't talk about his cleverness. 
He's inarticulate-- it's more feeling with him, feeling 
is just his mark, if you'll excuse my language. No, as I 
say, it's not out of.cleverness, not on intellectual 
grounds at all, that he can do as he likes with us. You 
would be right to deny it. It isn 1 t the point. But not 
on physical either. It's not the massive shoulders, or 
the strength of his biceps; not because he could knock.us 
down if he liked. He isn't conscious of his power; if he 
does take a notion, he can easily be put off it with a 
couple of civilized words. --So it is not physicaL .• 
But the result is what we see, the dynamic effect -- he 
puts us in his pocket. We've oi1ly one word for·. that -.-
personality. We use it in another; more regular sense 
too, in which we are all personalities --morally, legally, 
.and otherwise. But that is not the sense in which I am using 
it now. I am speaking of the mystery of personality, some-
thing above either cleverness or stupidity, and something we 
all have to take into account: partly to try to understand 
it; but partly, where that is not possible, to be edified by 
it. You are all for values; but isn't personality a value 
too? It seems so to me.,.it seems positive and absolute, 
like life -- in short, something quite worth while and 
calculated to make us trouble about it." 42 
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Hans is aware that the nature of the Mountain is to free and intensify 
both one's good and bad points. Some persons cannot survive the 
relaxation of external form; others are made richer and better by 
possessing more individual freedom of expression. Yet, Hans is not 
entirely in good faith about his own possibilities and his own danger 
because of the powerful lure of Clavdia and the Mountain. Mann expresses 
this bad faith thus: 
What a creature is man, how idly his conscience betrays 
him! How easy it is for him to think he hears, even in the 
voice of duty, a license to passion! Hans Castorp listened 
to Herr Settembrini out of a sense of duty and fairness, in 
the idea of hearing both sides; with the best of intentions 
he tested the latter's views on the subject of the republic, 
reason and the "bello stile." He was entirely receptive. 
And all the while he was finding it more and more permissible 
to give his thoughts and dreams free rein in another and 
quite opposite direction. Indeed, to give expression to all 
that we suspect or divine, we think it not unlikely that Hans 
Castorp hearkened to Herr Settembrini's discourse in order to 
get from his own conscience an indulgence which otherw-ise 
might not have been forthcoming. 43 
The content. of this powerful attraction which can so demoralize Hans as 
to involve him in deliberate self-deception is best described by Herr 
Albin, a fellow patient who, aware of his near approach to death, 
describes th~ pleasure of being able to rel:Lnquish the.need for striving 
and for making distinctions, the need for order and discipline: 
''Incurable, ladies, as I sit here before you, an incurable 
case; the Hofrat himself is hardly at the pains any longer 
to pretend I am r,ot. Grant me at least the freedom which 
is all I can getiout of the situation. In school, when it 
was settled thatisomeone was not to move up to thi next 
I 
form, he just stopped where he was; nobody asked him any 
more questions, he did not have to do any more work. I 
am in that happy condition now. I need do nothing more, 
I don't count, I can laugh at the whole thing.''44 
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Hans, from his balcony above, overhears this conversation and its effect 
on him is powerful. 
He had an indistfnct notion that Herr Albin was a puppy, 
yet could not resist a certain envy. In particular, the 
school~days comparison made an impression on him;.he him-
self had stuck in the lower second and well remembered this 
situation, of course rather to be ashamed of and yet not 
without its funny side. In particular he recalled the 
agreeable sensation of being totally lost and abandoned, 
with which, in the fourth quarter, he gave up the running 
~-he could have "laughed at the whole thing." His 
reflections were dim and confused, it would be difficult 
to define them; but in effect it seemed to him that, though 
honor might possess certain advantages, yet shame had 
others, and not inferior: advantages, even, that were 
well-nigh boundless in their scope. He tried to put him-
self in Herr Albin's place and see how it mu$t feel to be 
finally relieved of the burden of a respectable life and 
made free of the infinite realms of shame; and the young, 
man shuddered at the wild wave of sweetness which swept 
over him at the thought and drove on his labouring heart 
to an even quicker pace. 45 
There is no doubt but what1Hans is powerfully drawn toward the life 
offered him on the Magic Mountain, a life virtually free of the restraints 
and demands of society. After only a few weeks time, he is already in 
danger of losing contact with the flat-land and his life as a produc-
tive citizen there. First, he succumbs to tuberculosis and takes to 
his bed; then he comments to Settembrini: 
11 No, I don't think you, for instance, as homo humanus, would 
feel very comfortable down there; it often struck me that 
it was pretty strong, as I can see now, though I am a 
native of the place and for myself have never had to 
suffer from it. If a man does not serve the best and 
dearest wines at his dinners, people don't go, and his 
daughters are left on his hands. That is what they are 
like. Lying here and looking at it from th:(.s distance, I 
find it pretty gross. What were the words you used --
phlegmatic•and --'and energetic. That's-very" good. But 
what does it mean? It means hard, cold, and what do hard 
and cold mean? They mean cruel. It is ? cJ:tuel atmosphere 
down there, cruel and ruthless. When you lie here and look 
at it, from a distance, it makes you shudder. 11 46 
To which Settembrini replies: 
1~ •• the reproach of cruelty rests upon somewhat sentimental 
grounds. You would scarcely even have leveled it while 
you were in that atmosphere, for fear of being ridiculous 
in your own eyes. You left it to drones to make, and 
rightly. That you make it now bears witness to a certain 
estrangement, which I should be sorry to see increase; 
since he who makes it is in danger of being lost to life, 
to the manner of life to which he was born. 1'47 
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Settembrini fears Hans' nature. He fears his attraction to the 
indulgent Clavdia, and to "idle" speculation concerning the mysteries 
of the universe. Both show a tendency to inexac-tness, and a refusal to 
make distinctions. With this in mind, Settembrini warns Hans against 
the tendency to think in terms of paradoxes, calling them "the greatest 
depravity of all!"48 
"Have respect," he adjured him, "for your humanity, 
Engineer! Confide in your God-given power of clear thought, 
and hold in abhorrence these luxations of the brain, these 
miasmas of the spirit! Delusions? The mystery of life? 
Caro mio! When the moral courage to make decisions and 
distinctions between reality and deception degenerates to 
that point, then there is an end of life, of judgment, of 
the creative deed: the process of decay sets in, moral scepsis, 
and does its deadly work." 49 
Settembrini equates Hans' attraction to physical voluptuousness with a 
kind of "mental voluptuousness" which consists in dwelling on fathom-
less mysteries and ambiguities until one is lost in a maze of arguments 
and speculations. It is the charge of "voluptuary" which he also 
levels against Leo Naphta, the Jesuit dialectician; and it is obvious 
that the charge has more than a little to do with Naphta's religious 
beliefs and the mysticism that goes along with them. And there is 
every reason to believe that such a charge leveled at Hans at least has 
some validity. Hans, carried away with his metaphysical wanderings in 
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the infinite goes so far as to declare, "Form is folderol,"50 the im-
plication, of course, being that "feeling" is all. 
llims 1 safety depends upon his balancing between two dangers. On 
the one side is form and on the other is feeling. To abdicate to form 
would be_ to fearfully reject the new thoughts and sensations he has 
experienced on the mountain; to return to the flat-land and to his 
narrow, safe, and well-ordered existence. To abdicate to feeling is to 
risk complete dissolution of the form which is the individual conscience. 
Even though Hans is powerfully attracted to the indulgent 
life of passions, he is also attracted to the "formal" side of life. 
Tradition and formality also exert a powerful influence on his life. 
This attraction is best revealed in an often repeated episode from his 
childhood involving a christening basin which is a Castorp family heir-
_loom. The child, Hans, often made his Grandfather show him the basin 
and read the names of the successive owners, engraved on it: 
The old man named each one to his grandson, pointing with 
beringed index finger. There was Hans Castorp's father's 
name, there was Grandfather's own, there was Great-grand-
father's; then the "great" came doubled, tripl.ed, quad-
rupled, from the old man's mouth •••• That great~great­
great-great -- what a hollow sound it had, how it spoke 
of the falling away of time, yet how it seemed the expres-
sion of a piously cherished link between the present, his 
own life, and the depth of the past! 51 
This attachment to the past and its traditions is an illustration of one 
type of the "orderly sensibility." However, during his stay on the 
Mountain Hans tries -the limits of tradition, custom ~nd order and finds 
them lacking. He calls the world below, "hard and cruel." Settembrini, 
with his mixture of literary classicism and pragmatic humanism, he 
describes as a "windbag.and a hand-organ man,"52 "forever blowing on his 
53 penny pipe of reason." Still, Hans is attached to Settembrini and 
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ridicule him as he may, he finds his presence comforting: " ••. he 
leaned upon Herr Settembrini, set great store by his character and 
opinions; and the thought of being cast off would have weighed upon his 
spirit more heavily than that remembered boyish feeling of being left 
behind at school and not counting anymore, of enjoying, like Herr 
Albin, the boundless advantages of his shameful state."54 
For his part, Settembrini represents one variety of the moral 
sensibility of order -- rational, anti-metaphysical, humanistic order. 
He replies to his critics that, '~e had been accused of exaggerating 
the importance of form. But he who cherished beauty of form did so 
because .it enhanced human dignity .•• ". 55 He also typifies the 
utilitarian notion that morality is merely a human structure aimed at 
producing the happiness of all. He expounds this position in the 
following way: 
What are we? Master-builders and builders on a building. 
The purpose of all is one, the good of the whole the 
fundamental tenet of the brotherhood. What is this good, 
what is this building? It is the true social structure, 
the perfecting of humanity, the new Jerusalem. 56 
The Jesuit Naphta expresses a dissatisfaction with this view (a 
dissatisfaction shared by Hans) when he retorts: 
And this morality of Herr Settembrini's, what was it, 
what did he want? It was life-bound, and thus entirely 
utilitarian; it was pathetically unheroic. Its end and 
aim was to make men grow old and happy, rich and comfort-
able -- and that was all there was to it. And this 
Philistine philosophy, this gospel of work and reason, 
served Herr Settembrini as an ethical system. As far as 
he, Naphta, was concerned, he would continue to deny that 
it was anything but the sheerest and shabbiest Bour-
geiosiedom. 57 
However, Haphta's suggestion that true morality consists in submersion 
in "mystic community" is hardly more acceptable toHans. Naphta 
claims: 
'~ .. the principle of freedom has outlived its usefulness ... 
All educational organizations worthy of the name have always 
recognized what must be the ultimate and significant prin-
ciple of pedagogy: namely the absolute mandate, the iron 
bond, discipline, sacrifice, the renunciation of the ego, 
the curbing of the personality. And lastly, it is an un-
loving miscomprehension of youth to believe that it finds 
its pleasure in freedom: its deepest pleasure lies in 
obedience .•.• Liberation and development of the individual 
are not the key to our age; they are not what our age 
demands. What it needs, what it wrestles after, what it 
will create-- is Terror."58 
Leo Naphta represents the orderly sensibility in the guise of 
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transcendent absolutism. The word of God is law; there are absolutely 
no exceptions. The problem is that "the word of God" must be inter-
preted by humans, such as Naphta, and the God he sees is stern. Hans 
complains: 
Absolute auth6rity, iron discipline, coercion, submission, 
the Terror! All that might have its own value, but it 
paid scant homage to the individual and the dignity of his 
critical facultyL •• it was rigid, it was devout, to the very 
marrow. 59 
For Naphta, the personal feelings of the individual are not important. 
When personal intuition is pitted against "authority" authority in-
variably wins·. 
Hans is hard put to decide which position is the worst, Naphta's 
or Settembrini's. He comments on their constant arguing: 
They forced everything to an issue, wrangled bitterly 
over extremes, whereas it seemed to him, Hans Castorp, 
as though somewhere between two intolerable positions, 
between bombastic humanism and analphabetic barbarism, 
must lie something which one might personally call the 
human. 60 
But once again, as we saw in the last chapter, in spite of the 
apparent antagonism between Naphta and Settembrini, there is a peculiar 
blending of their opposing positions. They finally join hands on the 
issueof individual freedom-- just as do the relativists and the 
• 
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absolutists. Naphta's position on this matter is apparent from the 
quotations·attributed to him. However, Settembrini, with his talk of 
democracy, human rights and human dignity, surprises Hans a bit when 
he finally is forced to the issue and explains in answer to Hans' 
question: 
"I bound myself to an answer .. You are speaking of a imity 
which we seek to bring about, but whi'ch today, .. alas, does 
not exist. If it comes to exist -- and I repeat that we 
labour with silent assiduity upon this great task -- then 
indeed the religious creed of the Freemason will be unani-
mous, and it will be 1 Ecrasez 1' infame!" 
"Will that be obligatory? It would hardly be 
· tolerant." 
"The problem of tolerance, my dear Engineer, is 
rather too large for you to tackle. Do not forget that 
tolerance becomes crime, if extended to evil." 61 
If one reads between Settembrini 's carefully chosen lines, what 
emerges is that his Vision of the world and morality has no more place 
in it for the dissenting individual than does Naphta' s. Naphta him-
self explicates Settembrini's position when he explains to Hans the 
significance of Settembrini's membership in the Freemasons: 
"The idea of the society is rooted in and inseparably bound 
up with the absolute. By consequence, it isterroristic; 
that is to say, anti-liberal. It lifts the burden from 
the individual conscience, and consecrates in the name of· 
the absolute every means even to bloodshed, even to crime. " 62 
Naphta's Absolute, his "stone wall" .is his rigid religious code. 
Settembrini's Absolute, his "stone wall" is his conception of the 
perfect society; or what might be called, his "science" of humanity. 
Hans finds both intolerable. Between the rigours of ethical 
absolutism pushed to its logical conclusion and objective ethical 
relativism pushed to its logical conclusion there is no breathing 
space for the individual. Both conceptions E!nd in a military strict-
·ness, and as Hans is quick to point out, he is a "ctvilian" and as a 
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civilian, he has his own "duties" to perform. 
But in what do these duties consist? It is here the ambiguities· 
of Hans' delicate position begin. 
At the time Hans' cousin, Joachim, finally departs the sanatorium 
Wms is faced with the choice of going with Joachim back down to his 
old life in the flat-lands, or staying in the Mountains with Clavdia 
and his metaphysical wanderings. His own internal argument runs, in 
part, like this: 
On the contrary, Joachim's rash departure did-- in honesty 
-- offer his cousin a support, now, before the impossible 
should become utterly so, a guide and companion on a path 
which of himself he would never, never find again. Ah, if 
one consulted humanistic pedagogy, how humanistic pedagogy, 
would adjure him to take the hand and accept the offered 
guidance! But Herr Settembrini was only a representative·--
of things and forces worth hearing about, it was true, but 
not the only forces there were. And with Joachim it was 
the same. He was a soldier .... But for him, [Hans] the 
civilian, the thing was different. For him -- ah, here was 
the right idea, the thought which he had set himself to 
evolve, as he lay out in the cold and damp -- for him the 
real desertion would lie in his taking advantage of the 
occasion to dash off unlawfully -- or half unlawfully -- to 
the flat-land. It would be the abandonment of certain com- / 
prehensive responsibilities which had grown up out of his 
contemplation of the image called 'Homo Dei;' it would be the 
betrayal of that appointed task of "stock-taking," that hard 
and harassing task which was really beyond the powers native 
to him, but yet afforded his spirit such nameless and 
·adventurous joys; that task it was his duty to perform, here 
in his chair, and up there in his blue-blossoming retreat.63 
Hans cannot "desert to the flat-lands." He cannot accept the 
military and orderly outlook of Naphta, Settembrini, or Joachim. He 
must pursue his newly-found freedom even though it leads through an 
abyss from which he may never return. Hans comments: 
"The more I think of it, the surer I am that the bed of 
repose -- by which I mean my deck-chair, of course -- has 
given me more food for thought in these ten months than 
the mill down iri the flat-land in all the years befor~. 
There's simply no denying it." 64 ·• ·. 
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The "formal" life Hans rejects is apt to lead either to shallow-
ness and superficiality or to inhumat). and "immoral" rigor as it does 
in the cases of Settembrini and Naphta. But it may lead to a clean and 
healthy life. Joachim illustrates this last possibility. He is a well-
, mannered, tmiversally well-liked, even admirable fellow. He might -well 
be considered to be the most sympathetic character in the novel. He 
studiously avoids anything which would lead him off the straight and 
narrow path he has chosen for himself. Correspon<;J.ingly he is not 
"adventuresome." He expresses his own defining attitudes when he 
admonishes Hans: 
"Oh, you, with your learning! Getting wiser all the 
time, with your biology, and your botany, and your continual 
changing from one idea to another! You began philosophizing 
about time the first day you came. But we didn 1 t come up 
here to acquire wisdom. We came to acquire health, to get 
healthier and healthier tmtil we are entirely well, and are 
free to quit, and go down below where we belong •••• You will 
find that when people discuss their views nothing ever comes 
of it but confusion worse confounded. I tell you, it doesn't 
matter in the least what a man's views are, so long as he is 
a decent chap. The best thing is to have no opinions, and 
just do one's duty." 65 
The adventurous life of questioning accepted standards and delving 
into one's own feelings and intuitions, the life which Hans takes upon 
himself, may lead to a "higher" healthiness the healthiness of a 
commanding personality like Peeperkorn; or, it may lead to the common 
II 
and indulgent voluptuousness exemplified by Frau Stohr; and the 
tangled and self-depreciating consciousness of Herr Wehsal. Hans does 
not know, and cannot know which type his own indulgence will lead to. 
He is not even quite sure which type he truly hopes will triumph. Such 
mixed emotions and motivations are the very stuff of ambiguity. 
In addition to the dangers represented by Frau StHhr and Herr 
Wehsal, the danger of withdrawing from the relative safety of the 
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orderly sensibility is compounded by the imperative need for morality 
\ 
to have some kind of objectivity. "Order" provides that objectivity; 
but if morality is thought of as a function of subjectivity, it tends 
either toward complete chaos, or towards an equation of "might" and 
"right" as we saw in the case of Nietzsche. 
Mynheer Pe~perkorn illustrates both the merits and dangers of the 
intuitive sensibility. In his role of "personality" and champion of 
"feeling" he is somewhat reminiscent of a Nietzschean "over-man," and 
he faces similar problems. He scorns conventional morality and seeks 
his own path. He, as does Nietzsche, thinks in terms of challenge and 
struggle. Hans says of him: " .•• he is sort of military, a bit like 
my poor cousin, in that he has a point d 1 honneur, a sore spot, as it 
were, which ,is feeling, life."66 The challenge Peeperkorn sets for 
himself is to experience the simple pleasures of life to the full, and 
in so doing, pay appropriate homa:ge to them. As he explains to Hans: 
"Feeling, you understand, is the masculine force that 
rouses life. Life slumbers. It needs to be roused, to be 
awakened to a drunken marriage with divine feeling. For 
feeling, young man, is godlike. Man is godlike, in that 
he feels. He is the feeling of God. God created him in , 
order to feel through' him. Man is nothing but the organ 
through which God consummates his marriage with roused and 
intoxicated life. If man fails in feeling, it is blasphemy; 
it is the surrenderof his masculinity, a cosmic catastrophe, 
an irreconcilable horror--" 67 
Peeperkorn speaks the language of absolute demands, but, unlike the 
case of the orderly sensibility, the intuitive sensibility has no 
··obviously acces.sible objective limit to its demands ;..._ either for good 
or bad. The demands the intuitive sensibility makes upon itself; the 
demands Peeperkorn makes upon himself are limitless, and therefore 
definitionally incapable of satisfaction. So, in addition to ali the 
other dangers connected with the intuitive sensibility, there lurks the 
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danger of despair. It is this danger to.which Peeperkorn falls prey, 
and it is this danger which Thomas Mann illustrates when he has 
Peeperkorn die by his own hand. The healthiest example of the intui-
tive sensibility found in the book commits suicide. Such a resolution 
to the Peeperkorn episode certainly sheds an ambiguous light on the 
moral status of that sensibility. 
The book itself ends on a similarly ambiguous note when the hero, 
Hans Castorp, finally leaves the Magic Mountain at the outbreak of 
World War ·I. After all of his discoveries and adventures, the reader 
is left uncertain as to his fate. The implication is that he goes to 
an almost certain death; the worry is that he never does, perhaps never 
could, reach that higher state of health and that all his adventures 
have been in vain. 
Mann does not clear up the ambiguities of the two differing' moral 
experiences found in The Magic Mountain. He merely presents them to 
the reader as ambiguous. Critics have interpreted the novel in differ-
ing ways. R. Hinton Thomas explain~: 
The Flatland, one might be tempted to generalize, is the 
sphere of morality, the Magic MOuntain that of its negation. 
But the principle of interdependence of morality and sin 
is explicitly enunciated in the novel as in Mann's state-
ment a little later that true morality presupposes adven-
turing in the realm of sin. 68 
But it is possible that Thomas has been tempted to ~-generalize. 
Though it is true that the novel in many ways lends itself to Thomas' 
interpretation, the theme of the novel and of morality is more tangled 
than that. Mann's own feelings about the two sensibilities represented 
in the novel are more ambiguous than Mr. Thomas allows for. J. Lesser 
quotes Mann as explaining, "What I.do and write is concerned with the 
antithesis of romanticism and rationalism, the one of which I suspect 
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. " 69 and the other of which I desp1se... . 
,; 
Friedri.ch Carl Sell elucidates those two sensibilities which Mann 
claims to respectively suspect and despise in the following manner: 
Rationalism comprehends and guides life preferably by reason; 
it appreciates reality. The classical Greek civilization, -
the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the technical age 
are its outstanding representations. Irrationalism believes 
in religious feeling, in the creative genius, in visions, in. 
music, in instinct, in intuition, in unconscious vitality. 
Early .Christianity, medieval Mysticism, Gothic art, the 
ecstasies of the Counter-Reformation and the Baroque, and 
Romanticism mark its phases. 70 
If it is the case that Romanticism (i.e. intuition, feeling, and 
rebellion against the restrictions of form) inevitably leads to a 
higher health, why does Mann "suspect" it? Why refer to it as the 
"realm of sin?" Yet, if he is truly suspicious of it, why disparage 
classicism and order? Even though .Mann claims to "suspect" romanticism 
and to "despise" rationalism, it is not always clear that he does 
either. Mann's love for and affin~ty to romanticism whelms up over and 
over again in The Magic Mountain, and is climaxed in his creation of 
Myhnheer Peeperkorn. Though he may suspect the romantic attitude, he, 
like Hans, is obviously and powerfully attracted to it. 
In the case of rationalism, Mann may be seen to withdraw (in part) 
from his earlier condemnation of it during the course of his writing of 
The Magic Mountain. Explains Sell: 
Der Zauberberg was intended to be, the author says, "a 
book pf good will and of resolution, a book of farewell 
to many beloved things, many a dangerous sympathy, a book 
.•. of educational self-discipline.· Its service is service 
of life, its will is health, its aim is the future •.• ". 
This was the author's intention; whether he succeeded in 
making it completely clear in his extraordinary book is 
perhaps another question. 71 
That it is not clear that Mann decides against romanticism in favor of 
classicism is evidenced by Mr. Thomas' interpretation of the theme of 
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the story as being the "interdependence of morality and sin." 72 Mann 
does not say a final farewell to intuitionism, and unconscious 
vitality he stands his ground with Naphta in believing in the 
possibility of transubstantiation. Such a possibility is not "normal" 
or "healthy" but as Mann explains: "Disease is a mere category which 
derives its meaning from what it is coupled with, whom it belongs to. 
What matters is who is sick: an ordinary blockhead, in whom the disease 
73 has no intellectual or cultural aspects-- or a Nietzsche, a Dostoevsky." 
Mann obviously believes in the possibility of creative genius 
setting itself above social morality. But, he also warns us of the 
dangers of such abnormality. Creativity cannot survive and prosper 
within the bounds of strict social morality which reduces everything 
to mediocrity and conformity; but creativity cannot be boundless 
. . 
either. Mann portrays the dangers of placing oneself outside the 
bounds of the social conscience and the sensibility of order. He 
elucidates the dangers of inwardness and subjectivity; the dangers of 
involving oneself in deciphering feelings and their ambiguous motives 
and meanings. Such a quest is, by nature, self-involved and volup-
tuous. It is a quest which is boundless in its demands and so, given 
to the possibility of despair. These dangers include some of those 
· pointed out by Moore and Kant in their rejection of the intuitive 
sensibility. 
As Mann has Hans Castorp pronounce: "There are two paths to 
life: one is the regular one, direct, honest. The other is bad, it 
leads through death -- that is the 'spiritual' way.u 74 The regular, 
direct, and honest path is the path of the sensibility of order. This 
is the path of the Flat-lands~ It is a path which may fall into a 
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kind of immorality should it cease being the result of an individually 
experienced feeling of an appropriateness which transcends the indivi-
dual and his particular and idiosyncratic feelings and desires. It is 
a path which is appealing in many ways. Even the Jesuit Naphta says of 
it: "There was much to admire in the monumental respectability, the 
majestic Philistinism of the middle-class consciousness. But one 
must never forget that as it stood, straddle-legged, firmly planted on 
earth, hands behind theback, chest well out, it was the embodiment of 
irreligion." 75 The danger of the orderly sensibility is a loss of 
contact with the transcendent, a self-righteous strictness with others 
and a complacency toward the self which is far from moral. 
The path Hans calls the 'spirituel' path is the path of the 
sensibility of intuition. The dangers of this path make it under-
standable why Hans might proclaim that true morality consists in what 
hurts and destroys us. It is not a path which should be taken by 
everyone; and even when it is taken, it should be taken in fear and 
trembling. The ultimate danger of this path lies either in the self-
deception of contact with the transcendent used as an excuse to act as 
one wants; or in the abandonment of the concept of transcendence and 
the resultant self-indulgence of desire. 
An important fact to keep in mind concerning both these paths is 
the need of both for elements of the other. The sensibility of order 
must be the result of a moral intuition. The sensibility of intuition 
must have as its ultimate guide a moral order, and it must seek to 
impose that order upon itself. These two sensibilities can only be 
wholly abstracted in thought. In reality, their existence is 
intricately interwove. Separation of the two can only be a method of 
describing moral tendencies. It is the intricate interweaving of 
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that what~ver prevails is good; but the description of what "is" the 
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fluous. If it "is" regardless of our feelings toward it, the judgment 
that it is also "good" is either beside the point, or else it implies 
another standard besides its sheer facticity by which it is judged to 
be good or bad. Nietzsche, in affirming power rather than just 
acknowledging it, slips from the amoral world of power to the moral 
world of judgment,· and this equation of morality with power leads to 
just the sort of atrocity Karl Schmid denounces. Atrocities would be 
better committed simply in the name of power than in the name of moral 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE AMBIGUITY OF MORALITY 
The preceeding chapters have_pointed out that mo.rality is composed 
of two concepts: order and intuition. A moral life is one ordered in 
a peculiar way; and the peculiar way in which it is ordered depends on 
a man's intuitions as to what is appropriate and good. Some men have 
.seen order as the most important aspect of morality. "Order," for 
them, is itself appropriate and good. Others have seen personal intui-
tions and feelings as being the most important -- the distinguishing 
mark of morality. Nowhere does the reliance of the concept of morality 
on these two aspects become more explicit than in the case of the two 
extremes of moral relativism -- one of which accounts for morality 
sol~ly in terms of individual feelings; the other of which defines 
morality solely in terms of social norms or "order." 
Up to this point, it has been the purpose of this thesis to 
explain and illustrate morality in terms of the two moral sensibilities 
or order and intuition and to demonstrate that the concept of morality 
mus·t, in some way, incorporate both of these sensibilities. As we 
found in Chapter II, morality must be both personal and extrapersonal, 
immanent and transcendent, subjective and objective. ~he difficulty 
of hitting upon a satisfactory explanation of morality resides in the 
difficulty 9f adequately capturing both aspeqts of morality in one 
I 
concept. We account for order and lose the immediacy of personal 
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intuition. We enthrone intuition and lose the power of stability and 
discrimination afforded by order. In short, the most revealing aspect 
of the dual demand of morality for both intuition and order is that the 
two are, at best, ambiguously related. Order seems to be an intuitive 
moral concept; yet, in many ways, individual intuition and order seem 
antagonistic. To rely upon individual intuition to decide moral 
problems seems to be to step out of an already "given" order. To rely-
upon a system or an order to decide moral questions seems to be to dis-
regard, in advance, the importance of moral feelings and intuitions. 
How is it possible for these two to function together? What does 
the existence of these contraries at the very heart of morality reveal 
about the nature of morality? First, let us examine in detail the 
implications of both moral intuition and moral order to determine their 
relative importance and the manner in which.they interact, We will 
begin with the possible meanings of intuition, since, in one obvious 
respect, intuition is prior to the concept of order. 
Three Possible Meanings of Intuition 
There seem to be three basic possible interpretations of the 
phenomenon of moral intuition. The first two are variations on a 
psychological theme.· One stresses the importance of individual desires 
and ways of seeing; the other stresses sociological pressures on the 
individual. The third possibility stresses the experience of the 
self-evidence of subjectivity as the standard of objective reality. 
My purpose in comparing the th;ree is not to determine which interpreta-
tion is the correct one, it is rather to determine the logic of the 
word "intuition" and to see how the word must be understood if the 
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concept of morality is to survive a.s a distinctive and meaningful 
experience. 
It is always possible that intuition is a psychological trick 
human beings play on themselves. A person may want something to be the 
case so intensely that he envisions that desire as a type of external 
commandment rather than as a personal whim. Desire may even be so 
strong that he detects confirmation of the truth of the externality 
of the commandment in sources outside his own interior states. It 
seems as though the feeling could not be merely subjective whim or 
preference because it is so strongly felt, and because the truth of 
the intuition seems to be confirmed in the world and in his experience, 
When someone makes the claim, "That could not be right!" or "Surely 
this must be good!" he feels as though he were claiming something 
about the way the world is and must be; not something about the way he 
is. For the person who intuits the truth of such claims, they could 
not be reduced to "I want that not to be right!" or "I strongly desire 
that this be good!" However, if intuition is only a strongly felt 
interior state which we project upon the world, these two sets of 
claims are actually identical. This is the position taken by A. J. 
1 
Ayer and other moral emotivists. 
The second possibility is that the socialization process is so 
strong and complete that when individuals claim to have an "intuition" 
or to "know" right from wrong, what is actually occurring is something 
similar to that described above. In this case, however, the individual 
and his desires, likes and dislikes are not so much personal idio-
syncracies as social ones. The moral tastes of the individual (except 
in rare cases of complete social anomaly) are completely formed by the 
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interiorization of social norms. Once these norms have been interior-
ized, they are then projected outward -- coloring not only the way an 
individual sees his own society, but the way he sees the world in 
general. In this case, the claim "That cannot be right!" is equivalent 
to "I don't want that to be right because my society has so molded my 
desires." In this second case, the "felt" experience of intuition is 
identical to the "felt" experience of the man who confuses strong 
personal preference with what must, in fact, be so. This is essentially 
the position of Edward Westermarck and other social relativists. 
What is striking in both of these interpretations of intuition is 
that a person confron_ted with the required translations of his 
experiences would probably be reluctant to accept them and, if really 
convinced that these translations were adequate, he would probably be 
unable to regardhis former experiences of "intuition" in the same 
compelling moral light. "Intuition" would inevitably lose intensity 
and urgency. 
There is, however, a further problem involved in the second 
interpretation of intuition: What causes a society to adopt just 
these, and no other social norms? It could be the general agreement 
of personal preference, as the customary moralists, such as 
Westermarck, delineate it. It could be the most effective means of 
peaceful survival, as the social contract theorists variously outline 
it. Or, it could be that social norms are themselves based upon a 
type of "social" intuition. 
In the first two explanations, intuition as social enculturation 
is still fundamentally illusory. The special emotional fervor which 
has come to be attached to the "moral" actions explained by either of 
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these two theses is neither organically nor logically attached to the 
explanations themselves. Moral feelings are merely •:tacked on" to the 
fundamental meaning of social norms. It is only in the third explana-
tion that the emotion seems appropriate to its cause. If it is the 
case that social norms are the products of moral intui-tion, it is 
possible for individual moral intuitions to correlate exactly with 
social norms and still not violate the "meaning" of intuition. The 
agreement between social norms and individual intuitions would be 
based on a similar perception of identical data and not on the confusion 
of two different phenomena (i.e. the confusion of personal desires or 
social enculturation with the objectively and transcendently "true" or 
"good") • 
This leads us to the third possibility of the origination of 
intuition. It could be that intuition represents the ability on the 
part of an individual to be "grasped" by the "Truth" and a corresponding 
ability on the part of "Truth" to "grasp" individuals. This possibil-
ity suggests the meeting of the immanent and the transcendent spoken of 
2 
in Chapter II. It is, it seems, this third possibility which most 
people have in mind (with varying degrees of clarity) when they claim 
to have had an intuition. 
It is a prominent feature of the criticism aimed at many ethical 
codes that they somehow or other violate this "intuitive sense." 
Further, this manner of criticism is widely accepted as a legitimate 
procedural method. The charge is raised against both Kantian absolutism 
and Utilitarian relativism. As a method of deciding between alternative 
moral codes, or alternative actions in specific situations, "intuition" 
is too well used to be ignored. Moral choices often depend primarily 
upon what "feels" right. But, moral intuition should not be so 
frequently invoked in ignorance of its possible meanings and the 
implications of those meanings. 
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Regardless of whether or not any specific case of intuition is a 
case of being grasped by, or grasping the "Truth," that it is such a 
case is what people imply by claiming to have an intuition. That is 
the only alternative among the possibilities discussed which makes 
sense as a defense for or an argument against a piece of moral reason-
ing. It is not a reasonable argument to claim that a piece of moral 
reasoning is true or false because it is aligned with or in opposition 
to our own preference -- regardless of whether those preferences are 
the result of personal idiosyncracy or enculturation. Such a claim is 
not so much a reason as it is a refusal to give a reason. 
To involve a "moral" claim, a piece of reasoning has got to get 
back to some intuitive "ought." Morality can not be based on what men 
could do !!_ they desired some end or another. It must be based on 
what men should do and should desire. If we examine the meaning of 
morality as purely hypothetical, we discover that we cannot legitimately 
judge the ehds of a proposed action -- any end seems a legitimate 
candidate --we can only judge as to the effectiveness of the means. 
We could argue that the me.ans a person is using or wants to use would 
not get him the end he has in mind, but we could not argue that the 
end he proposes is unworthy or immoral. On what basis could such a 
claim be made, if not on the objective existence of some transcendent 
good? Our own peculiar preference? That of our societies? Morality 
here is translated into bigotry and suppression. 
In hypothetical morality, the necessary moral "ought" is reduced 
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to a matter of practical consideration on a level with the ought in-
valved in the statement: "If you want to reach the top shelf, you 
really 'ought' to use this stool.'' Morality primarily makes claims 
about the "goodness" of reaching the top shelf, not about the most 
effective means of reaching it. Means, of course, play a part in 
morality, and effective means are a legitimate concern for the 
moralist; but effectiveness is not the only consideration in a choice 
of means. Sometimes an effective means of attaining an end is ruled 
out, even though the end is a desirable one, for the simple reason 
that the means themselves would destroy the desirability of any goal 
obtained under their auspices. Further, the "goodness" of an end (as 
opposed to the effectiveness of a means) seems to be apprehensible only 
by way of intuition. An end is thought to be right or good simply 
because it presents itself to the subject as good and right. Thus it 
seems we can rule out any system of morality which does not include 
the trait of being based on a final, non-hypothetical, intuitive 
3 
''ought." Morality says something about what we ought to desire, 
not only something about what we ought to do ·to get that which we do 
desire. 
Further, it is clear that no "intuition" or "feeling" is a 
proper explanation for why one should or should not do something, un-
less that intuition is considered to be, in some way, an insight into 
the "Truth." The intuitive "ought" seems to be an integral part of 
morality; and it is not to be confused with the hypothetical oughL 
Morality requires that persons "feel" certain ways about the tasks and 
commitments undertaken in its name. Even though moralities which rely 
upon the hypothetical ought account for the presence of strong feelings, 
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the account they give is incommensurate with the feelings produced. 
Once a person has become aware of the "true" foundation of his feelings, 
the only way such feelings could continue to be attached to such "moral" 
conceptions is if the person with such feelings either is curiously 
deluded by his own motivations; or if, though he knows better, he can-
not resist the pull of such feelings and continually finds himself 
subconsciously endowing "morality" with a status which he has conscious-
4 ly renounced. 
Once again, this is not intended so much to b~ing forth a claim 
about the origination of morality, as it is intended to describe what 
is irresistably true about the "felt" moral experience. Insofar as 
ethical relativists do make claims about the origins of morality, and 
infer from those claims that morality is only what those origins 
imply, they commit the genetic fallacy. While it may be true that 
the origination of morality is one of the relativistic sources dis-
cussed, such origination says nothing about the truth or falsity of 
the transcendent status of morality. Further, morality, as a felt 
experience, cannot be understood or believed to be equal to personal 
preference or pleasure-- either our own, or that of past generations; 
our private, or the conglomeration of private. Nor can we reduce 
morality to the mere struggle for survival unless we are willing to 
grant that struggle the moral "ought." Morality can not be reduced 
either to preference or practicality without losing the special feeling 
which marks off moral considerations from other considerations and 
lends morality its special urgency and demand. 
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Intuition as Insight into Truth 
Regardless of the direction in which we turn in our efforts to 
comprehend the moral experience, we are confronted with individual moral 
intuition. In order to qualify as a moral stance, a position must be 
based on a direct, personal intuition of the inherent goodness or 
"badness" of an act, an attitude, or an end. A moral intuition, like 
any other intuition is a type of "feeling." But what kind of "feeling" 
is it? Is it purely subjective? Normally, feelings are apprehended 
subjectively and are aimed at subjective experience. They indicate a 
"felt" interior state, and as such, do not necessarily reflect any 
exterior state. However, as we have already seen, interpretations of 
intuition which make it purely subjective cannot account for intuition 
as a reason for moral action without destroying the personal sig-
nificance which moral actions have for us. It is only insofar as all 
feelings are experienced subjectively that moral intuition is also 
subjective. Insofar as moral intuitions are thought to reflect 
transcendent truth, they surpass mere subjectivity. There are feel-
ings, and then there are "Feelings." We have already examined the 
dangers of allowing mere subjective feelings to dominate one's atti-
tudes and relationships in the world. When the unrepressed expression 
of feelings and desires becomes an individual's over-riding concern, 
the result may ba_ far from "moral." 
A moral intuition (unlike pure subjective feeling) carries with 
it the concept of duty, It cannot only be that you want to do some-
thing and want to do it very badly. It must be that you feel you 
ought to want something (whether or not you do) and feel it very 
strongly. Moral intuition cannot be completely equated with disposition, 
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whim, desire, need, or any other of the usual categories used to 
delineate subjective experience. It could be likened more to a call or 
an invitation than to either the conformity to rules suggested by some 
moral theories, or the indulgence of desires and emotions suggested by 
others. That such "calls" or "invitations" are possible and do happen 
is what is indicated by the use of moral intuition as a criterion for 
moral action. Moral argumentation reveals the concept of intuition as 
central in making sense of morality. 
However, what possible method is there for distinguishing cases 
of actual intuition from cases of intense personal feeling, social 
enculturation, or perhaps yet other "feelings" which might mistakenly 
be labeled intuition? Perhaps the frustratingly inadequate answer is 
that it is impossible to establish a method apart from the actual 
experience of intuition. This answer begs the question insofar as it 
is not possible to use the experience of intuition as a measuring stick 
of the validity of any questionable 'intuition since it is the experience 
of intuition which is itself in question. Intuition must be a self-
validating experience and as such always contains the possibility of 
deception. Moral intuitions can be more or less clearly perceived, 
but there always remains a nagging doubt about their authenticity. 
When individual intuition happens to coincide with social custom, 
majority opinion, or legal or religious codes; fears are lulled by the 
comfort of social support. But when intuition leads the individual 
away from such supports, then the self-doubt and anxiety reach their 
peak. Moral intuitions are often acted upon in fear and trembling. 
The object of moral intuition is moral "Truth." We have already 
seen the impossibility of possessing moral knowledge in the form of 
5 
indubitability, but knowledge and Truth are not synonymous here. 
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While it is true to say that to possess certain knowledge one must 
possess the truth of something, it is not conversely true to say that 
to possess "Truth" one must also possess certain knowledge. Knowledge 
is given in certainty; "Truth" may be given in doubt. As G. E. Moore 
says, we can understand the difference between our thinking something 
true and its actually being true, 6 Knowledge is socially verifiable. 
"Truth" (in the form of intuition at least) is given individually and 
cannot be verified socially. The burden of intuitive "Truth" falls 
to the ·individual in the depths of confrontation with the self· and 
the world. Intuition focuses attention on the personal and individual 
recognition of duty rather than the social recognition of duty. 
In the interpretation of moral truth as intuition, conformity 
to rules and laws may act as a barrier which stands between individuals 
and morality. Law mediates between the individual and his intuitive 
perceptions of goodness, and may make him hesitant to act on his own 
intuitions, Rules act as the objectifying elements of morality, They 
turn the equation of moral truth and doubt into, the equation of moral 
knowledge and certainty. The security law offers is appealing, but 
it may be immoral if it is acquired at the e,xpense of truth, 
Moral intuition represents the position of the individual in 
direct, unmediated relationship with goodness. However, it is 
precisely because the intuitive approach to morality stands either 
prior to or outside of "form" that it is a dangerous project. Laws, 
rules, traditions, etc., give shape and guidance to personal ac~ions. 
Without them one is left in a dark void with only an inner voice to 
guide him. This voice is not always clear, and even if it is clearly 
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heard, one can never be sure that what he hears represents a true 
intuition (i.e., a true insight into the good). There is no sure way 
of disentangling a true intuition from that which merely appears to 
be an intuition. This notion of morality as intuitive has trouble 
when it.makes morality depend upon the presence of "true intuition" 
and then provides no clear and obvious way to determine true intuitions 
from false ones •. To establish such a clear and definite method would 
be to establish a rule or law, and this is just the thing the intuitive 
method rebels against. 
':.'\ny morality which bases the goodness of actions, thoughts and 
ways of being upon the feelings and intuitions of the person acting, 
thinking, and being; is also bound to have trouble delineating the 
guiding motivation of the morai agent amidst the tangled web of his 
emotions. When the only formulation of morality we can lean on to 
guide us is "Seek the good and avoid evil," and the only way we have to 
decipher what is good from what is evil is to consult our feelings and 
intuitions; it is dangerously easy to mistake our own motivations and 
7 hence to fail to do good. With law as ,our guide, our personal motiva-
tions may be in doubt, but the act itself (insofar as it is in con-
formity with the law) is secure. Without law, not only is the motiva-
tion behind the act in doubt, the very act itself is in doubt since 
the motivation (i.e. , the in tuition of goodness and our will to act on 
it) is the sole authority for the act. There is nothing against which 
to "check" our motivations and our intuitions. 
Thus, to seek this type of morality is to launch oneself on a sea 
of doubt and indefiniteness. It can be a profoundly disturbing and 
even compromising experience. This much was illustrated by Hans' 
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experiences on the Magic Mountain. There is such comfort in the clean, 
definiteness of uncompromising rules. There is such reassurance in the 
assurance of conformity to "the Good." Man seems to have a real need 
to grasp "Truth" with certainty rather than to have it always maddening-
ly elude him. A man likes to know \vhere he stands. 
As soon as intuition is examined, it forces itself upon us as 
the basis of the felt exp~rience of morality. It alone can provide for 
the possibility of a transcendent morality whose demands are binding 
yet at the same time, non-coercive and completely individual. For 
instance, intuition makes it possible to take circumstances into 
consideration without altering the absolute demand to act "well." The 
goodness of an act can depend on circumstances without becoming any 
less transcendent. Intuition further accounts for the importance of 
feelings without making morality lose the status of duty. The necessary 
distance between what I want and what I ought to want remains present 
without being debased into exterior constraint. What is intuited is 
the duty to act and "be" in certain ways. The duty of the moral 
person is to strive to align his natural desires and tendencies with 
those which he feels he should have, in addition to acting in accordance 
with intuited demands. 
By and large, as is evident from the above comments, this notion 
of internal restraint depends upon a prior notion of man as divided. 
In most cases, men both want and do not want to act in accordance with 
what they perceive to be moral. Human feelings are, in that sense, 
ambiguous. 
II 
As Soren Kierkegaard explains in Purity of Heart is to Will 
One Thing: 
••. when the person who desires is himself the obstacle that 
keeps himself from getting his desire fulfilled, not by 
giving it up, for then he would be at one with himself, but 
both by not willing and yet by willing to continue to desire: 
then the doublemindedness is clear .•.. 8 
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The moral battle is waged within a man, and the constraint sig-
nified by duty is not external but internal. It is thus that a man is 
both free and obligated. He is free because ho outside force decides 
his moral attitudes and actions; he is obligated because the intuition 
.to which he responds is felt to transcend his own feelings and needs, 
and also because the duty he intuits is not the only feeling or emo-
tional pull he feels. We have already noted in Chapter II that the 
very meaning of duty depends upon the notion of constraint. If a 
man's desires pointed in one direction only, then morality would never 
enter his world. It would not matter whether the whole of his desires 
were aimed at the good or whether they were aimed at what is evil; in 
either case the notion of morality is superfluous, for such a single-
minded being could not conceive of "duty." 
Strangely enough, the moral stance turns upon an odd mixture of 
desire and reluctance. In most men, t~e moral feeling seems to 
vascillate between a desire to fulfill oneself by striving towards some 
ideal state of existence, and a reluctance to take upon oneself the 
discipline and sacrifice involved in such a program. It is not so much 
"desire vs. will" (as Kant outlined it) as "desire vs. desire." It is 
the acknowledgment of transcendence and appropriateness·which gives (or 
ought to give) one desire precedence over another. Even when a man 
chooses the less worthy of two desires, he may do it while acknowledging 
the superior moral status of the unchosen desire. This acknowledgment 
takes the form of a guilty conscience. 
The morally ideal creature "wills one thing." He wants to do what 
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he should do, and feels no tension between these things. Here, con-
straint is not applicable; such a person is beyond "law" and "duty." 
The coincidence of duty and desire signifies the achievement of the 
ultimate moral end of "being" moral rather than merely "acting"·morally. 
It is, as Hermann Hesse puts it, a life "unconditioned" by.anything 
outside itself. 9 Thus, such a life would be, at the same time, fully 
expressive of the individual and fully reflective of the transcendent. 
The moral feeling we have been attempting to describe finds its 
model in the ideal concept of a transcendent being who is fully good, 
fully free, and fully individual; and who is accessible through "moral 
intuition." Moral intuition does not stand against desire as a 
general category; it recognizes "moral desire" as a very real desire, 
while at the same time acknowledging that not all desires are equally 
moral. Without the category of moral intuition (that is, a category 
of feelings which are set off from other feelings by their transcen-
dent character) there would be no basis on which to choose between 
conflicting desires except by weighing the comparative strengths of 
the desires. 
This, then, is an ethic of personal growth, but the growth is 
directed toward a transcendent reality which gives it an "appropriate-
ness" it would otherwise lack. Growth which is merely "chosen" always 
retains a suggestion of arbitrariness. This is essentially the creative 
morality espoused by Berdyaev. The goal of morality is to grow in some 
uniquely individual, yet ideal way. The ultimate aim is to become 
whole, and wholly authentic; to integrate all thoughts and actions; to 
order oneself appropriately and in accordance with a transcendently 
"good" realm of being. The ethic of individual intuition is the "duty" 
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to become some particular being whose actions, thoughts, and feelings 
all flow from one source -- willingness to do the good, and to "be" 
good. 
That is the ideal. Unfortunately, men's moral lives are ambiguous. 
They both will and don't will to do the good. Their desires are 
ambiguous. The duty of the man seeking morality is to attempt to work 
through this ambiguity as best he can. He must examine his conscience 
and his will in an attempt to clarify his feelings and motivations. 
However, as Kant indicates, this is never completely possible: 
... in fact even the strictest examination can never lead us 
entirely behind the secret incentives, for, when moral 
worth is in question, it is not a matter of actions which 
one sees but of their inner principles which one does not 
see. 10 
Search as we might, we never uncover our motivations as clear, unam-
biguous and definite. 
It is within the unavoidable complexity and ambiguity of our 
motivations that the compromising danger of individual mcral intuition 
lies. Not only is reliance on personal intuition and conscience a lure 
to do the good; it may be a lure to do evil as well. It is a lure to 
misapprehension, deception and bad faith. You may recall W. T. Stace's 
indictment of it: 
But to allow my mind to be in this way, entangled in the end-
less ramifications of future circumstances, in the maze of 
all possible, probable, or improbable consequences -- this 
is a profoundly dangerous proceeding. It is so fatally 
easy to twist such considerations into an excuse for doing 
what I want, a justification of myself for deviating from 
the straight and narrow path. 11 
Substitute the word "motivations" for the word "consequences" and the 
perils of the intuitive sensibility stand revealed. 
162 
The Morality of Order 
In The Symbolism of Evil, Paul Ricoeur identifies four mythical 
types having to do with the origin and end of evil. "According to the 
first, which we call the drama of creation, the origin of evil is co-
extensive with the origin of things; it is the 'chaos' with which the 
12 
creative act of the god struggles." 
Chaos is the complete absence of order. It is the lack of 
defining boundaries. If chaos is essentially immoral (as our own 
investigation of moral theories has seemed to indicate) then morality 
must be essentially orderly. It is the god's struggle with chaos 
which introduces order into the world. If we draw this comparison a 
little further, it seems possible that the meaning and purpose of "law" 
is to introduce order into the chaotic realm of feelings and desires. 
Thus the importance of law is both social and personal. Chaos is 
possible on either level, and on either level it is seen as a menace. 
In this orderly interpretation of morality, it is the ambiguity and 
doublemindedness of men which threatens their moral being. Consequently, 
this morality seeks to avoid meddling in that which is ambiguous. This 
evasion includes avoidance of the ambiguity implicit in the intuitive 
approach to morality. 
If we contrast the order of nature and its laws with the freedom 
implied by man 1 s existence outside the· absolute control of instinct, we 
can perhaps envision moral law as the "giver of limitations" in the 
same sense that instinct guides animal behavior with a minimum of 
confusion. Without the moral law to guide them, men would be immersed 
in unclear and even contradictory feelings and emotions. One envisions 
such human existence as a maze through which men wander; or as a dense 
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fog in which men grope for stability. To be uncertain is to be in danger; 
it is to open up the realm of possible actions and responses in too vast 
a number. This much freedom is frightening, and men wish to escape from 
the burden of it. 
It is also immoral. Confusion is both foreboding and seductive. 
To give into confusion is to relax; to cease attempting to make dis-
tinctions; even to insist that distinctions cannot be so roughly and 
readily made. It is to "flow" and "feel." The physical metaphor of 
"wallowing" perhaps conveys something of this. It is indulgence; the 
thing to which Hans is so attracted and Settembrini so fears. 
Health, cleanliness, strength, clearheadedness, definiteness: 
these are the descriptions of morality implied by law. It is the 
intuitive identification of these qualities with morality which 
constitutes the orderly sensibility found in the ethical theorists 
discussed in Chapters III and IV. "Order" is a moral intuition. It is 
the insistence of the moral theorists on order and clarity which is in 
back of their insistence on defining morality in terms of formulae. 
How is definiteness to be achieved in moral action? Kant turns to the 
universalization formula. Rousseau appeals to the general will. Moore 
and Westermarck look to general social practices. 
Perhaps the great stress laid on tradition and custom in morality 
is explicable as a moral intuition when seen from the point of view of 
order. An orderly existence can be easily obtained by reliance on past 
customs and traditions to guide behavior. As W. B. Yeats points out in 
his poem "A Prayer for My Daughter," there is a calm beauty and 
innocence about such a traditional existence. The poem concludes on 
this wish: 
And may her bridegroom bring her to a house 
Where all's accustomed, ceremonious; 
For arrogance and hatred are the wares 
Peddled in the thoroughfares. 
How but in custom and in ceremony 
Are innocence and beauty born? 
Ceremony's a name for the rich horn, 13 
And custom for the spreading laurel tree. 
Tradition and custom are moral because they keep life within 
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bounds, stop it from being "messy," from floundering in the indefinite-
ness of human passions. They keep a man on.the surface of life, and 
out of the labyrinths of ambiguity. Gesture, ritual, manner, law, all 
are given a meaning and a definiteness. 
In contrast to the terms symbolic of orderly morality stand the 
terms symbolic of immorality: disease, defilement, confusion, 
ambiguity, indefiniteness. Paul Ricoeur claims that: "Dread of the 
impure and rites of purification are in the backgrounq of all our 
14 
feelings and all our behavior relating to fault." The physical 
symbols of "stain," of filth, and the messiness these imply are. carried 
onto the moral plane. "Cleanliness is next to Godliness." Ricoeur 
adds, "Perhaps there is no taboo in which there does not dwell some 
reverence, some veneration of order."15 
Chaos, filth, uncertainty, ambiguity, indefiniteness, disease--
are all interpenetrating symbols of a "slackness" which is a term of 
moral retribution. They stand in opposition to moral health which 
implies discipline, limitation, and clarity. The need for order goes 
beyond the social 'need for order. Individual morality also demands 
order. Without it, the individual is subject to chaos, "slackness," 
and the self-indulgence associated with immorality. 
The following examples of the opposition between health and 
disease, definiteness and indefiniteness, form and formlessness; and 
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their relationship to the opposite pairs, morality and immorality, may 
help clarify this point. 
In his work, The Romantic Rebellion, Sir Kenneth Clark quotes 
Goethe as having replied, when asked to explain the difference between 
classicism and romanticism: "Classicism is health, romanticism 
16 
disease." The associations here should be fairly evident. Classic 
art strives for balance, harmony and proportion. It is usually a 
static, idealized art. Romantic art portrays human emotions, or hopes 
to evoke them in its audience. It is a pulsing, active art, seemingly 
intent on breaking out of its confinement. It is, in brief, far more 
chaotic, emotional, and involved than is classic art. Classic art is 
the art of disciplined and assured expression. Romantic art is the art 
of the individual in rebellion. 17 Classic art is, in the above sense, 
more "social;" romantic art more'personal." Health, clarity and 
assurance are public possessions. They gain their bright reality from 
social agreement. What everyone "knows" or can understand must be 
clear and unambiguous. Disease, obscurity and perversity are individual 
possessions. They gain their uncertain and dark tone from truths 
discovered in solitude and silence. 
Another example of the symbolism of disease and health comes 
from Nietzsche's The Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche gives us an 
insight into a correlary and not totally unexpected thesis. For him, 
the healthy individual is ~oral. He is the one who does not ponder 
his motivations, but acts. There is in this immediacy a nobility and 
beauty which can only be described as a higher morality, or what 
18 
Nietzsche calls a "second innocence." This manner of looking at 
morality should not be unexpected since both it and the more ordinary 
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ideal of moral order aim at an innocence which flows from an avoidance 
of just the kind of soul-searching which was discussed in relationship 
to the intuitive sensibility. Classical moral theorists obtain this 
innocence by making duties clear and unproblematic. Nietzsche obtains 
it by emphasizing the innocence of immediate and unreflective response. 
Notice the air of questionable morality with which he imbues the 
scrupulous conscience: 
Among the priests everything becomes more dangerous, not 
cures and specifics alone but also arrogance, vindictive.:... 
ness, acumen, profligacy, love, the desire for power, 
disease. In all fairness it should be added, however, 
that only on this soil, the precarious soil of priestly 
existence, has man been able to develop into an interest-
i.ng creature; that only here has the human mind grown 
both profound and evil ••.• 19 
To dwell on your actions, to ponder your motivations, to strive 
to uncover your innermost feelings and to discover meaning and sig-
nificance in all things is unhealthy and dangerous. It is to lose 
oneself in endless and confusing ramifications. Better to cling to a 
clearcut, social morality. In that path lies duty and clarity. Or, 
one might, as Nietzsche seems to recommend, cling to the superficiality 
of amorality. Amorality, when it suggests the healthy and immediate 
expression o~ desires, discloses a new innocence. In either case, 
however, the refusal to contemplate the symbolism of personal action is 
evident. Our feelings and actions reveal the types of persons we are; 
but feelings and actions can be interpreted in various ways. It is the 
personal symbolism of actions which seems·to be the dangerous component 
of the intuitive sensibility. The two obvious ways of denuding actions 
of their symbolic, and thus of their dangerously ambiguous nature can 
be summed up thus: First, mora~ity can be converted into legality, 
whereby it is social and legal and has nothing to do with personal 
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growth, feelings, or emotions. Nothing is immoral, it is simply 
illegal. This reduces morality to an easy-to-use formula. One does 
not do certain things and it is fairly clear which things one ought to 
avoid by simply consulting the laws or the customs of one's society. 
There is no particular reason to delve into such messy and unsavoury 
issues as personal motivations. 
Second, the symbolic function of actions can be denied altogether. 
This "normalizes" actions and makes them harmless. They become only a 
surface phenomenon. There is nothing to get to the bottom of and so no 
need to seek out the underlying meanings of our actions. There are none. 
There is just innocent, wholesome and meaningless preference. It is the 
delving below the surface (so necessary to the intuitive sensibility) 
which leads to man's becoming, as Nietzsche says, "both profound and 
evil .... " 
Both of these denuding processes are prominent in moral theories. 
In the case of absolutism, morality is made definite by the use of 
formulae, codes, rules, etc. In the case of relativism, morality is 
mad.e impersonal and non-symbolic by its tendency to explain morality as 
a "natural" phenomenon rather than a "spiritual" one. However, even in 
the case of most relativist theori.es, a genuinely symbolic and moralis-
tic thru~t may be traced. It is the symbolic power of the search for 
order, clarity, and uninvolvement. 
The incarnation of evil is the un-nameab.le,. the uncategorizable, 
the indefinite and the ambiguous. A man can only "keep himself clean" 
and act rightly if he is given clear and distinct ideas about what 
constitutes right action. The "form" of morality gives that to him. 
Laws and rules stand as guides to right action. Inside those rules, 
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men find something concrete with which to deal. "Right" and "wrong" 
become accessible with the tool of law. Here there is no need to probe 
beneath the surface of acts to arrive at the motivating spirit of the 
agent. "Right" consists in an equivalence of the demands of law and the 
exterior compliance of the agent. Ideally, law is rather like a trans-
parency which can be laid on top of any situation in order to obtain an 
answer to the question, "What ought I to do?" 
The Inadequacy of Form 
However, "form" alone cannot adequately account for morality. Two 
intuitive beliefs weigh heavily against thispossibility. First, if 
"form" were the only requirement for morality,. then it would be a matter 
of complete indifference as to which "form" was taken up. Second, if 
"form" were the only requirement for morality then all of the moral 
decisions derived from the application of a particular "form" would be 
inevitably moral. Let us take up these difficulties one at a time. 
The first thing that strikes one in regard to the first difficulty 
is its counter-intuitiveness. It certainly seems to matter greatly 
which.form of laws we take up. The organization of life through law is 
not an end in itself (or should not be an end in itself). Rather, law 
is a particular method for achieving some end beyond mere "ordering." 
It is perhaps fairer to say that organization aims at a certain quality 
of life. We organize not simply to organize, but in the hope of 
achieving some goodness by the method of organization. 
It is easy to imagine (as has often been done in literature) 
highly organized societies which have for us the quality of nightmare. 20 
If order were in and of itself good, this would not be the case. It 
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might even be fair to say that there is a limit beyond which it no longer 
seems positively good to be organized even if the organization is aimed 
in the right direction. It may even be that too much organization is 
positively bad. 21 
This brings us to -two important observations. First, it appears 
self-evident that not all forms are equally acceptable. We can in fact 
imagine certain forms that we would intuitively reject as the basis of 
a possible "moral" order. Form alone is not enough. The specific con-
tent of the form is at least as important to morality as the form 
itself. Further, we have observed that "form" may have a point beyond 
which it may not go. "Form," in the wo.rld of morality, may have its 
own law of diminishing returns. There may be such a thing as being too 
orderly. 
Though the need for order may originate from a moral impulse; 
form for the sake of form has within itself the seeds of evil. In 
emphasizing "form" the content of the form may be forgotten or over-
looked. The "sp_irit" of the law may give way to the "letter." It was 
this trait which Christ had in mind when he condemned the Pharisees 
(those men who knew and observed the laws with such zealousness) saying: 
Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for you are 
like whitewashed tombs, which outwardly appear beautiful, 
but within they are full of dead men's bones and all un-
cleanness. So you also outwardly appear righteous to men, 
but within you are full of hypocrisy and iniquity. 22 
One of the seeds of evil which form contains is its tendency to 
emphasize the exterior at the expense of the interior. Rules and laws 
pertain to what appears to the eyes and not necessarily what appears in 
the truth of inwardness. An undue emphasis on form-- on rules, laws 
and customs -- has a tendency to descend to the level of mere hypocritical 
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show. A show made doubly immoral by its immorally harsh, unbending,· 
self-righteous and uncharitable attitude towards others. 
With this observation, we have shaded over into the second objec-
tion weighing against the identity of morality and order. Given a form 
of which the content seems generally to tend towards the good, experience 
shows that a rigorous application of the law tends toward immorality 
rather than toward a more complete morality. We have already discovered 
23 
this to be so in our examinations of Kant, Rousseau, and Moore. Moore 
even admits that we can expect a rigorous enforcement of law to result 
. b 24 .tn a uses. One might add that any form of morality, no matter how 
carefully, extensively and meticulously designed, would likewise face 
this problem of abuse. In essence, what this means is that no set of 
regulations, no formula of morality is~ itself adequate to describe 
the phenomenon of morality. This is not merely a descriptive claim 
about current moral theories, rather it is a claim in principle about 
any possible moral theory. 
Rules, laws, and formulas are by their nature, inflexible. They 
do not discern, they do not make fine and subtle distinctions; only 
beings sensitive to situations and desirous of doing good and acting 
well are able to do that. Moral actions stem from moral person$, and 
not from moral rules. If and when "form" becomes autonomous and 
absolute, it loses touch with the moral point of view. Thus, although 
"form" is an essential part of morality, it stands as a constant threat 
to morality. It is both a condition of morality and a barrier which 
stands between individuals and morality. 
Rules have a natural tendency to harden and become insensitive. 
They become a way, not of opening oneself up to moral feelings, but of 
171 
placing an obstacle between oneself and feeling -- a way of distancing 
and protecting oneself from feeling. Gabriel Marcel refers to a 
similar phenomenon in a slightly different context, but his words seem 
appropriate here: 
There is always the risk of the hardened, transmissible 
expression of the illumination growing over the illumination 
like a sort of shell and gradually taking its place. This 
is true at all levels, true where ever anything has been 
revealed, for instance about a work of art, a landscape, 
and so on •••. It is just as if the initial, living experience 
could survive only on condition of degrading itself to a 
certain extent, or rather shutting itself up in its own 
simulacrum; but this simulacrum which should only be there 
on sufferance, as a kind of locum tenens, is always 
threatening to free itself from its proper subordinate 
position and to claim a kind of independence to which it has 
no right; and the serious danger to which thought itself is 
exposed is that of starting off from the simulcrum, as an 
existing basis, instead of referring itself perpetually to 
that invisible and gradually less and less palpable presence, 
to indicate which (and to recall it to our memories) is the 
sole justification of the simulacrum's existence. 25 
Order, in the moral world, is just such a simulacrum as that of 
which Marcel speaks. It is the "hardened, transmissible expression" of 
the "illumination" which is the experience of an intuitive moral in-
sight. Behind every moral 'theory which attempts to schematize and 
regulate morality through the application of rules and principles there 
stands a more direct, if "less palpable presence" against which we 
measure the results of such applications. If any of the moral theorists 
we have looked at had been right in their interpretations of morality, 
then how could their formulas of morality ever fail to bring satisfactory 
results? It is only because men tend to measure the results of the 
applications of such things as the categorical imperative, majority 
opinion, or social custom against some vague, but nevertheless present, 
intuition of "true" morality that the results they produce are ever 
capable of offending us. 
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Moral intuition, as an insight into the transcendent realm of 
value stands behind any reasonable explanation of the moral experience 
that does not merely dismiss the experience as illusory. Without such 
a reference, morality either loses the "spec~al feeling" associated 
with morality and becomes. arbitrary or cautiously prudential; or else, 
it retains that "special" feeling only at the cost of losing contact 
with the necessary orderly quality of morality. When morality has 
become entirely subjective and personal, it has ceased to be morality. 
On the other hand, when morality has become entirely equated with a 
set of rules or a principle or principles which can be mechanically 
applied to situations almost as though men were machines and not men; 
when every moral feeling save the feeling for form has been eliminated, 
it is doubtful whether what is left over can be properly called 
morality. 
The Relationship between Intuition and Order 
When the form of morality solidifies and takes the place of the 
initial and vital intuition which it represents, and to which it ought 
to be subordinate, there is the danger that the initial intuition wil1 
be altogether forgotten and that the rules and laws, cut off from their 
informing source of meaning, will become dumb and intolerably repressive 
for the individual. Such is the case with traditional approaches to 
both absolute and relative morality. 
It is true of relative morality because it dismisses the notion 
of a transcendent morality which can stand as a limitation to indivi-
duals and is left only.with the understanding that morality, in order 
to exist at all, must take a shape and a form beyond the whims of 
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individuals. This inevitably tends toward a suppression of all that is 
unique or "different" in individuals. 
It is true of absolute morality because the form becomes of 
paramount importance. The laws, rules and regulations become the be 
all and the end all. They come to take the place of the vital relation~ 
ship between the individual and the transcendent realm of value, and 
crush the individual beneath their weight. 
How does this occur? Marcel explains: "It is just as if the 
initial, living experience could survive only on condition of degrading 
itself to a certain extent, or rather shutting itself up in its own 
26 
simulacrum ••.. " The shell of law, it seems, is a kind of protective 
covering over the vital and sensitive intuition. But why does intui-
tion need to protect itself, and from what is it protecting itself? 
The explanation of this leads us back to the dangers we have 
already uncovered in the intuitive sensibility. First of all, intui-
tion needs to be protected from self-deception, self-indulgence and 
h b f . . 1" 27 t e a uses o excess1ve emot1ona 1sm. It also needs protection from 
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the immensity of the moral project it carves out for itself. This 
latter problem arises from. the formlessness of the most basic of all 
moral intuitions, which amounts to the command that good should be done 
and evil avoided •. How is this to be accomplished? Here it is that law 
steps in to calm the anxiety of the one seeking to be moral. Paul 
Ricoeur further explains the relationship of law to the intuited demand 
to do good and avoid evil. 
This tension between the absolute, but formless, demand 
and the finite law, which breaks the demand into crumbs, 
is essential to the consciousness of sin: one cannot 
just feel oneself guilty in general, the law is a 
'pedagogue' which helps the penitent to determine how 
he is a sinner ••.. 29 
174 
TI1e demand of the transcendent on our lives is infinite. The 
command to act well, and in accordance with the good is likewise 
infinite. On the other hand, the law is finite. One has hope of ful-
filling the demands of law; there can be no hope of fulfilling infinite 
demands. By defining our duties and limiting them, law tells us how 
good may be done, and which things are·to be avoided. The stumbling 
block to this solution is that law, in the process of limiting and 
defining our duties deforms them. It deforms them by externalizing 
what should properly be internal; and by making finite what is properly 
infinite. However, to leave men without the guidance of the law is 
also dangerous. The experience of such formlessness, as we noted 
earlier, is. seen as the archetype of evil. 
The difficulty of describing morality such that it is at once 
clear, accurate and true to the actual experience of morality lies in 
the circumstance that, from man's point of view, "true morality" seems 
to consist of two incompatible things. True morality ought to be both 
fully'personal, issuing from an intensely subjective experience; and 
fully impersonal (by which is meant fully real outside any subjective 
experience of it). The difficulty of explaining the·interplay of these 
two traits without (practically speaking) emphasizing one feature at 
the expense of the other is the perennial difficulty of both descrip-
tive and prescriptive ethics. 
The law gives to duty the form men find necessary to their own 
well-being and to their belief in the exterior quality of morality. 
Law can be easily handled. It can be taught to others and passed down 
to coming generations. This is not the case with intuition. Men can 
pass down the "formula" or shape their intuitions take, but'not the 
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intuitions themselves. The original intuition which gives law its 
meaningfulness must be discovered and rediscovered by single individuals. 
What this indicates is just what Marcel pointed out in the passage 
. 30 
quoted earlier. The survival of the original intuition seems to 
depend, as Marcel claims, on its perverting itself by fastening around 
its tender and ephemeral heart the hard shell of law. Even Nicolas 
Berdyaev admits: "But in actual life it is difficult to break through 
to this youth of spirit. Most of our moral actions and judgments do 
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not come from that primary source." 
Intuition is a necessary and vital part of morality. But intui-
tion must be protected from formlessness. Without the covering of law, 
intuitions cannot long survive in their pristine state -- however, they 
cannot survive in that state with the law either. Ambiguously enough, 
absolutist theories may well become suppressive and dumb by doing what 
they feel they must to keep moral intuitions alive and well -- pervert 
them. In actual moral practice, a perfect balance of these two is 
simply not possible. A man can never be satisfied that his intuitions 
are infallible or that they truly reflect what they seem to reflect. 
Neither can he rely on rules, laws, and formulas to always and 
adequately reflect what ought to be. Since neither is adequate by 
itself; the combination of the two is even more problematic. When 
ought one to rely on his intuitions and disregard the rules? When 
ought the opposite be done? These are the questions which beset the 
individual intent on making his life a moral one. However, these are 
the very questions which are answered, if at all, so unsatisfactorily 
by moral writers. The questions themselves are ~ot 'fashioned for a 
general reply. It is up to the individual to decide which of the two 
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paths Hans Castorp outlines for us is his proper path. It may well be 
that not every man could or should take the same path. Maybe it is well 
for the health of morality that not all men do take the same path. 
For the morality of a society to remain alive and vital some of 
the exuberance, the willingness to take a risk, and the passion of the 
intuitive sensibility is necessary. So is it also necessary that 
social morality have access to a stable and definite set of values by 
which individuals can measure what ought to be done. Within the wider 
social realm the two sensibilities (though finally irreconcilable) 
should at least respect each other and know that the other is a 
necessary watchdog against excesses. 
Within the individual the conflict is not so easily dismissed. 
No attempt at explanation could ever do justice to the proper balancing 
of the intuitive and the orderly. Balance, here cannot be a mechanical 
seeking-of the middle of the road. It seems inevitable that one of the 
two sensibilities prevail within the heart and mind of an individual; 
but whichever path the individual chooses he must choose it because of 
its perceived appropriateness, and he must remain aware that both paths 
are fraught with dangers for the unwary. 
A world directed only by personal feelings would be a world 
experienced as "slack" and indulgent. A world directed only by 
exterior compulsion would be intolerable. Somehow, which ever path is 
taken, "intuition ... and "order" must be combined to create a morally 
comprehensible world in which men are both "free" and "duty-bound." 
Such a world can only be accounted for by combining order and intuition 
in an attempt to reflect a transcendent good·. In his work, The Revolt 
of the Masses, Ortega y Gasset describes the danger of a world in 
which such a combination is not possible: 
Human life, by its very nature, has to be dedicated to 
something, an enterprise glorious or humble, a destiny 
illustrious or trivial. We are faced with a condition, 
strange but inexorable, involved in our very existence. 
On the one hand to live is something which each one does 
of himself and for himself. On the other hand, if that 
life of mine, which only concerns myself is not directed 
by me towards something, it will be disjointed, la.cking 
in tension and in "form." In these years we are 
witnessing the gigantic spectacle of innumerable lives 
wandering about lost in their own labyrinths, through 
not having anything to which to give themselves. All 32 
imperatives, all commands, are in a state of suspension. 
Some Conclusions about Morality 
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By now it should be clearer why it is so difficult to be clear 
about morality. Morality is (from our standpoint in the world) 
internally ambiguous. It is not simply that men have spoken ambiguously 
about it; morality itself defies clear and definite conception. In 
fact, to present morality as clear and definite is to misapprehend its 
nature. 
The moral experience involves the subjective apprehension of an 
(apparently) objective and transcendent moral order which appears to 
be both significant and appropriate. The absence of any of these 
attributes (subjectivity, objectivity, transcendence, order, 
significance, and appropriateness) leads to a distortion of the moral 
experience. If morality is distorted in the direction of subjectivity 
it is in danger of becoming solipsistic and losing contact with the 
necessary "hardness" of an objective, transcendent order. Morality 
becomes messy, obscure, indefinite, self-indulgent, and loses contact 
with the necessarily objective pole of the experience of "duty" when it 
is centered entirely in subjectivity. 
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If morality is distorted in the direction of objectivity it 
encounters the "stone wall" syndrome spoken of earlier. Without proper 
attention paid to the subjective experience of the individual, morality 
becomes merely an exterior imposition and the experience of duty and 
obligation lose their moral tone and become examples of force and 
suppression. Morality must be a freely made, interior recognition on 
the part of the individual or the unique tone of morality cannot be 
maintained. 
The necessity of transcendence is found in the sought for 
balance between objectivity and subjectivity. If the objective pole of 
morality is located either too near us or too far away (as seen, in 
objective relativism, morality is totally immanent and practical; or, 
in certain species of religious absolutism, morality is located in a 
being Who is totally transcendent and Whose commands may be totally 
inscrutable) the individual's experience of morality becomes illusory. 
In both cases men's experiences of morality have nothing to do with 
what is actually happening. In the first case men experience as 
transcendent that which is actually immanent; and they experience as 
"duty" that which is actually given as "necessary" in the world. In 
the second case, men have experiences -- feelings and intuitions 
which seem to make the good directly accessible to them when in fact, 
their subjective experiences have nothing to say about what ought to be 
done. 
If objectivity and subjectivity do not truly meet in the 
transcendence of the moral experience then that experience is illusory 
and should be ignored or put away. However, the transcendent aspect of 
moral experience is tenacious (as we have seen) and consists in the 
179 
perception of an accord between what is transcendently true and what 
is subjectively and immanently experienced as true. Transcendence is 
ambiguous in that we feel compelled by our experiences to posit its 
existence as a reality outside our subjective experience, yet we know 
of its existence only through our subjective experience of it. This 
leads to the dilemma of attempting to reject (in the case of both types 
of relativism) what we cannot reject; or, attempting to accept (in the 
case of transcendent absolutism) what we cannot in good faith accept 
absolutely. The orderly sensibility cannot, in good faith, accept the 
absolute exteriority of moral law nor the mandate of no exceptions to 
moral law. The intuitive sensibility cannot, in good faith, reject 
every externally imposed constraint in favor of equivocal moral feelings 
and intuitions. 
The need for order may become so unbalanced that it loses 
contact with the need for morality to.be personal, significant and 
appropriate. Order cannot be for its own sake but must be for the 
sake of something beyond mere order. And, whereas morality has got to 
be experienced as personally significant and appropriate, it cannot be 
thought that whatever appears to one as personally significant and 
appropriate must, for that reason, be significant and app~opriate. 
The two prominent features of morality, intuition and order 
constantly struggle for the upper hand. A perfect and infallible 
balance of the two cannot be found, and yet that is what morality 
seems to demand. 
Whichever sensibility dominates our moral life must be recognized 
as inadequate to explain morality. The intuitive sensibility can never 
be quite at ease with itself nor quite comprehend the desire to be 
180 
moral because it necessarily does an injustice to the real desire for 
order. It involves an often queasy and dizzying scrutiny of the self 
and its motivations which is essentially messy and ambiguous. The 
intuitive sensibility cannot but be aware of the dangers it courts and 
long for the security, the comfort, the simplicity and cleanliness of 
"order." 
The sensibility of order cannot quite rid itself of a nagging 
feeling of shallowness· and inadequacy. Just as morality is too hard 
to attain in the sensibility of intuition, it is too easy to be moral 
within the sensibility of order. Simple rule-abiding behavior cannot 
account for the complexities of the moral experience. Exterior 
compliance is not enough. 
At the same time each sensibility is attracted to the other, 
each haughtily feels itself superior to the other. The sensibility of 
intuition disdains the orderly sensibility as insensitive and com-
placent. The sensibility of order disdains the intuitive sensibility 
as self-indulgent and voluptuous. 
In reviewing the literature of morality, these two sensibilities 
can be seen in constant interplay. Neither sensibility can totally 
ignore the other, but neither can either sensibility (by its very 
nature) totally account for and satisfy men's longing for the other. 
Morality as personal obligation attempts to account for two 
poles (i.e. the transcendent and the immanent, the objective and the 
subjective) which cannot be balanced-- given man's limited viewpoint 
.and nature.. The two sensibilities, each of which tries to encompass 
the whole of the moral experience, fail to do so for similar reasons. 
It is impossible to adequately account for morality by reference to 
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either order alone or intuition alone. At the same time it is impossible 
to find an infallible compromise between the two. For these reasons 
morality remains and will always remain ambivalent, ambiguous, and to 
a certain degree, inexplicable. 
ENDNOTES 
1Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p. 107. The position of the 
moral emotivists can be summed up in Ayer's claim that: 
"The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds 
nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to some-
one, 'You acted wrongly in stealing that money.' I am 
not stating anything more than if I had simply said, 'You 
stole that money.' In adding that this action is wrong I 
am not making any further statement about it. I am simply 
evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had 
said, 'You stole that money,' in a peculiar tone of 
horror, or written it with the addition of some special 
exclamation marks." 
2see pp. 23-24 of this thesis. 
3This intuitive "ought" exists in every moral conception if only 
in such a general form as "I ought to do what my society says I ought 
to do," or "I ought to do what I feel is proper;" or even "I ought not 
to allow my society or my own feelings of appropriateness hinder my 
actions," etc. Without this final non-hypothetical ought the whole 
·concept of morality disintegrates, since morality rests on the 
ability to distinguish a "duty" in some .actions and not in others. 
4The incorrigibility of the moral response was illustrated earlier 
by using Edward Westermarck's seemingly contradictory claims that all 
moral duties are derived from subjective feelings (none having more 
"truth" value than others) and later claiming that nevertheless there 
are certain dispositions that men "ought" to have. 
5 
Knowledge is, by nature, someching which must be possessed in an 
indubitable way. If one "knows" that 2 + 2 = 4 it is expected that he 
could demonstrate this knowledge in a convincing manner. That 2 + 2 = 4 
is a "public fact." However, while it may be true that personal 
humility is good, that truth could never attain the status of impersonal 
indubitability. It could never be a "public fact," it must remain a 
personal belief which may be more or less clearly perceived. 
6Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 132. 
7Here again Hans Castorp's distinction between the path of danger 
and the path of safety comes into play. Though both paths have their 
own dangers the dangers of the path of intuition are more.immediately 
experienced by an individual seeking that path. He treads it carefully 
because of his apparent danger; whereas the path of order appears to 
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those who walk it as straight and sure, though, as we have seen, it 
is not as safe as it may appear. 
8 II 
Soren Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing, trans. 
Douglas V. Steere (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956), p. 80. 
9 Hess_e, Steppenwolf, p. 62. 
10 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 23. 
11 Stace, The Concept of Morals, pp. 114-115. 
12Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 172. 
13william Butler Yeats, "A Prayer for My Daughter," in The 
Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), 
stanza 10, lines 1-8. 
14Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, p. 25. 
15 Ibid., p. 43. 
16Kenneth Clark, The Romantic Rebellion (New York: Harper and 
Row, Publishers, 1973), p. 95. 
17 Ibid., p. 32. According to Kenneth Clark, " •.• totalitarian art 
must be a form of classicism: the State which is founded on order and 
subordination demands an art with a similar basis. Romantic painting, 
however popular, expresses the revolt of the individual." It is 
interesting to note that the classic is aligned with social repression, 
and with the calm and orderly; while the romantic is aligned with the 
individual, the emotional and the irrational. 
18 
Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, p. 224. 
19 
Ibid., p. 166. 
20 
Classic examples of such highly organized societies are found 
in Alduous Huxley's Brave New World and George Orwell's 1984. 
21There are several ways to illustrate the way in which too much 
organization may be positively bad. One way will be taken up in the 
discussion of the second difficulty involved in taking order to be 
necessary and sufficient for morality. Another pertinent illustration 
of this positive badness can be found in a short story written by 
Muriel Spark entitled "You Should Have Seen the Mess." 
In it the young heroine, Lorna, is so insistent upon order and 
cleanliness that her life is in danger of becoming totally sterile •. 
She cannot enjoy friendship, love, or even imaginative speculation 
since all of themappear to her as unpredictable, cluttered, messy and 
unorganized affairs. Muriel Spark, "You Should Have Seen the Mess," 
in Man and His Measure, ed. Francis Connolly (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and World, Inc., 1964), pp. 145-149. 
22 
Matt. 23: 27-28 (R.S.V.). 
23 Kant's rigorous application of the categorical imperative 
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renders him insensitive to certain claims upon his moral sympathies. 
The classic example of this blindness was discussed in Chapter III, 
pp. 41-42· Here Kant insists on telling the truth even when it will 
endanger the life of a friend. 
This trait of Kant's ethics can be found in any ethics which 
insists on the application of a rule, a law, or a more regardless of 
the consequence of such application. Rousseau falls into this category 
if interpreted to mean that the will of the people ought always to 
prevail. Such a reading (though dangerous due to the many ambiguities 
of Rousseau) is certainly indicated by Rousseau's statement that: 
"Besides, in any case, the people are masters, and may change even the 
best laws, for, if that body is ,disposed to l.nJure itself, who has a 
right to prevent it?" The Social Contract, p. 49. 
Moore falls into a similar moral dilemma when he admits, "In 
short, though we may be sure that there are cases where the rule should 
be broken, we can never know which those cases are, and ought, there-
fore, never to break it." Principia Ethica, p. 163. 
24 
See Moore's discussion in Principia Ethica, pp. 162-164. 
25 Marcel, The Mystery of Being, Vol. I, p. 66. 
26Ibid., 
27 Such abuses were illustrated earlier by several 
" characters; in particular Herr Wehsal and Frau Stohr. 
of this thesis. 
of Thomas Mann's 
.See pp. 123-129 
28 
Mynheer Peeperkorn illustrates the danger of trying to meet a 
too rigorous demand. See p. 136 of this thesis. 
29R, . 1.coeur, The Symbolism of Evil, p. 59. 
30 Marcel, The Mystery of Being, Vol. I, p. 66. The quotation from 
Marcel is found on p. 171 of this thesis. 
31 
Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, p. 142. 
32 L 
Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, trans. 
Anonymous (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1932), p. 141. 
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